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A study of early Vaiśeṣika

the teachings on perception

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Groningen 1990

Corrigenda

	read	for
p.1 l.24	practice	practise
p.6 l.6	cognition	cogniiton
p.9 n.36	Bhavya's	the Bhavya's
p.11 l.29	studies	stydies
p.19 n.26	*ātman*	*îman*
p.20 n.29	'being'	Being
p.42 l.3	*dbaṅ po thams cad pa'i śes pa*	*thams cad pa'i śes pa*
" "	*sarvendriya-*	*sarvendriẏa-*
p.42 l.19	properties	qualities
p.47 l.25	actions]"'.	actions"'.
p.48 l.31	principal	principle
p.72 l.21	while attentively fixing	attentively fix
p.72 l.21, 25	practice	practise
p.74 l.17	non-propositional	non-perceptual
p.75 l.12	"in regard to this there is no"	"in regard to this"
p.75 n.91	qualifiers',	qualifiers.
p.93 l.18	*Sāṃkhyakārikā*	*Sāṃkhyākārikā*
p.95 l.9	*Sāṃkhya-*	*Saṃkhyā-*

In chapter two, passim, read sūtras for sūtra's.

The translation of sentence 15 in chapter four (p.74 l.11–16) should be read as follows.

15. In regard to the arising of knowledge of (limited) universals, a mere undifferentiated seeing is the means of correct knowledge [known as] perception, and in regard to this there is no other further means of correct knowledge, because it is not a result.

It should be remarked that in view of the interpretation suggested for this sentence I am forced to translate *pratyakṣa* here as 'perception' rather than 'perceptual knowledge'.

Preface

It is thanks to fortunate circumstances, and the help of numerous people, that I have been able to carry out the research that resulted in the present thesis. Faculties of philosophy in the Netherlands as well as elsewhere generally pay scant attention to the study of Indian philosophy, and it is much to be regretted that the opinions of many philosophers on this subject seem to consist of no more than misinformed prejudices. I am therefore happy to say that the Groningen University faculty of philosophy broad-mindedly indulged my interests and allowed me to combine philosophy with indology. The work presented here, chiefly based on the study of primary sources in Sanskrit, is intended as a small contribution to our knowledge of a particular school of Indian philosophy, the Vaiśeṣika.

Apologies are perhaps due to philosophers who do not read Sanskrit for the philological nature of much of the commentary and annotations in chapters three and four. It must however be stressed that, considering the condition in which these texts have been transmitted to us, it would be foolhardy to try to interpret them without attempting to solve the often very considerable textual problems by the use of philological methods.

It is a pleasant duty to thank the many people who helped me in my work on the Vaiśeṣika and throughout my studies in Groningen. In the first place I would like to thank Dr. H.T. Bakker, my chief guide in the field of indology, who, since I first began the study of Sanskrit, has proved a most learned and patient teacher. Dr. Bakker first introduced me to the subject of the present thesis and has saved me from many serious errors in the course of his supervision of my work. As head of the Institute of Indian Studies, Dr. Bakker kindly allowed me the use of the (computer) facilities of the Institute over a lengthy period. For all this and for his help and support in countless other matters, I will always be deeply indebted to him.

Prof. T. Vetter (University of Leiden) took the trouble of reading through my work and made numerous suggestions and corrections, allowing me the benefit of his deep knowledge of Indian philosophy. I am extremely grateful to him for this and for his kind encouragement of my studies.

Dr. A. Vanderjagt very kindly agreed to be one of the supervisors of my work, and made numerous valuable suggestions. I am also much indebted to him for teaching me whatever I know about classical philosophy.

Until his retirement in december 1987 I had the privilege of studying Sanskrit and Hindi with Dr. R. Sarkar. I will always remain particularly grateful to him for introducing me to the beauties of Sanskrit classical poetry.

Prof. E.M. Barth showed great kindness and patience to a student with most eccentric interests during the period that I studied analytic philosophy and logic with her. I hope that she will be able to find something of interest in these pages.

I have benefited much from numerous conversations with Mr. R. Adriaensen

and Mr. R. Barkhuis, who were always willing to discuss the problems presented by the Sanskrit texts. These two, together with Mr. F. Velthuis and Mr. S. Yoshikawa, also gave me much needed help with the technical problems of producing this thesis with the LaTeX typesetting program.

Prof. M. Hara (University of Tōkyō) very kindly sent me photocopies of two important Japanese articles. My mother, Mrs. H.S. Isaacson, gave me invaluable help in collecting other Japanese articles and in reading Chinese and Japanese material.

To all the above I express my sincere thanks. The mistakes and imperfections that, as I realize, remain, are solely due to my own limitations.

प्रियन्तां गुरवः ॥

Harunaga Isaacson

Contents

Chapter One

Introduction

The aim of this thesis was to study the theory of perception in the early Vaiśeṣika, one of the classical schools of Indian philosophy. The main primary sources employed were the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* (VS) and the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* (PDhS),[1] together with their commentaries. The approach has been chiefly historical and philological; it was never my intention to indulge in 'comparative philosophy' or to argue the relevance of Vaiśeṣika standpoints for modern philosophers.

This introductory chapter will provide some general background on the Vaiśeṣika and on the problems involved in the study of particularly the early period of this school. A brief survey is also given of some important recent scholarly work on this subject.

Chapter two presents a translation of the main sections relevant to the theory of perception in the VS and of the commentary by Candrānanda on these sections. Chapter three contains a detailed commentary on the same passages, dealing with problems both of text and of interpretation. In addition to the existing Sanskrit commentaries on the VS, use has been made of testimonia and related material which have been collected from other philosophical texts. Attempts have been made to distinguish the historical levels in the VS passages discussed, and thus to arrive at a tentative reconstruction of the evolution of the Vaiśeṣika theory of perception during the earliest period.

Chapter four presents a text and annotated translation of the section on perception in the PDhS, the work which eventually replaced the VS, in practise if not in theory, as the standard work of the school.

The VS quotations found in the *Vyomavatī*, a commentary on the PDhS, have been collected in an appendix, as a small contribution towards the task of identifying all the testimonia for the text of the VS.

Before coming to grips with the texts themselves, I will attempt to provide some background for those unfamiliar with the Vaiśeṣika and with Indian phi-

[1] For abbreviations and details of the editions of Sanskrit sources see the bibliography. Unless otherwise stated, all references to the VS are to the text as commented on by Candrānanda.

losophy, to render the main body of this work a little less forbidding. A few of the basic concepts and presuppositions of the Vaiśeṣika are introduced in the following section.

Some philosophical concepts of the Vaiśeṣika

The remarks made here, far from complete, are intended as a conceptual rather than a historical introduction to the Vaiśeṣika. Occasionally I have tried to indicate some historical nuances, but in the main what follows describes the positions of the classical system, i.e. as described by Praśastapāda. In general, only the points which have some more or less direct relevance for the theory of perception and which are referred to frequently in the main body of this work have been mentioned. For fuller surveys, which do more justice to the complexities of the Vaiśeṣika, I may refer the reader above all to the standard works by Frauwallner and Potter.[2]

The main concern of the Vaiśeṣika school is ontology. This may be said to be the most fundamental difference with the related school of the Nyāya, which is concerned primarily with the techniques of debate and with epistemology. The Vaiśeṣika represents the most thorough attempt in the history of Indian philosophy to analyse reality in a fixed system of ontological categories.

In classical Vaiśeṣika these categories are six in number: substance, quality, action, universal, individuator and inherence.[3] Phenomenal reality as perceived by us is, according to the Vaiśeṣika, built out of these categories.

Before saying something about each of these categories separately, something should be said in general about the world view which can be said to lie behind them. The Vaiśeṣikas are realists; their position is often called naive or direct realism. In view of some of the conclusions that the (later) Vaiśeṣikas are forced into as a consequence of their dogmas, one might feel inclined to speak rather of die-hard realism. The basic premiss is that there is a physical world which has independent existence; this world can be known and is exactly as we know it by means of perception and inference, cases of sensory illusion or malfunction and faulty reasoning excepted.

Even more fundamental as a philosophical principle than the division in categories is the conceptual distinction between properties (*dharma*) and property-possessors or substrata (*dharmin*) as essentially different entities.[4] Herein lies

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[2]Frauwallner 1956, 15-250, and Potter 1977 (especially Part I, p. 1-208). Frauwallner's work remains one of the most fundamental in the field, and is primarily historically oriented. Potter's volume contains a good introduction to the philosophical concepts of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, aimed at an audience of philosophers, but does not always distinguish sufficiently between the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika standpoints. Both of these are well suited for reading by non-specialists.

[3]There is reason to believe that in the earliest stages of the Vaiśeṣika only the first three of these were recognized as categories, cf. Frauwallner 1956, 115-118 and Narain 1976, 119-122. In the later Vaiśeṣika non-existence (*abhāva*) was added as a seventh category.

[4]The importance of this distinction for the Vaiśeṣika (and Nyāya) has been emphasized in

one of the most fundamental differences between the Vaiśeṣika (followed in this by the Nyāya) and other schools of Indian philosophy. The position of the Buddhist epistemological school, for example, may be roughly said to be that only *dharmas*, pure particulars (*svalakṣaṇas*), really exist, and that *dharmins* are only mental constructions.

Turning now to the categories, the first and most important is that of substance (*dravya*). Both the concept of substance and the details of the list of substances accepted by the Vaiśeṣika offer numerous complex problems which can not be treated here.[5] It is however necessary to say a little about the atomic theory for which the Vaiśeṣika is well known.

Already in the VS there are references to a theory of atoms,[6] but a full account is not found before the PDhS. The essentials of the theory may be stated as follows.

Four elements—earth, water, fire and air—exist both in the form of atoms (*aṇu* or *paramāṇu*), indivisible and imperceptible eternal particles, and in the form of compound substances consisting of combinations of atoms.[7] The latter are perceivable and are said to be large (i.e. to possess the quality largeness, *mahat*).[8] Compound substances consist basically out of atoms of one particular kind, although atoms of the other elements may be conjoined with them in small quantities. Such a whole is not merely an aggregate of its parts, but a new distinct entity, which exists simultaneously with and in the same spatial and temporal location as its atomic constituents. The atoms are said to be the inherence causes (*samavāyikāraṇa*) of the resulting compound substance, that is to say they are the material causes in which the whole inheres.[9]

A problem is obviously formed by the transition from indivisible and imperceptible partless parts, which may almost be likened to mathematical points,[10] to perceptible, large compound substances. This process is explained in the classical system as follows. First two atoms combine and produce what is technically called a dyad (*dvyaṇuka*). Though consisting of parts, a dyad is not perceptible and is considered to still be atomic in size. Three dyads then combine together

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particular by D.N. Shastri (D.N. Shastri 1976, p. 15-17 and 77-80).

[5]The concept of substance has been studied by W. Halbfass in two important articles (Halbfass 1976 and 1979). According to Halbfass (cf. Halbfas 1976 150ff) we should strictly and historically speaking distinguish between the notion of substance as *āśraya* (locus, substratum) and that of substance as *dharmin* (property-possessor, qualificand). For our present purpose it is not necessary to go into this distinction, especially since it is not explicitly drawn by classical Vaiśeṣika texts themselves.

[6]Especially in the fourth *adhyāya*; cf. the commentary on 4.1.6 and 4.1.7 in chapter three below. The origin of the atomic theory, however, probably does not actually lie in the Vaiśeṣika.

[7]On the theory of elements which underlies the atomic theory of the vaiśeṣika see especially Frauwallner 1956, 29-41.

[8]Note that 'large' is generally used in the Vaiśeṣika in contrast with 'atomic' (*aṇu*); everything that is not atomic in size is said to be large.

[9]For more on this complex theory and its consequences see e.g. Potter 1977, 74-83.

[10]Cf. Faddegon 1918, 13.

to produce a triad (*tryaṇuka* or *trasareṇu*), which is 'large' and the smallest perceptible compound substance. Two assumptions appear to underlie this theory. First of all the Vaiśeṣikas supposed that something which is perceptible must have parts which are themselves complex, and not atomic. Furthermore there seems to be an connection of the number three with the dimension 'largeness'.[11]

Aside from earth, water, fire and air, the Vaiśeṣika recognize five other kinds of substances: ether (*ākāśa*), time (*kāla*), space (*dik*), the self or soul (*ātman*) and the internal organ[12] (*manas*). With the exception of the internal organ all of these are all-pervadingly large, and may perhaps be called 'immaterial' substances. Ether is postulated as the substratum of the quality sound. As for the other items of this somewhat heterogeneous list the last two are of importance for the process of perception.

The *ātman* is the subject of our experience (knower) and the director of our actions (doer). It is fundamentally distinct from the body (which is chiefly made up out of earth atoms), and, like ether, space and time, is eternal. The proofs of the existence of the *ātman* formed an important topic, which is discussed at length already in the third chapter (*adhyāya*) of the VS. Relevant for the present subject is above all the function of the *ātman* as knower. It is the substratum in which the psychological qualities, including cognition, inhere.

The internal organ plays an important part in the explanation of all psychical processes. In the first place it acts as 'attention', or as a kind of secretary, as Potter has put it,[13] to the *ātman*. Cognitions (and other psychological qualities) arise in the *ātman* with the help of the internal organ. The *ātman* as subject is only aware of sense data when there is a contact between the internal organ and one of the sense organs.[14]

Let us turn now to the second category, that of quality. In the VS seventeen qualities are enumerated;[15] later writers add a further seven to these. As with the substances, the items of this list are widely divergent. Five qualities, colour, taste, smell, touch and sound, are particularly associated with five substances; respectively fire, water, earth, air and ether. Of these colour, as we shall see in the following chapters, is most important for the theory of perception.

Also included among the qualities are a number which can belong only to the *ātman* and which may be called psychological qualities. These are cognition (*buddhi*), pleasure (*sukha*), pain (*duḥkha*), desire (*icchā*), aversion (*dveṣa*) and effort or will (*prayatna*). What happens in the case of perception for example is merely that because of a certain contact—in the most usual case involving

[11] This idea could be associated with the fact that in Sanskrit the plural is used only for three or more objects, since the use of the dual is obligatory when speaking of two objects.

[12] Since the *manas* does not possess consciousness or any of the psychological qualities, but functions merely as an instrument of the *ātman*, it would be misleading to translate *manas* as 'mind', despite the etymological connection.

[13] Potter 1977, 93-94.

[14] For more on the internal organ cf. VS 3.2.1, translated and commented on in chapters two and three below.

[15] See VS 1.1.5.

the *ātman*, a sense organ, the internal organ and an object, although these are not all simultaneously in contact with each other—a particular cognition arises as a quality of the *ātman*. These psychological qualities can themselves be perceived—we are aware of our own pleasure and pain for example—and for such perceptions only a contact between the *ātman* and the internal organ is required.

Having mentioned the term contact (*sannikarṣa*) here, it is necessary to say that, as we shall see later, this word is used to cover a number of relations which may hold between entities of various kinds. Of these one is a quality, known as conjunction (*saṃyoga*). This is a relational quality which is shared by two substances when they touch each other. Qualities, however, can not be in conjunction with other entities, since conjunction is a quality and qualities belong only to substances. Therefore it was necessary to conceive the 'contact' between a substance and a quality (for example between the tongue and the quality 'taste' which it is capable of perceiving) in a different way.[16]

Little need be said here about the category of action. This category includes motion of various kinds and only occurs in substances. The perception of actions was never considered problematic in the Vaiśeṣika, and we shall see that relatively little is said about this subject.

The category of universals (*sāmānya*) is naturally an important one for the Vaiśeṣika, and formed the most frequent object of criticism for the 'nominalist' (or 'phenomenalist') Buddhist epistemological school. For the Vaiśeṣika universals are real and eternal; for their Buddhist opponents they are mental constructs which we superimpose upon the particulars which are the only objects of our perception. The ontological status of universals however, like that of the other two remaining categories, is not completely the same as that of the first three categories. To quote from an important article by W. Halbfass on this subject, '"universals" etc. can be said to be, insofar as they are genuine objects of knowledge; they are irreducible constituents, parts of the world; they are, however, not physically separable entities, nor metaphysically superior archetypal powers.'[17]

A term we shall frequently encounter is 'limited universals' (*sāmānyaviśeṣa*).[18] This word usually denotes the universals other than the highest and most general universal 'being' (*sattā* or *bhāva*).[19] Such universals can be either looked on from the point of view of their inclusive character—as for example the universal 'cowness' (*gotva*) is a common property to and includes all cows—or of

[16] This would in the most developed form of the theory be called 'inherence in the conjoined' (*saṃyuktasamavāya*); the taste inheres in a substance which is in conjunction with the tongue. This terminology was not however developed until after Praśastapāda.

[17] Halbfass 1975, 189. Cf. also Halbfass 1970, 143–145.

[18] Candramati in the DPŚ took the in some respects logical step of calling this a separate category, distinguished from *sāmānya*, the highest universal, and *viśeṣa*, the ultimate individuators. In this he was not however followed by any other Vaiśeṣikas known to us.

[19] There are however, as we shall see later, text passages where it seems that *sāmānyaviśeṣa* is meant to include even 'being'.

their exclusive character—cowness excludes all non-cows, and is in this respect a particularization of for example the universal 'earthness'.[20] This reflection may probably be traced to the VS.[21]

According to the Vaiśeṣika universals are perceptible by our senses, and play an important part in the perception of the categories substance, quality and action. When we have for example the perceptual cogniiton 'this is a cow', this is caused by the perception of the universal cowness which is a qualifier of the cow (a substance), which we are looking at. But one cannot fail to notice that we never have perceptual cognitions of the form 'this is cowness', so the theory was developed that our perception of universals is a non-propositional form of perception.[22]

The category of (ultimate) individuator (*(antya) viśeṣa*) is for our purposes of relatively little importance. Ultimate individuators occur in atoms and the other eternal substances. This category can plausibly be supposed to have grown out of the category of universals. Most universals have, as we just saw, both an inclusive and an exclusive character. The universal 'being' however is only inclusive; in analogy with this the (ultimate) individuators are only exclusive: that which distinguishes for example two atoms which are in every other possible respect alike.

The five categories enumerated so far can be called the building blocks of the Vaiśeṣika universe. But aside from these, there is one more requisite; the mortar which connects them. This is provided by the final category, inherence (*samavāya*). It is this which relates and binds together the other categories. For example, there are a number of properties which inhere in a substance such as a cow. Some of these are universals, such as the universal 'being' and the universals 'earthness' and 'cowness', while others are qualities, such as white, and actions. Further universals, 'qualityness', 'actionness' and others, are inherent in the qualities and actions of the cow.[23] It must be noted that inherence does not itself inhere in the other categories, and it is for this reason that it is not held to be perceptible by the Vaiśesika.[24] Nonetheless, the fact that we can know it (that is infer its existence) means, for the strictly realist Vaiśeṣikas, that it must exist as a real entity outside of us.

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[20] Cows of course consist primarily of earth atoms, and therefore possess the universal 'earthness' in common with e.g. horses or people.

[21] Cf. the somewhat controversial sūtra 1.2.3: *sāmānyaṃ viśeṣa iti buddhyapekṣam*; to use Frauwallner's pleasantly non-technical translation 'Gemeinsamkeit oder besonderheit, das hängt von der Auffassung ab' (Frauwallner 1956, 147). On the interpretation of this sūtra see especially Halbfass 1970, 144–145.

[22] We shall see that this theory is found in the PDhS, but probably not in the VS.

[23] Qualities and actions do not however have other qualities and actions inherent in them; cf. VS 1.1.15-16 and 8.8.

[24] For more on the problems concerning this category see—aside from the relevant sections in Potter 1977—the monograph by G. Patti (Patti 1955).

Problems of the study of early Vaiśeṣika

In this section some of the difficulties involved in any serious study of the early history of the Vaiśeṣika school, and some of the consequences that these problems have for the methodology involved, will be sketched.

The task of reconstructing the development and the early phases of the Vaiśeṣika is not dissimilar from that of solving a jigsaw puzzle of which all but a few pieces have been lost. The fundamental problem faced by anyone interested in the early period of the Vaiśeṣika is the lack of textual material. From the beginning of the system, presumably sometime before the start of the Christian era, to ca. A.D. 800 only three works have been preserved from what must have been a flourishing tradition with a large number of texts.

The oldest and most important of these is the VS, which always remained, in principle at least, the fundamental text of the Vaiśeṣika. It is impossible to give a precise date for the VS, and in any case, as we shall see, the text was subjected to numerous interpolations and changes, so that many sections are undoubtably of later date than the first redaction of the sūtras. For our purposes it is sufficient to say that the VS probably took on a form roughly resembling the text as known to us sometime within a century or so, either way, from the beginning of our era.[25]

Like the sūtra texts of other schools, the VS consists of a number of brief and often highly elliptical 'aphorisms', which present the basic tenets and arguments of the school in as concise a manner as is possible. In many cases the text is practically incomprehensible without a commentary, which would normally have been provided orally by a teacher.

The VS has been transmitted to us in a condition which is philologically extremely unsatisfactory.[26] As the theories of the Vaiśeṣika evolved, numerous changes were made to the VS, usually with the aim of bringing the text 'up to date' with the latest philosophical developments. These revisions took the form of both interpolations, of individual sūtras or of entire sections,[27] and alterations to already existing sūtras. In some cases such revisions of the VS have left sufficient traces to be relatively easily discerned, but there may be many more cases which have not yet been brought to light.

For a long period the only recension of the VS available was that embedded in a commentary by the fifteenth century scholar Śaṅkara Miśra (Ś), which was generally recognized to be very inadequate. Fortunately, during the last

[25] The earliest citations from the VS apparently date from the first century A.D.: see especially Ui 1962, 38-65.

[26] The most penetrating account of the textual difficulties surrounding the VS is to be found in Wezler 1982, 643-648. Cf. also Thakur 1963b.

[27] To give but one example which has frequently been pointed out, the text as commented on by Śaṅkara Miśra includes a sūtra not found in any other source (1.1.4 in his text) which enumerates the six categories of the classical Vaiśeṣika and proclaims that the knowledge of them leads to niḥśreyasa, i.e. liberation. This is certainly a late addition. Examples of whole sections or sūtras which have been introduced in the sūtras have been pointed out by A. Wezler among others (Wezler 1982; cf. also Wezler 1983, 56).

fifty years two older commentaries have been discovered and published, which both preserve a much better text of the sūtras and often give simpler and more convincing explanations than Ś. The older and in general superior of these commentaries (C) is by one Candrānanda, who should probably be dated before A.D. 1000.[28] The other is a work of the philosopher Bhaṭṭa Vādīndra, active at the Yādava court during the first half of the thirteenth century, which exists both in an abridged and an extended version. The abridged version (V) is extant up to the beginning of the ninth *adhyāya*, and the extended version (BhV) only up to the end of the second *adhyāya*.

In addition to these important commentaries, there exists an anonymous commentary on *adhyāyas* nine and ten of the VS, written at the end of the twelfth century in Bengal at the Sena court.[29] The commentary on the ninth *adhyāya* has been edited by A. Thakur,[30] but that on the tenth still remains unpublished.

Aside from these surviving commentaries, there were undoubtably a number of older commentaries which have been lost. Some fragments from such commentaries have been preserved in other works, but these usually do not provide much information. The only lost commentary of which we have a fairly large number of quotations and references is a *bhāṣya* by one Ātreya.[31]

Under the circumstances outlined above, it will be obvious that the interpretation of the VS is fraught with difficulties. The text of the sūtras found in the surviving commentaries differs greatly, and while Candrānanda's commentary may generally be regarded as the most reliable, there are also places where his text is less good than that of the other commentators. The interpretations of the sūtras given in the various commentaries also are highly divergent, and again, while Candrānanda's explanations are often simpler and better, they cannot always be regarded as faithfully representing the original meaning. But although the existing commentaries must of course always be taken into serious consideration, and may occasionally preserve ancient interpretations handed down in the school, they must always be used critically and with caution, in view of their relatively late date. No less than other Indian commentators, the commentators on the VS were obliged to trace the latest philosophical developments in their school back to the root text, often interpreting the sūtras as referring to theories and concepts which were not in fact developed until much later. There are some cases where it seems that none of the VS commentaries

[28] For a brief survey of the evidence with regard to Candrānanda's date cf. the introductory section in chapter two below.

[29] See Thakur 1965.

[30] In the *dvitīyaṃ pariśiṣṭam* of Thakur's edition of BhV.

[31] See Thakur 1947, Thakur 1969c, Pandeya 1953. The date of Ātreya has not been determined with any certainty, nor is it clear whether his commentary is the same as a *Rāvaṇabhāṣya* to which some references are known; cf. (in addition to the articles mentioned) Potter 1977, 337-338. On some other lost commentaries see also Thakur's introduction to Jambuvijayaji's edition of C, p. 10-16, and Matilal 1977, 60-62.

offers an acceptable interpretation of a sūtra.[32]

With so many uncertainties of text and interpretation, the study of the VS must proceed with extreme caution and must attempt to use every scrap of evidence that can be gleaned, not only from the sūtras themselves and the commentaries on them, but from any available source. This includes parallel texts and discussions of similar subjects in the texts of other schools,[33] quotations of sūtras or passages from lost commentaries and expositions of Vaiśeṣika theories by their philosophical opponents.[34]

A word or two could be said about this last point. There are a considerable number of works of various schools which criticize the Vaiśeṣika.[35] From the attention paid to the Vaiśeṣika in such texts, and the numerous references to lost Vaiśeṣika works, it is clear that at least until the end of the seventh century or so the Vaiśeṣika was an active participant in the lively philosophical debates on many important subjects, and was despite its close relationship with the Nyāya very much an independent force.[36] Much can be learned from the polemics found in such works, and though one must always be alert for possible misrepresentations of the Vaiśeṣika positions, the general impression is that such debates were carried out with a high degree of intellectual honesty.

Aside from the VS there are two other Vaiśeṣika works extant from the earlier period of the school. Of these, the short manual *Daśapadārthaśāstra* (DPŚ) or *Treatise on the ten categories*, by an author named Candramati or Maticandra is usually considered the older. The Sanskrit original of this text has been lost, but it has fortunately been preserved in a Chinese translation.[37] As may already be apparent from its name, this work represents a considerably devient form of the Vaiśeṣika, adding no less than four categories to the usual six. This work has been dated ca. 450-500 A.D. by Frauwallner,[38] who argues that Candramati probably preceded Praśastapāda. B.K. Matilal has however questioned this, pointing out some arguments which could support placing Praśastapāda before Candramati.[39] The evidence either way is very scanty, and the point cannot yet be convincingly decided.

The DPŚ provides us with a tantalising glimpse of the variety which must once have existed in the Vaiśeṣika system. It is inconceivable that it was the only work which proposed a different categoriology from the usually accepted

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[32] Cf. the discussions of VS 4.1.8 and 4.1.11 in chapter three.

[33] In particular the Nyāya, whose positions are on most subjects so close to the Vaiśeṣika.

[34] Doxographical works such as the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* may be included in the last of these categories.

[35] A few of the most important are Bhavya's *Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā* with his autocommentary *Tarkajvālā* (TJ), Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya* with his own *Vṛtti* thereon (PSV), and Mallavādin's *Dvādaśāranayacakram* (DNC) with Siṃhasūri's commentary thereon.

[36] Note for example that the Vaiśeṣika is dealt with independently from the Nyāya in works like the Bhavya's TJ and Dignāga's PSV.

[37] The translation—by the famous Chinese traveller and monk-scholar Hiuan Tsang—was made in A.D. 648: cf. Ui 1962, 1.

[38] Cf. Frauwallner 1955, 65-85.

[39] Cf. Matilal 1977, 63-65.

one, and, from the fact that Hiuan Tsang considered it worth translating, one would suppose that at one time Candramati's system had a certain amount of currency. Not a single reference to the DPŚ or its heterodox views is, however, found in the surviving Sanskrit literature of the Vaiśeṣika, or indeed, to the best of my knowledge, of any other school.

The last of the early works that must be introduced here is Praśastapāda's *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* or *Summary of the properties of the categories*. This work is far lengthier than either the VS or the DPŚ, and is also the most impressive as far as its systematic qualities go. The date of Praśastapāda has frequently been the subject of controversy; the crucial question being whether or not it can be shown that Praśastapāda was aware of Dignāga's theories. It is now accepted by almost all scholars that Praśastapāda must be later—though perhaps not by much— than Dignāga, and was influenced by him at least in regard to his logical theory. A date somewhere around A.D. 550 is now usually accepted.[40]

The PDhS appears to have rapidly gained popularity and eventually replaced the VS as the most studied work of the school. Its chief advantage over the older text was its better organization, treating the categories and their subdivisions in a meticulously thorough and orderly manner. Among the numerous features found for the first time in this work is the introduction of God, *Īśvara*, into a system whose beginnings seem to have been distinctly atheistic.[41] For some more remarks on the PDhS see the introductory section of chapter four below.

Some recent research on the early Vaiśeṣika

A subsidiary aim of this thesis was to provide a full bibliography of scholarly work on the early Vaiśeṣika. It can hardly be claimed that this has been accomplished, but nonetheless it is hoped that the second section of the bibliography, which contains all the secondary literature on the early Vaiśeṣika available to me, will be of use to other students of Indian philosophy. Obviously it is not possible to discuss all of the items listed, or even all the important ones, but something should at least be said about some major contributions and the general directions in which research has been proceeding.[42]

[40] See Nozawa 1982b, 76–77, to name only the most recent author who has confirmed Praśastapāda's dependence on Dignāga. Note however that Miyamoto—and I am inclined to agree with him—thinks that there is no sign of influence by Dignāga on Praśastapāda's theory of perception; cf. Miyamoto 1982, 523–524. Y. Miyasaka has argued for an earlier date for Praśastapāda, on the grounds of apparent references to Praśastapāda in the TJ; cf. Miyasaka 1958.

[41] See especially Chemparathy 1968, and 1969a. Chemparathy has demonstrated that the *Īśvara* doctrine was probably already being developed in the period between the VS and the PDhS of which we know so little. Cf. also Frauwallner 1984.

[42] Japanese work on the Vaiśeṣika is particularly difficult to survey, and has hitherto been largly neglected outside Japan, since scholars working in the West have only very limited access to Japanese publications. It is therefore in this area in particular that both the bibliography and the brief survey given here may prove to be incomplete. I hope to be able to provide a

In my opinion one of the most important aspects of recent work on the Vaiśeṣika, and particularly on the VS, is the increasing use which has been made of references to and quotations from the VS, as well as other (lost) early works. The importance of such testimonia, as may have become clear by now, can hardly be overestimated. A. Thakur has published a series of useful articles collecting testimonia and references found in the basic Nyāya texts.[43] A. Comba and Y. Miyasaka have independently studied the Vaiśeṣika material found in the medical text *Carakasaṃhitā*, one of our oldest sources of information.[44] Miyasaka also investigated Patañjali's grammatical work, the *Mahābhāṣya*, from the same standpoint.[45] A. Wezler has studied some quotations from the VS in the *Pātañjalayogaśāstravivaraṇa* (attributed to Śaṅkarācārya).[46] A number of quotations from lost Vaiśeṣika works preserved in Mallavādin's DNC and Siṃhasūri's commentary thereon have been studied by W. Halbfass. A reference to VS 9.1 in the Sāṃkhya commentary *Yuktidīpikā* has been discussed by Motegi.[47]

Of particular relevance for the subject of this thesis is M. Hattori's edition and well annotated translation of the section of Dignāga's PSV which discusses the Vaiśeṣika theory of perception.[48] Another important Buddhist text which discusses Vaiśeṣika standpoints is Bhavya's *Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā*, which, together with Bhavya's own commentary *Tarkajvālā* may be the earliest encyclopedic compendium of Indian philosophy. The chapter on Vaiśeṣika, *Vaiśeṣikatattvaniścaya* in this work has been studied by Miyasaka in a series of articles.[49]

Turning now to other topics which have been the object of scholarly attention in recent years, mention should first of all be made of an important series of articles by W. Halbfass on Vaiśeṣika ontology, which have been appearing since 1970.[50] Halbfass is apparently at present engaged in preparing a monograph on the history of Vaiśeṣika ontology, which will hopefully represent another major step forward in our knowledge of the Vaiśeṣika. G. Chemparathy has published a series of stydies dealing with the (introduction of) the doctrine of God (*Īśvara*)

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full bibliographical survey of Japanese scholarship on the Vaiśeṣika at a future date.

[43]Thakur 1949 on the material in Uddyotakara's *Nyāyavārtika* (NV), Thakur 1963a on Pakṣilasvāmin's *Nyāyabhāṣya* (NBh) and Thakur 1975 on Vācaspati Miśra's *Nyāyavārtikatātparyaṭīkā*. Cf. also Thakur 1969b, on the Vaiśeṣika materials found in the works of the Mīmāṃsā philosopher Śālikanātha.

[44]Miyasaka 1963 and Comba 1987.

[45]Miyasaka 1971.

[46]Wezler 1982 and 1984.

[47]Motegi 1988.

[48]Hattori 1968a, section 4. See also the Sanskrit reconstruction of the same section by Jambuvijayaji in the *saptamaṃ pariśiṣṭam* of his edition of C, and cf. Hattori 1968a.

[49]Miyasaka 1954 and 1958. Another article not at present available to me is: Y. Miyasaka: 'Bhavya to Vaiśeṣika gakusetsu'. [Bhavya and the Vaiśeṣika doctrines] in: Shūkyō Kenkyū 133 (1954), 173-177.

[50]Halbfass 1970, 1975, 1976, 1980a, 1986 and 1989. Another article not presently available to me is: W. Halbfass: 'Vyomaśiva on sattāsambandha'. in: Studies in Indian Culture (S. Ramachandra Rao Felicitation Volume). Bangalore 1987, 65–80.

in the early Vaiśeṣika.[51] The Vaiśeṣika teachings on the *ātman* have been the object of a number of recent studies, particularly by Japanese scholars.[52]

As for the epistemology of the Vaiśeṣika, the logical theories of both the VS and the PDhS have been studied particularly intensively in recent years, with much work being done by the leading Japanese scholar of the Vaiśeṣika, M. Nozawa.[53] The theory of perception on the other hand, although certainly the corner-stone of Vaiśeṣika epistemology, has been less thoroughly studied. The relevant passages of the VS have not been studied as a whole since Faddegon's pioneering work on Vaiśeṣika.[54] VS 3.1.13, which is called the Vaiśeṣika's definition of perception in some sources, has been treated by a number of scholars.[55] Hattori has made some brief observations on a number of sūtras on perception which are quoted by Dignāga and Jinendrabuddhi.[56] Aside from these, only the sūtras on yogic perception have been studied recently.[57]

The theory of perception in the PDhS has been the object of a number of studies.[58] These have however almost all concentrated on the question of Praśastapāda's position on non-propositional (*nirvikalpaka*) perception. Hattori suggested that Praśastapāda had been influenced on this point by Dignāga, but, as mentioned above, this has been disagreed with particularly by Miyamoto, who is of the opinion that Praśastapāda's theory can be understood purely as a development of the teachings found in the VS.[59] The related topic of Praśastapāda's theory of number (*saṃkhyā*) has also been studied by Miyasaka.[60]

No systematic study of the theory of perception in the Vaiśeṣika—as distinct from the Nyāya—after Praśastapāda has yet been undertaken. Mention must be made of a doctoral dissertation by W. Slaje on the theory of perception of Vyomaśiva,[61] but this has unfortunately not yet been published.

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[51] Chemparathy 1965, 1968, 1969a and 1970. A further article on this topic is not available to me at present: G. Chemparathy: 'Theism and early Vaiśeṣika system', in: Kavirāja-abhinandanagrantha. Lucknow 1967, p. 105–125. Cf. also Frauwallner 1984.

[52] See especially Miyasaka 1954, Murakami 1975 and 1976, Adachi 1985b and Oetke 1988 (p. 278–342).

[53] On the theory of inference in the VS see Schuster 1972, Nozawa 1982a, 1983 and 1988, and Wezler 1983 (especially p. 41–55). On that of Praśastapāda see Hattori 1972 and Nozawa 1982b. Not at present available to me is: M. Ishitobi: 'Praśastapāda no anapadeśa'. [The *anapadeśa* of Praśastapāda] in: Saṃbhāṣā 5 (1983), 24–38. Cf. also Frauwallner 1955.

[54] Faddegon 1918, 284–294. The survey given in de Smet 1964 adds little or nothing of value. A short article not at present available to me is C. Mishra: 'The nature of perception as elucidated in Vaiśeṣika philosophy', in: Research Journal of the Ranchi University 9 (1973), 1–7.

[55] See especially Hattori 1966, Murakami 1976 (p. 15–20), Honda 1986 (p. 433-432) and Oetke 1988 (p. 303–319). Cf. the commentary on VS 3.1.13 in chapter three below.

[56] See Hattori 1968b, 134–142.

[57] See Wezler 1982, 666–669.

[58] See especially Hattori 1968a, Schmithausen 1970, Miyamoto 1982 and Murakami 1987. For references to some other literature on this subject cf. the notes to chapter four below.

[59] Cf. Miyamoto 1982, 523–524.

[60] See Miyasaka 1976 and 1977.

[61] See the brief report on this dissertation in WZKS XXVII (1983), 201–202.

Chapter Two

A translation of the VS on perception, with Candrānanda's commentary

Introductory

This study of the teachings on perception in the VS will be divided into two parts. This chapter provides an English translation of the major sections on perception in the VS, together with Candrānanda's commentary, which may be regarded as the earliest attempt known to us to give a complete and coherent interpretation of the VS. I have not however included the sūtra's on yogic perception (VS 9.13-17), as these have recently been studied by Wezler[1] who has also pointed out that they are to be regarded as a relatively late addition to the VS.[2] The sūtra's have been here translated according to Candrānanda's interpretations, even where these are questionable. Notes have been restricted to those dealing with the problems posed by Candrānanda's commentary. The following chapter will offer a detailed commentary on these sūtra's, including discussion of the various textual problems.

Candrānanda's commentary on the VS

The date of Candrānanda has not yet been fixed with any precision. Sandesara, in his foreword to Jambuvijayaji's edition of C, suggested the seventh century

[1] Wezler 1982, 666-669.

[2] I would however like to add one note on this subject. Wezler apparently thinks it possible (though by no means certain) that these sūtra's are actually post-Praśastapāda. As far as 9.13 is concerned, this possibility can probably be ruled out on the basis of a passage from the NBh on NS 1.1.3. In the course of demonstrating that the *ātman* can be known by more than one means of correct knowledge (*pramāṇa*), Pakṣilasvāmin says: *pratyakṣam yuñjānasya yogasamādhijam* ātmany ātmamanasoḥ saṃyogaviśeṣād ātmā pratyakṣaḥ *iti* (NV[1] 182.17-19; NV[2] (omitting *ātmany*) 92.23), which must be regarded as a quotation of VS 9.13. In the light of this passage we should probably also qualify Wezler's statement that yogic perception is 'a doctrine developed by Buddhist thinkers, i.e. apparently by Dignāga' (Wezler 1982, 668), since the NBh is certainly older than Dignāga.

as a possible date.[3] According to Matilal Candrānanda 'might have belonged to the eighth or the ninth century A.D.',[4] while Chemparathy says that 'judging from the contents and the style of his work I feel strongly inclined to place this commentary before the tenth century, probably in the seventh or eighth century, this latter precision being hypothetical.'[5]

A definite *terminus post quem* is in any case provided by the fact that Candrānanda refers to Uddyotakara (ca. 550-610 A.D.), and quotes a passage from his *Nyāyavārttika*.[6] Both Aklujkar[7] and Umakant P. Shah[8] have suggested an upper limit of the tenth century for Candrānanda's date, on the basis of apparent quotations from him by respectively Helarāja and Abhinavagupta. As regards Abhinavagupta's reference however I would like to remark that in my opinion there is nothing in the verse he quotes from a Bhaṭṭa Candrānanda that allows us to be certain that this verse is by our author. The passages adduced by Aklujkar from Helarāja's commentary on the *Vākyapadīya* are more convincing but here too one must bear in mind the possibility that Helarāja and Candrānanda have made use of a common source.[9]

Although the above evidence is far from conclusive, the cumulative effect tends to support a date before the tenth century.[10] This also accords well with the simple fact that Candrānanda's *sūtrapāṭha* is obviously superior to those of the other surviving commentaries.

Candrānanda certainly had at least one older commentary on the VS before him, for at two places[11] he refers to and quotes from a *vṛttikāra* whose work is now lost. The most important influence on him however seems to be that of Praśastapāda; we will more than once have occasion to point out this indebtedness. Somewhat curiously however, Candrānanda never refers to Praśastapāda or his work by name. It is possible that aside from the PDhS Candrānanda also had access to another, now lost, work by Praśastapāda, for Chemparathy[12] has pointed out that an argument for the existence of God (*Īśvara*) found in C

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[3] 'This commentary must have been written sometime after the sixth century, very probably during the 7th century'. Foreword to C, page viii.

[4] Matilal 1977, 74.

[5] Chemparathy 1970b, 48.

[6] C p. 29. No other quotations have been identified in C which help to establish a later *terminus post quem*.

[7] Aklujkar 1970.

[8] Umakant P. Shah 1975.

[9] Wezler has also drawn attention to the fact that the *Pātañjalayogaśāstravivaraṇa* (attributed to Śaṅkarācārya) apparently made use of a commentary on the VS which resembles C, but adds that 'the assumption that both have independently made use of (an) older, apparently lost Vaiśeṣika work(s), most probably (a) commentary(-ies) on the Sūtra, is perhaps to be preferred' (Wezler 1982, 662; cf. also Wezler 1984, 460-461).

[10] Though admittedly partly subjective, the evidence of Candrānanda's style seems particularly convincing to me. Note for instance the tremendous difference in style between the commentaries by Candrānanda and Bhaṭṭa Vādīndra, who seems to me to be heavily influenced by Udayana.

[11] C, p. 69 and 70.

[12] Chemparathy 1970b, 50.

may be based on an argument found in a passage attributed by Kamalaśīla to Praśastamati.[13]

Translations

The difficulties of translating Sanskrit philosophical literature are well known. The translations presented below have been kept quite literal, at the inevitable expense of style. The abstract nouns in °*tva* and °*tā* which are used for universals have generally been translated with -ness, e.g. 'qualityness' for *guṇatva*. For the translation of numerous technical terms I have been guided by the usage of the *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*,[14] but I have differed from this on a number of points (e.g. 'cognition' rather than 'judgement' for *buddhi*).

VS 3.1.13

> **ātmendriyamanorthasannikarṣād yan niṣpadyate tad anyat.**
> **What arises because of contact between the *ātman*, the sense organs, the internal organ and an object, is a different [proof of the existence of the *ātman*]. 3.1.13**[15]

C: What arises because of the contact between [these] four, [namely] the effect called 'knowledge', is a different reason which allows one to know the [existence of the] *ātman* [as demonstrated in the following syllogism]:

Knowledge is dependent on an inherence cause (*sādhya*)
because it is an effect (*hetu*)
like a jar (*pakṣa*).

VS 3.2.1

C: The contact between the *ātman*, the sense organs, the internal organ and an object has been stated [in 3.1.13] as being the cause of knowledge. In order to prove this [the author of the sūtras now] describes the internal organ.

> **ātmendriyārthasannikarṣe jñānasyābhāvo bhāvaś ca manaso liṅgam.**
> **The absence and presence of knowledge when there is contact between the *ātman*, the sense organs and an object, is the inferential mark of the internal organ. 3.2.1**[16]

[13] I.e. Praśastapāda: on the various names of Praśastapāda cf. Chemparathy 1970a.
[14] Potter 1977.
[15] 3.1.13 is the first sūtra which offers us important information on the theory of perception.
[16] The second *āhnika* of the third *adhyāya* begins with a discussion of the internal organ (*manas*). 3.2.1 is intended to prove the existence of the internal organ.

C: The internal organ is that, the absence of which causes knowledge not to arise [even] when there is contact between the *ātman*, the sense organs and an object, and in the presence of which [knowledge] arises [when there is contact between the *ātman*, the sense organs and an object]. Thus the arising and non-arising of knowledge is the inferential mark of the internal organ.

The qualities [of the internal organ] are number, size, separateness, conjunction, disjunction, remoteness, nearness and trace (*saṃskāra*).[17]

VS 4.1.6-14

C: If [one asks] how perception [takes place], [we reply]:

> **mahaty anekadravyavattvād rūpāc copalabdhiḥ.**
>
> **Perception in regard to a large [substance arises] because of its possessing many substances [as inherence causes] and because of its colour. 4.1.6**[18]

C: Knowledge in regard to a substance in which the size 'largeness'[19] inheres, arises because of the manifoldness of the substances which are its inherence causes and because of its colour, such as white.

[If one asks] 'why is that?' [we reply]: For,

> **adravyavattvāt paramāṇāv anupalabdhiḥ.**
>
> **Because it does not possess a substance [as inherence cause] there is no perception in regard to an atom. 4.1.7**

C: Because an atom does not possess a substance as its inherence cause, there is no perception [of it], despite the presence of colour [in it].

> **rūpasaṃskārābhāvād vāyāv anupalabdhiḥ.**
>
> **Because of the absence of the trace (*saṃskāra*) 'colour' [in it], there is no perception in regard to air. 4.1.8**

C: Because of the absence [in it] of the trace called 'colour', there is no perception of air, despite its possessing many substances [as inherence causes] and largeness. Because [the sūtra] does not mention 'the consisting of many substances' (*anekadravyatā*) as a separate [cause of perception mentioned in 4.1.6], it is proved that there is no perception of a triad (*tryaṇuka*) too.[20]

[If one asks] how [does perception] of colour [take place], [we reply]:

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[17] This sentence is merely intended to list the qualities which may inhere in the internal organ. This list is not found in the VS, but is given by Praśastapāda in the PDhS: *tasya* (i.e. *manasaḥ*) *guṇāḥ saṃkhyāparimāṇapṛthaktvasaṃyogavibhāgaparatvāparatvasaṃskārāḥ*. NK 89.12-13.

[18] The first extended discussion of perception in the VS is found in the first *āhnika* of the fourth *adhyāya*, after a section on the existence of atoms.

[19] The quality 'size' (*parimāṇa*) is considered to be of four kinds: atomic (*aṇu*), large, long and short. Cf. VS 7.1.15-26 and the section on *parimāṇa* in the PDhS.

[20] This sentence is not quite clear to me, and may be corrupt. Nonetheless it is clear that Candrānanda claims that triads too cannot be perceived, and this claim is repeated

anekadravyeṇa dravyeṇa samavāyād rūpaviśeṣāc copalabdhiḥ.

Perception [of colour takes place] because of [its] inherence in a substance which possesses many substances [as inherence causes] and because of the species (*viśeṣa*) 'colour'. 4.1.9

C: Because of the inherence of the quality 'colour' in a large substance in which many substances inhere [as inherence causes], such as a pot, and because of the species 'colour', [that is to say] because of the limited universal (*sāmānyaviśeṣa*) called 'colourness', perception [of colour takes place].

etena rasagandhasparśeṣu jñānaṃ vyākhyātam.

[Perceptual] knowledge in regard to taste, smell and touch is explained by this [same rule]. 4.1.10

C: Perception of taste and so on [arises] in accordance with this [same] rule which has just been stated [in 4.1.9], [that is to say] because of inherence in a substance which possesses many substances [as inherence causes], and because of the limited universals 'tasteness' and so on.

tadabhāvād avyabhicāraḥ.

Because of the absence of that (i.e. inherence in a substance which possesses many substances as inherence causes) [in the case of the colour of an atom], there is no deviation [from the rule given in 4.1.9]. 4.1.11

C: Because the colour of an atom does not inhere in a [substance] which possesses many substances [as inherence causes], there is no perception [of it], and therefore there is no deviation of 'inherence in a substance which possesses many substances [as inherence causes]' and the perception of colour.[21]

saṃkhyāḥ parimāṇāni pṛthaktvaṃ saṃyogavibhāgau paratvāparatve karma ca rūpidravyasamavāyāc cākṣuṣāṇi.

[The qualities] numbers, sizes, separateness, conjunction

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even more explicitly in his commentary on 7.1.15 (*tryaṇukasya mahattve 'py anupalabdhiḥ* C p. 53.24). The words *anekadravyatāyā viśiṣṭāyā grahaṇāt* (MS P reads *agrahaṇāt*) must be Candrānanda's attempt to justify this view of his on the basis of the sūtra's. I have adopted the reading *agrahaṇāt* and assumed that Candrānanda is drawing a distinction between *anekadravyatā* and the *anekadravyavattva* of 4.1.6. Nonetheless I am unable to reconstruct Candrānanda's argument in a very convincing way, since triads may be called both *anekadravya* and, as they are produced from three dyads (*dvyaṇuka*), *anekadravyavat*. The question is a curious one because this view of Candrānanda's is as far as I am aware quite heterodox; I have not found it in any other Vaiśeṣika work.

[21] I.e. *anekadravyeṇa (dravyeṇa) samavāya* and *rūpopalabdhiḥ* are fully concomitant. Candrānanda apparently understands *avyabhicāra* in the sense in which this term is used in NS 1.2.5 (and NBh thereon).

and disjunction, and remoteness and nearness [as well as the category] action are objects of visual perception because of [their] inherence in a substance which possesses [pronounced] colour. 4.1.12

C: By '[substance] which possesses colour' [the sūtra means] '[substance] which pronouncedly possesses colour'. [All] these (i.e. numbers etc.) are objects of visual perception because of [their] inherence in such a [substance] possessing colour which is capable of being perceived, and because of [their respective] limited universals.

[If one asks] 'why [is that]', [we reply]:

arūpiṣv acākṣuṣatvāt.

Because [they] are not objects of visual perception [when they inhere] in [substances] which do not possess colour. 4.1.13

C: Because [the numbers etc.] which reside in other substances which, [although they] are large, are devoid of colour, are not cognized.

etena guṇatve bhāve ca sarvendriyajñānaṃ vyākhyātam.

By this it is explained that in regard to [the universals] 'qualityness' and 'being', knowledge [arises through] all the sense organs. 4.1.14

C: Just as, in regard to a large [substance], [there is] perception of [the qualities] colour and so on because of [their] inherence in [a substance] which possesses many substances [as inherence causes], in the same way, [there is] perception of [the universals] 'qualityness' and 'being' inherent in the qualities inherent in a large [substance], by [all] the sense organs, the visual organ and so on, because of the inherence [of the universals 'qualityness' and 'being'] in the respective qualities, colour and so on. Limited universals (*sāmānyaviśeṣa*) are not however causes of perception in regard to those [universals],[22] because of not being present in them. In the same way [there is perception of] the universals belonging to those [qualities] and so on (*tattvādīnām*)[23] by the respective sense organs. In regard to a substance however, [there is perception of the universal] 'being' because of its inherence [in the substance]. In regard to action [there is perception of universals] because of [their] inherence in what inheres (*samavetasamavāya*) [in a perceptible substance] (i.e. actions), as in the case of qualities.

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[22] *teṣu* = *tayoḥ* ?

[23] It is not clear what Candrānanda means by *tattva*. I conjecture, chiefly on the strength of *svair indriyaiḥ* that we should take this as *tat-* (i.e. *rūpa* and so on) *tva*, and that the intended sense is that the universals 'colourness' and so on are perceived in the same way as 'qualityness' and 'being' are perceived.

VS 8

C: Now [the quality] cognition (*buddhi*) is described:

> **dravyeṣu jñānaṃ vyākhyātam.**
>
> **Knowledge in regard to substances has [already] been explained. 8.1**[24]

C: Of the six categories, only in regard to the substances has knowledge been explained, as to how it arises from contact (i.e. of the *ātman*, sense organs, internal organ and object),[25] but not in regard to qualities and so on (i.e. the other categories).

Of that [knowledge in regard to substances],

> **mana ātmā ca.**
>
> **The internal organ and the *ātman* [which are two of the causes, have also already been explained]. 8.2**

C: The internal organ and the *ātman*, [which are both a] cause of knowledge, have been explained [in *adhyāya* 3].[26]

Now [the author of the sūtra's] discusses knowledge in regard to qualities and so on:

> **jñānanirdeśe jñānaniṣpattir uktā.**
>
> **The arising of knowledge has been described in the [passage which gives] instruction on knowledge. 8.3**

C: For the arising of [perceptual] knowledge has been described [as resulting] from contact [of an object] with a sense organ, but there is no contact of qualities etc. with a sense organ; for this reason knowledge is now stated [in regard to qualities etc.]. Even though there is no contact of those [qualities with the sense organs], there is [perceptual] knowledge[27] [of them], for,

> **guṇakarmasv asannikṛṣṭeṣu jñānaniṣpatter dravyaṃ kāraṇaṃ kāraṇakāraṇaṃ ca.**

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[24] The eighth *adhyāya* of the VS is the shortest one in the whole text, consisting of only 17 sūtra's in the Candrānanda recension. It is entirely devoted to problems concerning perception, and is therefore translated in full.

[25] Apparently a reference to 3.1.13.

[26] Of the four factors named in 3.1.13, the *ātman* and the internal organ have already been discussed. One would have expected *kāraṇe vyākhyāte* rather than *kāraṇaṃ vyākhyātam*: did Candrānanda write the latter in order to make even more clear that the verb omitted in the sūtra is to be supplied from 8.1?

[27] I read *teṣām asannikṛṣṭeṣu 'pi jñānam*, as conjectured by Jambuvijayaji in a note. Both the MSS have *teṣām asannikṛṣṭeṣu vijñānam*, which however gives a less satisfactory sense. This is of course an easily made scribal error, considering the palaeographical similarity between *pi* and *vi*. Candrānanda generally uses the word *vijñāna* to mean the 'higher knowledge' of yogis or God; cf. for example the following remark from his commentary on 2.1.18: ... *bhagavān vijñānādibhir viśiṣṭo maheśvaras* ... C 13.23.

In regard to qualities and actions which are not in contact [with a sense organ], substance is the cause and the cause of the cause of the arisal of knowledge. 8.4

C: Because substance is the inherence cause of qualities and actions, the same substance is the cause of the contact which is the cause of the arising of knowledge in regard to those [qualities and actions] even when they are not directly in contact with a sense organ.[28] Therefore knowledge in regard to qualities and actions [arises from] inherence in the conjoined (*saṃyuktasamavāya*). The word 'and' [in the sūtra] indicates a causal relationship (*caśabdo hetau* i.e. 'substance is the [inherence] cause and therefore the cause of the cause of ...').

sāmānyaviśeṣeṣu sāmānyaviśeṣeṣābhāvāt tata eva jñānam.

Because of the absence of limited universals in them, [perceptual] knowledge in regard to [the highest] universal and [the ultimate] individuators arises merely from that (i.e. contact of a substance and a sense organ). 8.5

C: Knowledge in regard to [the highest] universal, Being and so on (*sattādau*),[29] and ultimate individuators arises, for the people who [can] see them,[30] merely because of contact [of a sense organ] with the substances [in which Being and the ultimate individuators inhere], and not because of limited universals,[31] because they are not present in them.[32]

In regard to other [categories] however [perceptual knowledge arises in the following way]:

sāmānyaviśeṣāpekṣaṃ dravyaguṇakarmasu.

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[28] Here too I propose reading *'pi jñānaniṣpatteḥ* for *vijñānaniṣpatteḥ*. In this case there is an additional argument in favour of the emendation, since the word *jñānaniṣpatteḥ* is a *pratīka* from the sūtra.

[29] It is not clear what Candrānanda means by 'and so on' here. There is in fact only one universal, Being, which can not also be regarded as a species (*viśeṣa*); see 1.2.4 *bhāvaḥ sāmānyam eva*. That we must however indeed translate '[the highest] universal' seems to be made certain by the fact that Candrānanda here uses a singular form (*sāmānye*), but a plural (*viśeṣeṣu cāntyeṣu*) to gloss the second half of the compound. Cf. also Candrānanda's commentary on 8.6.

[30] Ultimate individuators can only be perceived by yogis.

[31] Murakami, who translates Candrānanda's commentary on this sūtra, understands *sāmānyaviśeṣa* here too as 'universals and ultimate individuators' (Murakami 1987, 115 (note 13)). I differ from him for two reasons. First, I believe that Candrānanda himself always attempts to avoid the semantic ambiguity of this term in his commentary. Though he interprets the word in various different ways when it occurs in the sūtra's, when he introduces the word himself in his commentary (i.e. not as a *pratīka*) it is always with the meaning 'limited universal' (see for example his commentary on 4.1.10 and 8.6). Secondly, the latter interpretation also accords better with the general tenor of Candrānanda's comments on the theory of perception, in which he emphasizes the priority of the (non-propositional) perception of (limited) universals and thus the important role that they play as causes of the (propositional) perception of substances, qualities and actions.

[32] Cf. Candrānanda's comments on 4.1.14 above.

[Perceptual knowledge] in regard to substance, quality and action, is dependant on [the highest universal, 'being', and] limited universals. 8.6

C: [The meaning of the sūtra is that] the knowledge that '[this] exists', '[this] is a substance' and so on in regard to substances, qualities and actions, [arises] because of the contact of substance and sense organ, and because of the [highest] universal, 'being' and so on, and because of a lower universal, such as substanceness. Here in this sūtra 'universal' [means] 'being' and 'individuators' [means] 'substanceness and so on'; in the previous sūtra [these terms are to be interpreted] otherwise.[33]

And among those (i.e. substance, quality and action):

dravye dravyaguṇakarmāpekṣam.

[Perceptual knowledge] in regard to substance is dependant on substance, quality and action. 8.7

C: [The meaning of the sūtra is that] the knowledge in regard to a substance [which arises] through contact with the visual organ, arises dependant on a substance[34] [as for example] '[this cow] has horns' , dependant on a quality [for example] '[it is] white', [or] dependant on an action [for example] 'it goes'. And [these] substance and so on are perceived first, because they are qualifiers, and therefore the cognition of the qualifiers is the cause and the cognition of the qualified the effect.[35]

guṇakarmasu guṇakarmābhāvād guṇakarmāpekṣaṃ na vidyate.

[Perceptual knowledge] in regard to qualities and actions is not found to be dependant on quality and action, because quality and action are not present in them. 8.8

C: [The meaning of the sūtra is that] because of the absence of quality and action in quality and in action, knowledge in regard to qualities and actions is not caused by quality and action.

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[33]The word *sāmānyaviśeṣa* occurs thrice in 8.5-6, and each time Candrānanda gives a different interpretation. At the first occurance of the word in 8.5 Candrānanda analyses it as a *dvandva* compound with *sāmānya* = *sattā* and *viśeṣa* = *antya viśeṣa*. At the second occurance Candrānanda interprets it as 'limited universal' (which involves analysing the compound as a *karmadhāraya*). In 8.6 Candrānanda again takes the compound as a *dvandva* with *sāmānya* = *sattā*, but now interprets *viśeṣa* as *sāmānyaviśeṣa*, 'limited universal'. Note that in 4.1.9 too Candrānanda interprets **viśeṣa* as *sāmānyaviśeṣa*.

[34]I adopt the reading *dravyāpekṣam*, suggested by Jambuvijayaji, for the *sāmānyaviśeṣāpekṣam* found in both the MSS. The latter reading could be the result of a scribe misinterpreting *viṣāṇīti* as '[this is] a cow' (which would be a judgement caused by the limited universal 'cowness') instead of '[this cow] has horns' (caused by the perception of substances, namely horns, on the cow).

[35]Cf 8.9 and Candrānanda's commentary thereon.

It is not necessary that knowledge in regard to substance and so on should arise first, for,

> **samavāyinaḥ śvaityāc chvaityabuddheḥ śvete buddhis te kāryakāraṇabhūte.**
>
> **Cognition [arises] in regard to [the quality] white because of the [universal called] whiteness which inheres [in it] and because of the cognition of [the universal called] whiteness. These two [cognitions] are related to each other as cause and effect. 8.9**

C: Knowledge of the quality white is produced from the universal [called] 'whiteness' which inheres in the quality white and from the knowledge of the universal 'whiteness'. The connection (*sambandha*) of the universal and the quality also must be regarded [as a factor which causes knowledge of the quality to arise].[36] Therefore the cognition of the qualifiers is the cause and the cognition of the qualified the effect.

However when there is no [relation of] qualifier and qualified:

> **dravyeṣv anitaretarakāraṇā(ḥ)[37] kāraṇāyaugapadyāt.**
>
> **[Perceptual knowledges] in regard to substances are not causes of each other, because [the fact that they arise in a temporal sequence is because] of the non-simultaneity of [their] cause [the internal organ]. 8.10**

C:Even though there is a [temporal] succession [of cognitions], because the internal organ, being atomic in size, is not simultaneously [the cause of more than one cognition], the knowledges of [for example] a pot and a cloth are not related as cause and effect, because the concepts of qualifier and qualified are not appliable [to them].

> **tathā dravyaguṇakarmasu kāraṇāviśeṣāt.**
>
> **In the same way [perceptual knowledges arising in succession] in regard to substance, quality and action [are not causes of each other], because of the same reason. 8.11**

C: Although [perceptual] knowledges in regard to substance, quality and action arise in [temporal] succession, [as for example] 'a cow, which is white, goes', they are not related as cause and effect, because of the same reason which has

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[36] Probably the addition of this remark should be seen as another instance of Candrānanda's dependance on Praśastapāda. Cf. the PDhS on the arising of knowledge of the quality 'two': *dvitvasāmānyatatsambandhatajjñānebhyo dvitvaguṇabuddher utpadyamānatā* (NK 111.14-16).

[37] I adopt this reading which, as Jambuvijayaji says in the *vṛddhipatrakam* of his edition of C (p. 231.4/5), appears to be the correct one, agreeing better with Candrānanda's commentary (and supported by V and Ś). The MSS read **kāraṇāt*.

already been given, namely the absence of the relation of qualifier and qualified. Therefore [perceptual] knowledge in regard to a substance is not a cause of the cognitions of quality and action, and the cognitions of quality and action are not the cause of a succeeding [cognition].

However, where the rule of [the relation of] qualifier [and qualified] is not [appliable] -

> **ayam eṣa kṛtaṃ tvayā bhojayainam iti buddhyapekṣam.**
> **'This, that', 'you did it' 'feed him': [such cognitions are] dependant on [other] cognitions. 8.12**

C: 'This' [is a notion (*pratyaya*) which arises] in regard to someone near by, and 'that' is a notion [which arises] in regard to someone at a certain distance. 'You did it' is a notion [which involves] an object and a subject, and 'feed him' is a notion [which involves] a subject and an object. The notion ['that'] in regard to someone at a distance is dependent on [the cognition of] someone [else] nearby, the notion '[you] did it' in regard to a subject ['you'] is dependent on [the cognition of] an object, and the notion 'feed [him]' in regard to an object is dependent on [the cognition of] a subject.

If [you ask] why [these notions] are dependent [on other cognitions], [we reply]:

> **dṛṣṭeṣu bhāvād adṛṣṭeṣv abhāvāt.**
> **Because [these notions] are present when [the objects on whose cognitions they depend] are seen, and not present when [those objects] are not seen. 8.13**

C: Since [the above-mentioned] notions in regard to someone at a distance and so on are present when someone nearby and so on is seen, but not when they are not seen, therefore, though dependent they are not related as cause and effect, because the concepts of qualifier and qualified are not appliable [to them].

Since cognitions are dependent on an object and on sense organs,[38] first [the concept] 'object' is described:

> **artha iti dravyaguṇakarmasu.**
> **The word 'object' [is used] in regard to substance, quality and action. 8.14**

C: Though there is no universal 'objectness' [inherent] in them, the word 'object' is applied by common usage (*prasiddhyā*) just to the three [categories] substance and so on. Like what? Just as the knowledge 'these are universals' (*sāmānyaṃ sāmānyam*) [arises] in regard to limited universals, and in regard to the universals, 'being' and so on, though there is no other universal [inherent] in them, , in the same way, in regard to individuators, though there is no

[38] *buddhīnām arthendriyāpekṣatve 'pi*: the force of *api* here is not clear to me.

other individuator, the [higher] knowledge (*vijñānam*) 'these are individuators' (*viśeṣo viśeṣaḥ*) [arises] for those who [can] see them (i.e. yogis). In the same way the word 'object' is used by convention (*paribhāṣika*) for substance and so on, though there is no [universal] 'objectness' [inherent in them].

[Now] the sense organs are described, and they do not consist of [all] five [elements combined together], for -

> **drayveṣu pañcātmakaṃ pratyuktam.**
>
> **In regard to substances, [their] consisting of [all] five [elements combined together] has been refuted [already, in 4.2.1]. 8.15**

C: [This is] because when [compound] substances are to be produced, the five elements [together] are not found to be productive factors (*ārambhakāṇi*), but rather the four [elements] which do produce [compound substances] each produces its own class (*jāti*) [of compound substances]. In the same way the sense organs too are produced from their particular elements, for example:

> **bhūyastvād gandhavattvāc ca pṛthivī gandhajñāne.**
>
> **Because of its preponderance and its possession of smell, earth [is the material cause] in regard to knowledge of smells. 8.16**

C: 'Knowledge of smells' [here means] the olfactory organ. When that is to be produced, earth is its cause, because of its preponderance. This preponderance is [to be understood] with regard to the body. And [with regard to the body] there is a preponderance of [the element] earth in the olfactory organ, since there is no perception of smell by the feet and so on. And [earth is the material cause of the olfactory organ] because of its possession of smell; [that is to say] since the olfactory sense organ manifests smell [to us] by virtue of the smell which is inherent in it, therefore the earth, which possesses smell, alone is its [material] cause.[39] The other elements however are conjoined [with the earth in the olfactory organ], but only in very small quantities.

> **tathāpas tejo vāyuś ca rasarūpasparśajñāneṣu rasarūpasparśaviśeṣāt.**[40]
>
> **In the same way water, fire and air [are the material causes] in regard to the knowledge of [respectively] tastes, colours and touches, because of the species of [respectively] taste, colour and touch. 8.17**

C: Because the organ of taste, the organ of sight and the organ of touch manifest [respectively] tastes, colours and touches [to us] by virtue of [respectively] the

[39] Earth is the only element which possesses the quality smell; cf. VS 2.1.1-5.

[40] The *iti* found after this in Jambuvijayaji's edition of C merely is intended to indicate the end of the *āhnika*, and is not part of the sūtra.

taste— sweet[41] and not produced by 'cooking'[42]—, the colour— white and shining[43]—, and the touch— not produced by 'cooking' and neither hot or cold[44]— , which are inherent in [these respective sense organs], for this reason water, fire and air must be regarded as being the inherence causes in regard to those three sense organs respectively, in the same order (*yathāsaṃkhyam*), because of their [respectively] possessing taste, possessing colour and possessing touch, as well as because of their preponderance, as a result of their not being overpowered by the other elements. However, ether separated within the cavity of the ear is itself the organ of hearing and not the material cause [of the organ of hearing], because it is not a productive factor (*anārambhakatvāt*). In this way perception has [now] been [fully] explained [in this *adhyāya*].

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[41] Cf. Candrānanda ad 2.1.2: *śuklamadhuraśītā eva rūparasasparśāḥ*: 'the colour, taste and touch [of water] are [respectively] only white, sweet and cold'. Exactly the same words are used by Praśastapāda: NK 35.24-36.1.

[42] According to classical Vaiśeṣika theory, various qualities belonging to atoms are changed under influence of heat.

[43] Cf. Candrānanda ad 2.1.3: *rūpaṃ bhāsvaraṃ śuklaṃ ca*: 'the colour [of fire] is shining and white.' PDhS *tatra* (this word is omitted in the editions of Vy[1] and Kir) *śuklaṃ bhāsvaraṃ ca rūpam*: NK 39.1.

[44] Cf. Candrānanda ad 2.1.4: *anuṣṇāśīto 'pākajaḥ sparśaḥ*: 'the touch [of air] is neither hot nor cold and is not produced by 'cooking'.' PDhS *sparśo 'syānuṣṇāśītatve saty apākajaḥ*: NK 44.2-3.

Chapter Three
Commentary on the VS passages on perception

This chapter will attempt to deal with the various problems of text and interpretation presented by the sūtras which have been translated in chapter two above. Many of these problems can not, I believe, be definitively solved with the materials presently available. It must be remembered that the VS is couched in the brief, elliptical, not to say enigmatic, style often called the 'sūtra-style', intended to be memorized, and generally accompanied with an oral commentary. The earliest commentary available to us however is at least eight hundred years later than the earliest parts of the VS, and thus was written in a philosophical milieu very different from that in which the VS itself originated. The surviving VS commentaries must therefore on the one hand always be taken into serious consideration, as they may preserve ancient interpretations handed down in the school, but must at the same time be used with the utmost caution, reflecting as they do many centuries of post-VS philosophical development.

Aside from the VS commentaries, I have attempted in this chapter to make as much use as possible of the evidence which we can extract from the numerous quotations and references to the VS in other (philosophical) literature. Such testimonia, especially those older than the available VS commentaries, may be of the greatest value both for establishing the text of the VS and arriving at the correct interpretation of the sūtras. Here too however caution and a critical approach are necessary, particularly in regard to quotations and interpretations found in the context of anti-Vaiśeṣika polemics, where misrepresentation of the Vaiśeṣika standpoints, whether deliberate or from insufficient familiarity with them, can not always be ruled out.

The commentary below on the individual sūtras first presents the readings found in the available VS commentaries, and then the various testimonia known to me, presented in chronological order. These lists of testimonia should on no account be thought of as complete, being chiefly based on the Sanskrit texts at present available to me, together with the testimonia to which others have already called attention. A really thorough search of the mass of early Sanskrit philosophical literature, not to mention the works preserved only in Tibetan or

Chinese translations, will no doubt reveal many more quotations from the VS.

In order not to increase the bulk of this chapter still further, I have refrained from discussing the interpretations found in Ś, in cases where it seemed to me that this would add little of value. Ś is of course the latest and in general the least reliable of the VS commentaries, and is in any case also readily accessible in an adequate English translation.[1]

VS 3.1.13

C and V read ***ātmendriyamanorthasannikarṣād yan niṣpadyate tad anyat***; Ś reads ***ātmendriyārthasannikarṣād yan niṣpadyate tad anyat***.

Testimonia.

The following quotations of this sūtra are at present available to me:

- PSV (*pratyakṣapariccheda*):[2] *bdag dan dbaṅ po daṅ yid daṅ don du phrad pa las gaṅ grub pa de gzan yin no*, which can probably be reconstructed as ***ātmendriyamanorthasannikarṣād yan niṣpadyate tad anyat*** (i.e. the reading of C and V).
- DNC 110.1: same reading as C and V.
- YD 34.29-30: same reading as C and V.
- Jinendrabuddhi's *Viśālāmalavatī* (commentary on PSV):[3] same reading as C and V.
- NM Pt. I 100.11-12: same reading as C and V.
- *Sarvasiddhāntapraveśaka*:[4] same reading as C and V.

Aside from the above, this sūtra is also quoted (with the same reading as C and V), according to Jambuvijayaji,[5] in Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka's *Tattvārtharājavārtika*. I have not however been able to check this reference in the text itself.

A glance at the evidence presented above shows that the reading of this sūtra is not in any doubt. Only Ś (which is late) and one demonstrably wrong translation of PSV omit °*mano*°.

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[1] Sinha 1974.

[2] Tibetan text in Hattori 1968, 198-199, *A*. This is the reading of Kanakavarman's translation; Vasudhararakṣita's translation omits *yid daṅ* (= °*mano*°), wrongly, as is pointed out in Hattori 1968, 135 note 4.4. Cf. also Jambuvijayaji's Sanskrit reconstruction in his edition of C, 169.12-13.

[3] Tibetan not at present available to me: Sanskrit reconstruction by Jambuvijayaji in his edition of C, p. 173.23–174.1 and 174.6.

[4] The chapter on Vaiśeṣika in this anonymous Jain work was edited by Jambuvijayaji as the *pañcamaṃ pariśiṣṭam* of his edition of C. The quotation of VS 3.1.13 is to be found on page 145.

[5] Cf. Jambuvijayaji's edition of C, 232.32-33.

Several scholars have written on the interpretation of this sūtra, part of the difficult section on the *ātman* and the proofs of its existence.[6] Here I will confine my observations to a few notes on the points of immediate relevance for our subject.

There is little doubt that what is meant by *yan niṣpadyate*, what arises from the contact of these four factors, is perceptual knowledge. The question which concerns us most immediately is whether this sūtra is meant to be a definition of perception. There are three main possible explanations that have been put forward, the difference between them turning on the interpretation of the word *anyat*.[7]

We have already seen in the previous chapter that Candrānanda understands *tad anyat* as 'that [perceptual knowledge] is a different reason (i.e. aside from the one given in 3.1.2) which allows one to know the [existence of the] *ātman*'. This interpretation is supported by Hattori.[8]

A different interpretation is found in V, where this sūtra is introduced with the words *anumānānantaraṃ pratyakṣaṃ nirūpayati*:[9] 'after [having explained the theory of] inference, [the author of the sūtras now] describes perception'. Here the word *anyat* is explained as *anumānād vyatiriktam*:[10] 'different from inference'. It must be noted that this interpretation, according to which the sūtra may be regarded as a definition of perception, is effectively supported by a large number of our testimonia. Dignāga calls the sūtra the Vaiśeṣika's *rdzas 'ga' źig la mṅon sum gyi mtshan ñid*:[11] i.e. *dravye kasmiṃścit* (?) *pratyakṣalakṣaṇam*. Mallavādin and the anonymous author of the YD quote this sūtra in a series of different definitions of perception. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa too introduces the sūtra with the words *yad api kaiścit pratyakṣalakṣaṇam uktam*. The second of two interpretations given by Jinendrabuddhi also agrees closely with V.[12] Finally, one may compare Bhavya's remark *de bźin du dbaṅ po daṅ don daṅ yid 'dus pa'i śes pa ni mṅon sum gyi tshad ma'o*.[13] 'And the knowledge (*jñāna*) [arising from] the contact between sense organ, object and the internal organ is the perceptual means of correct knowledge.'

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[6]See especially Hattori 1966, Murakami 1976 (p. 15-20), Honda 1986 (p. 433-432) and Oetke 1988 (p. 303-319).

[7]The two possibilities given by Śaṅkara Miśra, one taking *anyat* as meaning 'different from the fallacies discussed in the previous sūtras' and the second understanding *anyat* as 'different from the internal organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*) accepted by the Sāṃkhya', have been rightly dismissed by all modern scholars.

[8]Hattori 1966, 890.

[9]V 37.6.

[10]V 37.9.

[11]So Kanakavarman's translation: Vasudhararakṣita's reads *rdzas la mṅon sum mo*, i.e. *dravye pratyakṣam*. Tibetan text in Hattori 1968b, 198-199.

[12]*anye tu - laiṅgikapramāṇe 'bhihite tata āha - kiṃ laiṅgikam ekam eva pramāṇam āhosvin neti cet, ucyate 'ātmendriyamanorthasannikarṣād yan niṣpadyate tad anyat'. pratyakṣam iti vākyaśeṣaḥ.* Sanskrit reconstruction (Tibetan not at present available to me) by Jambuvijaya in his edition of C, p. 174.5-7.

[13]TJ 273a, line 2.

The third important interpretation is also found in Jinendrabuddhi's *Viśālāmalavatī*, given as the first possibility. The crucial part of this explanation runs as follows: ***yad yato niṣpadyate tat tato 'nyat, yathā mṛdāder ghaṭādi, ātmādibhyo jñānam api tathā niṣpadyate tasmāt tad api tebhyo 'nyat.***[14] 'Whatever arises from a certain thing is different from that thing,[15] as for example a pot and so on [is different] from the clay and so on [from which it is made]. In the same way knowledge arises from the *ātman* and so on, and is therefore different from them'. This interpretation is supported by Oetke, who has advanced the interesting theory that 3.1.13 originally was intended as an answer to the objection of a *pūrvapakṣin* formulated in 3.1.7.

For the moment, while admitting that Oetke's suggestion is attractive and offers a solution to some of the difficulties of this *āhnika*, I am inclined to agree with Honda[16] in giving most weight to the strong tradition that interprets this sūtra as giving a definition of perception (in regard to substances at least). This is the interpretation found in the PSV, our oldest source of information on this sūtra. I am not convinced that, as Jinendrabuddhi and Hattori suggest,[17] Dignāga knew or referred to another interpretation of this sūtra. Another point is that VS 8.1 is taken by both Candrānanda and Śaṅkara Miśra as referring to this sūtra, and it is argued below that this interpretation is probably correct, which seems to support taking it as a definition of perception.[18]

The concept of *sannikarṣa*, contact, which is introduced in this sūtra is not explained or worked out in the VS. In later Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika theory it is subdivided into five or six kinds of relation. In the VS however I suspect that *sannikarṣa* was conceived of as a relationship between substances, more or less as equivalent to *saṃyoga*. A critical sūtra for the meaning of this word in the VS is probably 8.4; see the commentary on this sūtra below.

VS 3.2.1

C and V read *ātmendriyārthasannikarṣe jñānasyābhāvo bhāvaś ca manaso liṅgam.*
Ś *ātmendriyārthasannikarṣe jñānasya bhāvo 'bhāvaś ca manaso liṅgam.*

Testimonia

Only one case of a possible quotation of this sūtra is known to me:

— Bhavya: TJ 274a, 2-3: *śes pa'i ño bo [ñid]*[19] *med pa daṅ ño bo yod pa ni yid kyi rtags so.* This may possibly be reconstructed as *jñānasyābhāvo bhāvaś ca manaso liṅgam.*[20]

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[14] Sanskrit reconstruction by Jambuvijayaji in C, p. 174.1-3.

[15] A reference to the Vaiśeṣika *asatkāryavāda.*

[16] Honda 1986, 432.

[17] Cf. Hattori 1968b, 134-135 (note 4.3).

[18] See the commentary on 8.1 below.

[19] Miyasaka, who has made use of the Derge and Narthang editions, reports that this word is not found in the Derge, and appears to consider this the better reading, with which I agree.

[20] The reading of the Peking and Narthang editions would correspond to *jñānasyāsvabhāvo* ...

This sûtra is intended to prove the existence of the internal organ, and offers no serious problems of interpretation. Of relevance for our present subject is that the internal organ plays an essential role in the arising of (perceptual) knowledge, functioning, one could say, more or less as 'attention'. Everyone has just one internal organ,[21] which is atomic in size.[22] It is therefore constantly moving around, according to the various volitions of the *ātman*.[23]

VS 4.1.6

C, V and Ś unanimously read *mahaty anekadravyavattvād rūpāc copalabdhiḥ*.
<u>Testimonia</u>

- Harivarman's *Satyasiddhiśāstra*:[24] 大多陀羅驃是中色可見 which is reconstructed by Sastri as *mahaty anekadravyavattvāt rūpāc copalabdhiḥ*.[25] In my opinion however it is not possible to be sure of the original wording of the Sanskrit.

- NBh ad NS 3.1.35 (NV^2 p. 764.3): *mahattvād anekadravyavattvād rūpavattvāc copalabdhiḥ*.

- NBh ad NS 3.1.40 (NV^2 p. 769.5-6): *mahadanekadravyavattvād rūpaviśeṣāc copalabdhiḥ*.

- NBh ad NS 3.1.67 (NV^2 p. 800.4): *mahattvānekadravyatvād rūpāc copalabdhiḥ*.[26]

- Dignāga: this sûtra is quoted in a fragment attributed to Dignāga found in the NVTṬ (NV^1 329.12-31, NV^2 165.28), reading *mahadanekadravyasamavāyād rūpāc copalabdhiḥ*.[27] I am not at present aware which work of Dignāga this is quoted from.

- NV ad NS 3.1.37 (NV^2 p. 765.8): *mahadanekadravyavattvād rūpavattvāc copalabdhiḥ*.[28]

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[21] Cf. VS 3.2.3 *prayatnāyaugapadyāj jñānāyaugapadyāc caikaṃ manaḥ*: 'Because of the non-simultaneity of [different] volitions and because of the non-simultaneity of [different] knowledges, there is [only] one internal organ [in each person]'.

[22] Cf. VS 7.1.30 *tadabhāvād aṇu manaḥ*: 'Because it does not possess that (i.e. *vibhava* or all-pervadingness, mentioned in 7.1.28) the internal organ is atomic [in size]'.

[23] Cf. VS 5.2.15 *hastakarmaṇā manasaḥ karma vyākhyātam*: 'The action (or motion) of the internal organ is explained by (i.e. in the same way as) the action of the hand (i.e. as being a result of conjunction with the *ātman* and a particular volition of the ātman: cf. VS 5.1.1)'.

[24] *Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō* vol. 31, work no. 1646, p. 329c, line 26-27.

[25] Sastri 1975, 365.3-4.

[26] All three of these quotations in the NBh are followed by *iti* and clearly intended as quotations.

[27] One wonders whether this reading is a result of contamination with 4.1.9.

[28] Cf. also the NV ad NS 2.1.32 (NV^2 470.13): *mahadanekadravyarūpāṇy upalabdhikāraṇāni*.

— Vip 37.23-24: *mahaty anekadravyavattvād*[29] *rūpyāc*[30] *copalabdhiḥ*.

— HBṬ 168.2-3: *mahattvād anekadravyavattvād rūpāc copalabdhiḥ*. Note however that Durvekamiśra in his commentary *Āloka* on the HBṬ apparently read *mahaty* rather than *mahattvād* here (HBṬ 382.7).

— TSP 52.22: *mahaty anekadravyavattvād rūpāc copalabdhiḥ*. Quoted again, with the same reading, at 57.16-17 and 234.18.

— AKBhS 561.14: *mahaty anekadravyavattvād rūpāc copalabdhiḥ*.

— Vy (Vy¹ 272.21-22): *mahattvād anekadravyavattvād rūpaviśeṣāc ca dravyaṃ pratyakṣam*. Again quoted at Vy¹ 442.6-8, reading *dravyapratyakṣam* for *dravyaṃ pratyakṣam*.[31]

In addition to these, this sūtra is also quoted, according to Jambuvijayaji,[32] in Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka's *Tattvārtharājavārtika* and Prabhācandra's *Nyāyakumudacandra*, both apparently reading *mahaty anekadravyavattvād rūpāc copalabdhiḥ*. Jambuvijayaji also refers to the following passage from Śālikanātha's *Prakaraṇapañcikā*: *mahattvam anekadravyatvaṃ rūpaviśeṣaś ca sannikarṣa iva pratyakṣatve hetuḥ*.[33]

This sūtra is of great importance for the Vaiśeṣika theory of perception, as is evident already from the large number of quotations of it in other philosophical works. It gives the causes or conditions for the perception of substances.

There is clearly a difficult textual problem here; whereas the commentaries on the VS are unanimous in reading *mahaty*, a locative, many old testimonia point to another reading, either with *mahattvād*, ablative, or with *mahat* or *mahattva* as the first part of a compound with *anekadravyavattva*, again in the ablative. M. Honda has recently expressed his opinion that the reading quoted in the Vy is the original one.[34] According to him the reading *mahaty* was introduced partly under influence of the PDhS.[35] In my opinion it is somewhat more likely that it is the PDhS which is modelling itself on the sūtra here, and not the other way around. The word *mahati* seems to be more functional in the sūtra, if looked at in a wider context, than in the PDhS. That is to say, it could be taken as alluding to the preceding sūtras 4.1.1-5, which are concerned with atoms, and particularly 4.1.5. This sūtra is read by C as *avidyā ca*, by V as *avidyā cāsmadādīnām* and by Ś simpy as *avidyā*. Both C and V interpret this sūtra as referring to the fact that atoms can not be perceived (by ordinary

[29] Read so for the *anekadravyavattād* of Shastri's edition.

[30] So Shastri's edition: the edition used by Jambuvijayaji apparently reads *rūpāc*: cf. p 233.7-8 of C.

[31] Cf. Appendix A, nos. 27 and 46.

[32] Cf. C 233.

[33] Cf. also Thakur 1969b, 49.

[34] Honda 1986, 432-431.

[35] *dravye tāvat mahaty anekadravyavattvodbhūtarūpaprakāśacatuṣṭayasannikarṣād dharmādisāmagrye ca svarūpālocanamātram*: discussed as sentence 5 in chapter 4 below.

people at least). 4.1.6 then proceeds to say that perception is possible only in regard to substances which are large, and as a result of certain conditions or causes.

Another related problem is the meaning of *anekadravyavat* here. V understands this as meaning 'being produced from parts which are made up of more than one substance': *anekadravyam āśrayo yasya tad anekadravyam. tadvattvāt tadārabdhatvāt.*[36] This sounds like a late interpretation which presupposes a fully developed theory of *dvyaṇukas* and *tryaṇukas*, for this distinction between a substance which possesses many substances as inherence causes and a substance which possesses parts which possess many substances as inherence causes seems only to be relevant for the case of a *tryaṇuka*. Faddegon however already pointed out that *anekadravyavat* may be taken as a derivative with superfluous suffix, and supports the translation 'in consequence of its possessing substances more than one'.[37] I believe that this is the probable original meaning, and as Faddegon also pointed out, it is confirmed by the fact that 4.1.9 simply reads *anekadravyeṇa (dravyeṇa)*.

On the word *rūpāc* V remarks that *rūpād ity atrodbhūtād*[38] *iti śeṣaḥ*:[39] 'one must supply the word "[which is] manifest" to the word "because of colour" [in the sūtra]'. This is a reflection of a theory which is in my opinion not found in the VS.[40]

Mention should be made here of Vyomaśiva's remarks on this sūtra. After Vyomaśiva has declared, against conventional Vaiśeṣika doctrine, that air is perceptible, an opponent raises the objection that this contradicts VS 4.1.6. It is worth quoting the ensuing discussion *in extenso*. *atha mahattvād anekadravyavattvāt rūpaviśeṣāc ca dravyaṃ pratyakṣam iti sūtravirodhaḥ. na, sūtrārthāparijñānāt. tathā ca sūtrārthaḥ, aparokṣajñānasadbhāve sati samastaṃ vyastaṃ ca lakṣaṇam iti jñeyam. yatra hy aparokṣajñānaṃ tatra amīṣāṃ samastavyastānāṃ kāraṇatvam. tathā hy ātmā mahattvād eva pratyakṣaḥ. vāyus tu mahattvānekadravyavattvābhyāṃ ca. yatra cakṣuḥsparśanābhyāṃ vijñānaṃ dravye tatra samastaṃ lakṣaṇam iti. prādhānyaṃ tu yathādarśanam abhyupeyam. tathā hi rātrāv agnir dūre 'py upalabhyate rūpātiśayāt, mahattvānekadravyavattve 'py agrahaṇaṃ parvatāder iti rūpasya prādhānyam. evam ālokasya sadbhāve dūre 'pi parvatāder grahaṇam. mahattve tv alpaprādhānyam ity utprekṣyam.* '[An opponent says:] "In that case (i.e. if you claim that air is perceptible) you contradict the sūtra which says that 'a substance is perceptible because of its largeness, its possessing [parts which possess] many substances [as inherence

[36] V 44.9-10. A similar explanation is given in Ś 138.3-5, and cf. also Vyomaśiva's *anekaṃ ca dravyaṃ cety anekadravyaṃ tad yasyāsti tat tadvat, tasya bhāve 'nekadravyavattvam* (emend thus with Vy^2 against Vy^1's *'nekadravyatvam*) Vy^1 557.19-20, Vy2 vol. 2 141.12-13.

[37] Faddegon 1918, 287-288.

[38] Emend so for the printed *atrodbhatād*.

[39] V 44.10.

[40] Cf. also the commentary on 4.1.8 and 4.1.9.

causes] and its particular colour'".[41] [We reply]: No, [there is no contradiction with the sūtra] because [your objection arises] from not thoroughly understanding the meaning of the sūtra. The meaning of the sūtra is as follows: it should be understood as [giving] a definition [of the causes of perception] whenever there is direct (perceptual) knowledge, [which may either be taken as] an aggregate [or each cause may be] separate. For wherever there is direct (perceptual) knowledge, those [factors named in the sūtra] are the cause, either separately or as an aggregate. For example, the *ātman* is perceptible only because of its largeness [and not because of the other two causes, which are not found in the *ātman*], while air [is perceptible] because of its largeness and its possessing [parts which possess] many substances [as inherence causes]. And in the cases where there is cognition (*vijñānam*) in regard to a substance by means of both the organ of sight and the organ of touch, [the sūtra is to be taken as giving] an aggregate definition. [The question which of these factors is] preeminent must however be decided in each [separate] case. For example, at night a fire is perceived even when at a [great] distance, because of its abundance of colour, while a mountain and so on is not apprehended despites its largeness and its possessing [parts which possess] many substances [as inherence causes]. Therefore [in this case] colour is the preeminent [causal factor]. Similarly, when there is [sufficient] light, a mountain and so on is apprehended even when at a [great] distance. Largeness however must be regarded as being of relatively small importance [as a causal factor].'

This explanation of Vyomaśiva, according to which it is not necessary in all cases that all the factors mentioned in the sūtra be present for perception of a substance to be possible, is as far as I am aware unique to him. Presumably it is inspired by his desire to avoid the position, which the Vaiśeṣika's are normally forced into, that in the case of air we perceive the quality touch inherent in the air but not air itself. One wonders however how Vyomaśiva got around VS 4.1.8 — or did he not accept this sūtra?

VS 4.1.7

C *adravyavattvāt paramāṇāv anupalabdhiḥ*. The MS of V apparently does not contain this sūtra, but Thakur inserts it (within square brackets) in his edition, reading *adravyatvāt paramāṇāv anupalabdhiḥ*. Presumably this is based solely on the strength of the words *tatra paramāṇau dravyārabdhatvābhāvāc cakṣurādinānupalabdhiḥ* which are found in V's commentary.[42] Jambuvijayaji apparently assumes that V read this sūtra in the same reading as C.[43] This seems somewhat more plausible than Thakur's suggestion, but I am not completely certain that

[41] In the example he gives Vyomaśiva seems to equate *rūpaviśeṣa* with *rūpātiśaya*, abundance of colour. In another passage, commenting on the word *rūpaviśeṣa* occurring in the PDhS, Vyomaśiva explains it as 'manifestness', cf. the annotation on sentence 7 in chapter four below.

[42] V 44.15.

[43] Cf. C 110.

the passage from V quoted above must really be taken as a commentary on this sūtra: the word *tatra* also allows one to suppose that this is rather an additional remark belonging to the commentary on the previous sūtra. Ś omits this sūtra.[44]

Testimonia

— NV ad NS 2.1.33 (NV^2 490.5): *adravyadravyatvāt*[45] *paramāṇāv anupalabdhiḥ*.

— TSP 52.23: same reading as C.

In addition to these, this sūtra is apparently also quoted, presumably together with 4.1.8, in Siddhasena Divākara's *Nyāyāvatāra* and in Puṇyarāja's *Vākyapadīyaṭīkā*.[46]

The evidence available on this sūtra raises in my opinion some doubts about its authenticity (that is to say its belonging to the same historical level of the VS as the rest of the section on perception in *adhyāya* 4). Candrānanda is the only commentator of whom we can be certain that he read this sūtra at all, and we do not have any quotation of the sūtra which predates the seventh century. Note also that Śāntarakṣita quotes 4.1.6 and 4.1.8 together in the Vip,[47] without referring to 4.1.7. A more serious argument is that this is the only sūtra in the VS which contains the word *paramāṇu*. Note that the beginning of *adhyāya* 4 (4.1-5) deals with atoms, but in a somewhat cryptic fashion which suggests a very early phase of the development of an atomic theory.[48] The word *paramāṇu* on the other hand may point to a somewhat later and more developed stage.

The function of this sūtra may be said to be twofold: to explain why we do not perceive atoms and to explain the reason why *anekadravyavattva* is said in 4.1.6 to be a cause or condition of the perception of substances. As such one may well suspect that it is a piece of (originally oral) commentary on 4.1.6 which later came to be regarded as a sūtra in its own right.

VS 4.1.8

C *rūpasaṃskārābhāvād vāyāv anupalabdhiḥ*. V as C but reading *vāyor* for *vāyāv*. Ś *saty api dravyatve mahattve rūpasaṃskārābhāvād vāyor anupalabdhiḥ*. Śaṅkara Miśra does not however actually comment on the words *saty api dravyatve mahattve*.

Testimonia

[44] Cf. the following remark from Śaṅkara Miśra's commentary on 4.1.6: *tathā ca paramāṇor mahattvābhāvād anupalabdhir ity uktaṃ bhavati* (Ś 198.7-8).

[45] Jambuvijayaji quotes the Jaisalmer MS of the NV as reading *adravyavattvāt*; cf. C 233.

[46] Cf. Thakur's introduction to his edition of V, p. 13.

[47] Vip 37.23-25.

[48] E.g. 4.1.1 *sad akāraṇavat tan nityam*: 'That which exists but does not have a cause is eternal'.

— NV ad NS 2:1.33 (NV² 490.5-6): same reading as V.

— Vip 37.24-25: *rūpasaṃskārābhāvād vāyānupalabdhiḥ* (sic! presumably we should emend to *vāyāv anupalabdhiḥ* as also read by Jambuvijayaji[49]).

— TSP 52.24: same reading as V.

This sūtra does not present any particular textual problems. The evidence does not seem to allow one to choose with certainty between the readings *vāyāv* and *vāyor*, but as far as the meaning of the sūtra goes this variant may be said to be unimportant. It should however perhaps be pointed out that if *vāyor* should prove to be the original reading this would in my opinion cast some further doubt on the previous sūtra, where *anupalabdhiḥ* is used with a locative. Conversely, one could argue that at the time 4.1.7 was added the most current reading of 4.1.8 probably was *vāyāv*. The reading found in Ś may be dismissed as clearly expanded and late.

The word *rūpasaṃskāra*° provides us with an interesting and important problem of interpretation. What is the precise meaning of the term *saṃskāra* here? Turning first to the commentaries on the VS, we have already seen that Candrānanda more or less evades the question by glossing *rūpasaṃskārābhāvāt* with *rūpākhyasya saṃskārasyābhāvāt*:[50] 'because of the absence of the trace (*saṃskāra*) called colour', without explaining the sense of *saṃskāra* here. V gives us a clear gloss of the word: *rūpasya saṃskāro 'tiśayaḥ udbhūtatvam*:[51] 'the trace of colour, [that is to say its] abundance [or] manifestness'. Finally, Śaṅkara Miśra explains the word as follows: *rūpasaṃskārapadena rūpasamavāyo rūpodbhavo rūpānabhibhavaś ca vivakṣitaḥ*: 'by the word *rūpasaṃskāra* [the author] means inherence of colour, manifestness of colour and the colour's not being overpowered [by other qualities].'[52] Śaṅkara Miśra also quotes a fragment from a lost *Vṛtti* on this sūtra: *vṛttikṛtas tu rūpaṃ ca rūpasaṃskāraś cety ekarūpapadalopaḥ. tena rūpābhāvād vāyor anupalabdhiḥ, rūpasaṃskārābhāvāc cakṣurādīnām anupalabdhir ity āhuḥ*:[53] 'the author of the *Vṛtti* however says that [the word *rūpasaṃskāra* here means] colour (*rūpa*) and the trace of colour (*rūpasaṃskāra*), [that is to say that] the word *rūpa* has been elided once. Therefore there is no perception of wind because of the absence of colour [in it], and there is no perception of the visual organ and so on because of the absence of the trace of colour.' Judging by the example given, the author of this commentary took *rūpasaṃskāra* as meaning 'manifestness of colour'.

In addition to these explanations given by the various commentators on the VS, we are fortunate enough to have some even older evidence on this problem. Two of the writers who quote this sūtra, Uddyotakara and Kamalaśīla,

[49] Cf. C 233.
[50] C 33.9.
[51] V 44.18.
[52] Ś 199.11-12.
[53] Ś 200.4-7.

apparently thought that the sense of the word *saṃskāra* was not immediately self-evident. Both authors add an explanatory note glossing *rūpasaṃskāra* as *rūpasamavāya*,[54] 'the inherence of colour [in air]'.

Of these interpretations, those by Śaṅkara Miśra and the author of the *Vṛtti*, who both attempt to read more than one meaning into the word, and both appeal to the theory of manifest and unmanifest colour, may perhaps be dismissed without much hesitation. V's explanation, though simpler, also takes *saṃskāra* to mean manifestness. Apart from the fact that, as already stated, the term *udbhūta* does not occur in the VS, it would be in any case irrelevant to mention it, since in the early Vaiśeṣika air does not possess the quality colour at all. Of the qualities specifically connected to the elements, air only possesses touch.[55] There would therefore be no point in using the word *saṃskāra* if this really meant 'manifestness' as opposed to 'unmanifestness'.[56]

This seems to leave the explanation given by Uddyotakara and Kamalaśīla as the only more or less acceptable alternative. It is conceivable that in a period before inherence had become recognized as a category, a different word was used to express the idea, although such a meaning for *saṃskāra* certainly seems rather unnatural. If this were correct, it would seem to imply that this sūtra is older than 4.1.9, which contains the word *samavāya*. It must however be pointed out that the term *saṃskāra* occurs in several other sūtras (5.1.17, 5.1.18, 9.22, 9.25) but never in the sense of *samavāya* (or in any sense that seems appropriate here). It might also perhaps be possible to understand *saṃskāra* in a slightly different way, as meaning something like 'conditioning' or 'conditioned', a sense which is well attested in Buddhist literature.

We may in any case aver with certainty that *saṃskāra* here does not refer to the quality trace as accepted and defined by later Vaiśeṣika writers.[57] It therefore seems probable that this sūtra predates the introduction of *saṃskāra* as a quality, that is to say that it belongs to approximately the same layer of the VS as 1.1.5, which enumerates the qualities without including *saṃskāra*.[58]

VS 4.1.9

C ***anekadravyeṇa dravyeṇa samavāyād rūpaviśeṣāc copalabdhiḥ***. Note that MS O and the section of MS P which gives only the *sūtrapāṭha* omit *dravyeṇa*: C's commentary does not in my opinion decisively support either reading. V omits this sūtra: I conjecture that this omission is either due to a scribal error or, less plausibly, a result of the process of abbreviation from Bhaṭṭa Vādīndra's commentary, since V does include 4.1.10, which refers to this sūtra, and also

[54] NV[2] 490.5, TSP 53.1.

[55] *sparśavān vāyuḥ*. VS 2.1.4.

[56] Cf. also the commentary on 4.1.9 below.

[57] Cf. Praśastapāda's description of *saṃskāra*, which begins *saṃskāras trividho vego bhāvanā sthitisthāpakaś ca* (NK 266.23-24).

[58] Cf. also the commentary on 4.1.12 below.

seems to refer to it in the commentary on 4.1.11. Ś reads *anekadravyasamavāyāt* (sic) *rūpaviśeṣāc copalabdhiḥ*.

Testimonia

- NBh ad NS 3.1.37 (NV² 766.5): *anekadravyasamavāyād rūpaviśeṣāc ca rūpopalabdhiḥ*. This is often mistakenly taken as NS 3.1.38 (so also in NV²). Thakur has however convincingly shown that this is part of the NBh.[59]

- NBh ad NS 3.1.40 (NV² 769.4): *anekadravyeṇa samavāyād rūpaviśeṣāc copalabdhiḥ*.

- NV ad NS 1.2.2 (NV¹ 624.19, NV² 358.6-7): *anekadravyeṇa dravyeṇa samavāyād rūpaviśeṣāc ca rūpopalabdhiḥ*. NV² reads *anekadravyasamavāyād* for *anekadravyeṇa dravyeṇa samavāyād*.

- Vy (Vy¹ 441.20-21, Vy² vol. 2 15.20-21): *anekadravyeṇa samavāyāt svagataviśeṣāc ca rūpaṃ pratyakṣam*. Vy¹ adds *dravyeṇa* in parenthesis after *anekadravyeṇa*: presumably this is an editorial addition not actually in the MS.[60]

- TBhP 213.8-9: *anekadravyeṇa samavāyād rūpaviśeṣāc ca rūpopalabdhiḥ*. Actually Cinnambhaṭṭa quotes this from the NBh: cf. ... *ity etatsūtravyākhyānāvasare nyāyabhāṣyakāreṇoktam* (TBhP 213.9).

It does not seem possible to determine on the basis of the material presented above what the original reading of this sūtra was. None of the variants however gives a significantly different sense.[61]

The critical question in regard to the interpretation of this sūtra is the meaning of the word *rūpaviśeṣa*. Candrānanda, as we have seen in the previous chapter, explains this as 'the limited universal called "colourness"'.[62] Unfortunately Bhaṭṭa Vādīndra's commentary on this sūtra (assuming that he did indeed accept it) has not been preserved. Śaṅkara Miśra explains *rūpaviśeṣa* as follows: *rūpagato viśeṣo rūpaviśeṣaḥ tac codbhūtatvam anabhibhūtatvaṃ rūpatvaṃ ca*:[63] 'The particularity which is in colour [is called] *rūpaviśeṣa*, and this [comprises its] manifestness, [its] not being overpowered and [the universal] "colourness"'. Pakṣilasvāmin gives the following explanation: *rūpaviśeṣas tu yadbhāvāt kvacid rūpopalabdhiḥ yadabhāvāc ca dravyasya kvacid anupalabdhiḥ sa rūpadharmo 'yam udbhavasamākhyāta iti. anudbhūtarūpaś cāyaṃ nāyano raśmiḥ, tasmāt pratyakṣato nopalabhyate iti*:[64] '*rūpaviśeṣa* is the property (*dharma*) of colour

[59] Cf. Thakur 1963a, 79-80.

[60] Cf. also Appendix A, no. 45.

[61] In the case of the reading *copalabdhiḥ* the context requires us to understand *upalabdhiḥ* as *rūpopalabdhiḥ*.

[62] *rūpaviśeṣāc ca rūpatvākhyāt sāmānyaviśeṣāt*. C 33.13-14.

[63] Ś 201.3-4.

[64] NV² 766.7–767.1.

the presence of which causes colour sometimes to be apprehended, and the absence of which causes substance sometimes not to be apprehended; this [property of colour] is called "manifestness". And the ray [of fire atoms] which belongs to the eye does not have manifest colour, and is for this reason not apprehended by perception.'

If we may dismiss the somewhat eclectic and, I believe, clearly late explanation given in Ś, we are apparently left with two interpretations of *rūpaviśeṣa*: Candrānanda understanding *viśeṣa* as *sāmānyaviśeṣa* and Pakṣilasvāmin as more or less equivalent to *udbhūtatvam*. The latter explanation however again presupposes the distinction between manifest (*udbhūta*) and non-manifest colour, which is found nowhere else in the VS. The terms *udbhūta* and *anudbhūta* also do not occur in the NS. To the best of my knowledge they are first used by Pakṣilasvāmin (in the NBh ad NS 3.1.40), who introduces them to explain why the ray which proceeds from the eyeball and comes into contact with the objects of perception is not itself perceived. It is in this context also that Pakṣilasvāmin quotes the sūtra under discussion. It therefore appears likely to me that Pakṣilasvāmin was attempting to give added weight to his usage of concepts not found in the NS by maintaining that they were already alluded to in the VS. It seems however quite unlikely to me that this represents an interpretation that is faithful to the original intention of the sūtra.

Candrānanda's interpretation seems more probable, and it may be noted that it appears to be supported by Dignāga, who takes the *tad* in 4.1.11 as referring to the universals *rūpatva* and so on.[65]

VS 4.1.10

C, V *etena rasagandhasparśeṣu jñānaṃ vyākhyātam*. Ś's text is the same, except for reading *tena* for *etena*.

Testimonia

- — NV ad NS 1.2.2 (NV[1] 624.20, NV[2] 358.7): same reading as C and V, but *anena* for *etena*.
- — Vy (Vy[1] 441.21, Vy[2] vol. 2 15.21-22): *etena rasādiṣu jñānaṃ vyākhyātam*.

There is no serious textual problem here, the variants being semantically equivalent; *etena* however is the word which is normally used in this way in the VS, cf. 2.2.2, 2.2.18, 4.1.14, 5.2.24, 6.1.15, 7.1.7, 7.1.13, 7.1.23, 7.2.11, 9.8 and 9.19. The interpretation too does not offer many difficulties: it may perhaps suffice to refer to the translation of Candrānanda's commentary in the previous chapter.

[65]Cf. the commentary on 4.1.11 below.

VS 4.1.11

C, V *tadabhāvād avyabhicāraḥ*. Ś *tasyābhāvād avyabhicāraḥ*.

Testimonia

— PSV (*pratyakṣaparicceheda*):[66] *de med pa'i phyir mi 'khrul lo* = *tadabhāvād avyabhicāraḥ*. So Vasudhararakṣita's translation: Kanakavarman's translation apparently reads *med phyir mi 'khrul lo*.[67]. In view of the passage before this where both translations read *de med pa'i phyir dbaṅ po'i blo sṅon po la mi 'khrul lo*,[68] we should perhaps follow Vasudhararakṣita's translation here; in any case it seems probably that Dignāga knew the same reading as C and V.

There seems to be no real textual problem here, but the problems of interpretation are all the greater. C as we have already seen takes *tad* as referring to the *anekadravyeṇa dravyeṇa samavāya* of 4.1.9, and assumes that the sūtra is meant to explain the non-perception of the colour of atoms. V's commentary runs *tasya cākṣuṣapratyakṣasyātmany abhāvāt, na cākṣuṣapratyakṣam anekadravyārabdhatvarūpaviśeṣau vyabhicarati*: 'because of the absence of this [namely] visual perception, in regard to the *ātman*, visual perception does not deviate from (i.e. is fully concomitant with) "being produced from [substances which possess] many substances" and *rūpaviśeṣa*'. This interpretation, which appears to take the sūtra as referring to the non-perception of the *ātman*, seems very unlikely, considering that the sūtras both preceding and succeeding this one deal with the perception of qualities. The interpretation given by Śaṅkara Miśra, according to whom this sūtra refers to the quality weight, is even more unlikely, as was pointed out already by Faddegon.[69]

A much more plausible explanation, which does not require the assumption that this sūtra is referring to substances or qualities which are not mentioned in this *adhyāya*, is given by Dignāga in the PSV. He explains this sūtra as meaning that 'the non-deviation [of the sense-cognitions from their respective objects][70] is because of an absence, for example, the absence of color-ness in sound, but not because of a presence, for example the presence of color-ness in color.'[71] One must agree with Hattori that this interpretation, though apparently not found elsewhere, seems by far the best.[72]

[66] Tibetan text in Hattori 1968b, 204-205, *Ej*. Sanskrit reconstruction by Jambuvijayaji in his edition of C, p. 171.

[67] Hattori's edition reads *med phyir min* for *med phyir* but this is an editorial addition: cf. Hattori 1968b, 143, note 4.43.

[68] Hattori 1968b, 204-205, *Ee*.

[69] Faddegon 1918, 288-289.

[70] I.e. the fact that each of the sense organs perceives the particular quality which is related to it, and the eye, for instance, does not perceive sound or taste.

[71] Translation by Hattori in Hattori 1968b, 47. Text in Hattori 1968b, 204-205, *Ej*.

[72] Cf. Hattori 1968b, 141-142, note 4.37.

VS 4.1.12

C, V, Ś *saṃkhyāḥ parimāṇāni pṛthaktvaṃ saṃyogavibhāgau paratvāparatve karma ca rūpidravyasamavāyāc cākṣuṣāṇi.*

Testimonia

- TSP 57.14-15: as the VS commentaries but reading *rūpisamavāyāc cākṣuṣāt*. Again quoted at 263.21-22 and 287.11-13, both times with the reading *rūpisamavāyāc cākṣuṣāṇi*.
- Jinendrabuddhi's *Viśālāmalavatī*:[73] reading *saṃkhyā* for *saṃkhyāḥ* and *rūpisamavāyāc cākṣuṣāṇi*.
- Vy (Vy¹ 194.27-28): same reading as the VS commentaries.[74]
- NK 29.11-12: reading *saṃkhyā* and *rūpidravyasamavāyāc* (v.l. *rūpavaddravyasamavāyāc*) *cākṣuṣāṇi*.
- Kir 31.13-14: as the VS commentaries but reading °*rūpa*° for °*rūpi*°.
- TBhP 211.13-14: reading *saṃkhyā* and *rūpidravyasamavāyāś* (MSS A and B however °*samavāyāc*, which is probably better here too) *cākṣuṣāṇi*.

In addition to these, this sūtra is also quoted by Śālikanātha in his *Prakaraṇapañcikā*, with the same reading as the VS commentaries.[75]

This sūtra may be said to be quite free from textual problems. The VS commentaries are unanimous in their reading, and are supported by the oldest testimonium known to me. The various variants found in the other testimonia are not particularly significant, and do not give a really different sense.

As far as the function of the sūtra goes, it explains the way in which actions and the qualities which are not specifically connected with one of the sense organs are perceived. The sūtra only mentions visual perception, but both V[76] and Ś[77] claim that tactile perception is to be understood as being included. This is presumably to bring the sūtra in line with the parallel passage in the PDhS.[78]

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[73] Tibetan text not at present available to me: Sanskrit reconstruction by Jambuvijayaji in his edition of C, 178.20-21.

[74] Cf. Appendix A, no.

[75] Cf. Thakur 1969b, 48.

[76] *spārśanāni ceti śeṣaḥ.* V 45.3.

[77] *cākṣuṣāṇīti spārśanatvam apy upalakṣayati, yad vā cakāra eva cākṣuṣāṇi cety atrāpi yojyaḥ*: 'the word "objects of visual perception" [in the sūtra] implies also that [these qualities and actions] can be perceived by touch. Or, alternatively, the word "and" [in the sūtra] should be construed here as well, [i.e. as] "objects of visual perception and [of tactile perception]."' Ś 205.7-9.

[78] *saṃkhyāparimāṇapṛthaktvasaṃyogavibhāgaparatvāparatvasnehadravatvavegakarmaṇām pratyakṣadravyasamavāyāc cakṣuḥsparśanābhyāṃ grahaṇam*: sentence 9 in chapter 4 below.

There are strong reasons for assuming that this sūtra belongs to an old layer of the VS. If we compare the related passage in the PDhS we see that Praśastapāda reproduces this list but adds the qualities viscidity (*sneha*), fluidity (*dravatva*) and impulse (*vega*, one of the three kinds of trace). Why are these not listed in the sūtra as well? Most probably because they were not recognized as qualities at the time that this particular sūtra was composed. It is well-known that the sūtra which enumerates the different qualities (1.1.5) includes only 17, whereas the classical Vaiśeṣika recognizes 24 different qualities, adding weight (*gurutva*), fluidity, viscidity, trace, *dharma*, *adharma* and sound.[79] Some of these at least probably came to be regarded as qualities at a fairly early date, weight for instance being referred to in a number of sūtras.[80] Our sūtra would seem to predate this addition.

VS 4.1.13

C, V *arūpiṣv acākṣuṣatvāt.* Ś *arūpiṣv acākṣuṣāṇi.*

Testimonia

- PDhS (NK 44.4): *arūpiṣv acākṣuṣavacanāt.* Unfortunately this gives us no certainty as to whether Praśastapāda knew this sūtra in the reading of C and V or in that of Ś.
- Vy (Vy¹ 270.29): same reading as C and V.[81]
- TBhP 215.14: same reading as Ś.

The material presented above suggests that *acākṣuṣatvāt* is the older reading. The interpretation of this sūtra does not seem to present any particular problem.

VS 4.1.14

C *etena guṇatve bhāve ca sarvendriyajñānam*[82] *vyākhyātam.* V and Ś as C but reading *sarvendriyaṃ jñānam.*

Testimonia

- *Viśālāmalavatī*:[83] *'dis ni yon tan ñid dan yod pa ñid la dban po thams cad pa'i śes par bśad do*, which Jambuvijayaji reconstructs as *etena guṇatve*

[79]The standard explanation given as to why the sūtra does not list the last seven is that they are implied by the inclusion of the word *ca*, 'and', in the sūtra. cf. the PDhS's *caśabdasamuccitāś ca gurutvadravatvasnehasaṃskārādṛṣṭaśabdāḥ saptaivety evaṃ caturviṃśatir guṇāḥ*. NK 10.12-14.

[80]Cf. VS 1.1.27, 5.1.7, 5.1.13, 5.1.18 and 5.2.3.

[81]Cf. Appendix A, no. 24.

[82]Note that this is actually the reading of MS O only: the section of MS P which gives the sūtras within the commentary reads *sārvendriyajñānam*, and the section of P which gives only the *sūtrapāṭha* reads *sarvendriyaṃ jñānam*. Unfortunately the commentary does not allow us to determine with certainty what Candrānanda really read here.

[83]Tibetan quoted in Hattori 1968b, 140, note 4.25. Sanskrit reconstruction by Jambuvijayaji C 178.9-10.

bhāve ca sarvendriyaṃ jñānaṃ vyākhyātam. It is however perhaps more likely that *yod pa ñid la* represents an original *sattāyām* rather than *bhāve*, while *thams cad pa'i śes pa* suggests *sārvendriyaṃ jñānam* or *sarvendriya-jñānam* more than *sarvendriyaṃ jñānam*.

— Vy (Vy[1] 559.6-7): *sattāyāṃ guṇatve ca sarvendriyajñānam*.[84]

Cf. also the NV ad NS 1.1.24 (NV[1] 419.1): *sattāguṇatve ca sarvendriyagrāhye*.

It is not easy to establish what the original reading of this sūtra was,[85] but none of the variants gives a significantly different sense.

This is the only sūtra in *adhyāya* 4 which deals with the perception of universals, and unfortunately it does not seem to offer us very much information. Nothing is said about the universals other than 'being' and 'qualityness'. A universal such as 'substanceness' would not however be perceptible by all the senses, since substances can only be perceived by sight and touch. Quality is the only category which is perceived by all the senses, and therefore 'qualityness' and 'being', the only universals which are inherent in all the kinds of quality, are also so perceived. Cf. the commentary given in V: *eteneti yadindriyagrāhyam yat taddharmā api tadindriyagrāhyā iti vyutpādaneneti*:[86] 'the word "by this [rule]" means by the teaching that if a certain object is perceptible by a particular sense organ, its qualities are also perceptible by that same sense organ.'

Let us now sum up the results of this somewhat closer look at VS 4.1.6-14. I hope that I have been able to demonstrate, chiefly on the basis of internal evidence such as terminology, that most of this section belongs to a very old layer of the VS. Particularly noteworthy is the systematic arrangement on the basis of the Vaiśeṣika categories, perhaps the most obvious difference in character between this section and *adhyāya* 8. An interesting point is also that the perception of sound is not discussed,[87] which could again point to a period in the development of the Vaiśeṣika when sound was not yet recognized as a quality.[88]

Though I believe that the whole section is quite old, it is perhaps possible to distinguish different historical levels within it. I have argued above that 4.1.7 may be a relatively late addition. I would like to put forth one other, admittedly much more speculative theory. If 4.1.6, as suggested above, refers to and is connected with 4.1.1-5, it could be possible that in the oldest form this *āhnika* consisted only of 4.1.1-6, and that the other sūtras were only added later, in order to give a more or less complete account of perception. Originally,

[84] Cf. Appendix A, no. 66.

[85] As far as the reading *sattāyām* versus the reading *bhāve* is concerned, it may be noted that the word *sattā* is used once in the VS in the sense '[the universal] "being"' (1.2.8), while *bhāva* is used in the same sense at least six times (1.2.4, 1.2.18, 2.1.28, 2.2.8, 2.2.14, 7.2.30).

[86] V 45.8-9.

[87] The perception of sound is however referred to, though not explained, in 2.1.25 and 2.2.24.

[88] Sound is another one of the qualities which is not mentioned in 1.1.5.

however, the main concern would have lain with the account of the elements especially in their permanent (or atomic) form.[89] An argument in favour of this theory could be the fact that, according to C and V, in 4.1.5 the term *avidyā* is used to mean non-perception[90], whereas in 4.1.7-8 *anupalabdhiḥ* is found.

VS 8.1

C, V, Ś *dravyeṣu jñānaṃ vyākhyātam.*[91]

No quotations of this sūtra in other works known to me at present.

As we have seen in the previous chapter, Candrānanda seems to take this sūtra as referring to 3.1.13. Ś takes the sūtra as referring to 3.1.2 and 3.1.13.[92]

The text and commentary of V on this and the following two sūtras present us with some interesting problems. Beginning from 8.1, the text as edited by Thakur reads as follows.

dravyeṣu jñānaṃ [vyākhyātam]. 8.1

[dravyeṣu bhūmyādinavasu dvitīyādhyāyavyākhyāteṣv ātmany atirikte jñānaṃ tadāśraya ā]tmā ca.

jñānanirdeśe jñānaniṣpattir uktā. 8.2

vāgādiṣv alaiṅgikaṃ jñānam ātmany aparokṣajñānaṃ tṛtīyādhyāye vyākhyātam.

ātmamanasī kāraṇe vyākhyāte.[93] *8.3*

[kāraṇe samavāyikāraṇanimittakāraṇe vyākhyāte ya]treti jñānanirdeśaś caturtho 'dhyāyaḥ. tatra pṛthivyādiparamāṇuviṣayaṃ laiṅgikaṃ sthūlapṛthivyādiviṣayam aparokṣajñānaṃ sakāraṇaṃ vyākhyātam.[94]

All the material placed in square brackets by Thakur represents places where the MS, or, less probably, the transcript of the MS available to Thakur, is illegible. Thakur himself remarks that 'the frequent use of brackets both in the sūtras as well as in the commentary will show that we had to take liberty in many cases wherever the manuscript was found defective'.[95] Here it seems likely that both Thakur's reconstructions of the lacunae and his arrangement of the passage must be corrected. First of all, we note that the order of 8.2

[89] The second *āhnika* of this *adhyāya* proceeds to refute the notion that bodies consist of different kinds of elements combined, and may refer (in 4.2.1) to the conditions of perception listed in 4.1.6.

[90] C glosses *avidyā* with *agrahaṇam* (C 32.16), and V seems to interpret it as *anupalabdhiḥ*, introducing the sūtra with *na ca paramāṇvādayo yogyanupalabdhibādhitā ity āha* - (V 44.4).

[91] *vyākhyātam* is not actually found in the MS of V, which appears to have a lengthy lacuna here. Thakur is, however, probably justified in assuming that Bhaṭṭa Vādīndra did read this word; cf. the commentary below.

[92] *dravyeṣv iti viṣayeṇa viṣayinaṃ tṛtīyādhyāyam upalakṣayati. 'indriyārthaprasiddhir indriyārthebhyo 'rthāntarasya hetuḥ'* (3.1.2) *'ātmendriyārthasannikarṣād yan niṣpadyate tad anyat'* (3.1.13) *ity etābhyāṃ sūtrābhyāṃ jñānaṃ vyākhyātam ity arthaḥ.* Ś 355.5-8.

[93] Thakur expresses uncertainty as to whether this should be taken as a sūtra: *etasya sūtratvaṃ sandigdham* (V 75, note 1).

[94] V 75.4-12.

[95] Introduction to V, p. 9. It must also be remembered that the MS of V 'does not distinguish the sūtras from the commentary' (loc. cit.).

and 8.3 is apparently reversed in V. But if we look at what Thakur takes as the commentary on 8.3 (his 8.2) it seems very likely that, though the beginning of this sentence is almost certainly corrupt,[96] this really is a comment on 8.1.[97] What Thakur takes as 8.3 is probably a comment on 8.2, while the passage which Thakur prints as commentary on this belongs with 8.3 (his 8.2), as the word *jñānanirdeśa* clearly indicates. It therefore seems plausible that the *tmā ca* which follows the illegible passage taken by Thakur as the commentary on 8.1 is in fact half of the sūtra *mana ātmā ca*, i.e. 8.2. This means that the MS apparently first gives 8.1-3 — in the same order and very probably the same reading as C — and then the commentary on these three sūtras.[98] If the arrangement suggested here is correct, Bhaṭṭa Vādīndra too must have taken 8.1 as referring to the third *adhyāya*.

It seems therefore that the VS commentaries are fairly unanimous in understanding this sūtra as referring to the third *adhyāya*, and in particular to 3.1.13. If the interpretation of 8.2 offered below is accepted, one must agree with the commentators here. This implies that, at least at the time that 8.1 was written, 3.1.13 was regarded as a definition or explanation of perception in regard to substances.

VS 8.2

C *mana ātmā ca*. V probably, as I have argued above, knew the same reading. Ś *tatrātmā manaś cāpratyakṣe*.[99]

No testimonia known to me at present.

It appears most likely that the reading of C is the original one. Ś's reading again seems clearly late.

The meaning of this sūtra, which consists of two nominatives and the copulative *ca*, is not immediately self-evident. I am inclined to believe that the explanation of C and V is correct. The train of thought may be represented as follows. 8.1 indeed refers to 3.1.13 or at least to the theory contained therein, namely that perceptual knowledge arises because of contact between four factors. Of these factors, the *ātman* and the internal organ have already been discussed in *adhyāya* 3. The other two, the sense organs and the concept of an

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[96] In any case I am fairly confident that *alaiṅgikam* is a corruption for *laiṅgikam*. The word is clearly intended to contrast with *aparokṣa* (i.e. *pratyakṣa*), as is confirmed also by the commentary on 8.3. Furthermore *vāgādiṣu* also seems suspicious to me, as there is no suggestion in V's commentary on the third *adhyāya* that speech is discussed there. One would conjecture something like *vahnyādiṣu laiṅgikaṃ jñānam*, which would refer to the section on inference in the first *āhnika* of *adhyāya* 3.

[97] The word *vyākhyātam* in this comment also confirms Thakur's restoration of 8.1.

[98] If the amount of material placed in square brackets corresponds more or less accurately to the size of the lacuna in the MS (a fact about which we have no certainty, since Thakur gives us no precise information about the MS readings and the guidelines behind his reconstructions), there may have been an additional (commentatorial) sentence written between 8.1 and 8.2.

[99] 'In regard to this (i.e. the category substance and the perceptibility thereof) the *ātman* and the internal organ are not perceptible'.

'object' have not yet been defined or discussed, and indeed, an important section of the present *adhyāya* is devoted to the explanation of these terms (8.14-17). The word *vyākhyātam* (or rather *vyākhyāte*) must therefore be understood to be carried over from 8.1.[100] If this explanation is correct, some doubts may arise as to the section 8.3–8.13, for one would have expected 8.14 to follow immediately after 8.2. Śaṅkara Miśra's reading is probably the result of a misinterpretation of the sūtra.[101]

VS 8.3

C, V *jñānanirdeśe jñānaniṣpattir uktā.* Ś *jñānanirdeśe jñānaniṣpattividhir uktaḥ.*

No testimonia known to me at present.

Candrānanda seems to take this sūtra as referring again to 3.1.13, which would mean that this sūtra says little or nothing beyond what was said in 8.1. V, as we have seen, explains *jñānanirdeśa* as referring to the fourth *adhyāya*: *jñānanirdeśaś caturtho 'dhyāyaḥ. tatra pṛthivyādiparamāṇuviṣayaṃ laiṅgikaṃ sthūlapṛthivyādiviṣayam aparokṣajñānaṃ sakāraṇaṃ vyākhyātam*: '"the instruction on knowledge" [means] the fourth *adhyāya*. In that [*adhyāya*] the inferential knowledge of the atoms of earth and so on, and the direct (perceptual) knowledge of gross [substances made of] earth and so on have been explained, together with their causes'. Ś on the other hand understands this sūtra as introducing the following section, rather than referring to an earlier passage, basing this interpretation on the possibility that the termination of the past passive participle may be used to indicate the commencement of an action.[102]

Of these three possibilities, V's interpretation may seem, at first sight, the most attractive, since if we follow Candrānanda, this sūtra, as mentioned above, adds almost nothing to 8.1. Nonetheless, the evidence seems on the whole in favour of Candrānanda's interpretation. The use of the word *jñānaniṣpatti* strongly recalls the *niṣpadyate* of 3.1.13. Furthermore, the *asannikṛṣṭeṣu* of the following sūtra, 8.4, suggests that the *jñānaniṣpatti* which, according to 8.3, has already been stated, contained the word *sannikarṣa*, which again fits best with 3.1.13.

If we decide for Candrānanda's interpretation here too, the fact that 8.1 and 8.3 both refer to 3.1.13 provides us with an additional argument for supposing that 8.14 originally was placed after 8.2, and 8.3–8.13 was placed between these two sūtras at a later date.

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[100] This is in effect what V does by saying *ātmamanasī kāraṇe vyākhyāte*, which, as explained above, I take to be his comment on this sūtra.

[101] Honda however has recently expressed his opinion that Ś's reading is superior (Honda 1988, 469-468). This is apparently based on his understanding C's reading and commentary as 'the internal organ and the *ātman* have been explained as being the cause of knowledge' rather than, as I believe that Candrānanda intended, 'the internal organ and the *ātman*, which are [both] a cause of knowledge, have [already] been explained'.

[102] *jñānanirdeśe kartavye jñānasya niṣpattividhir utpattiprakāra uktaḥ, ucyata ity arthaḥ, ādikarmaṇi ktavidhānāt* (cf. Pāṇini 3.4.71). Ś 359.15–360.3.

VS 8.4

C *guṇakarmasu asannikṛṣṭeṣu jñānaniṣpatter dravyaṃ kāraṇaṃ kāraṇakāraṇaṃ ca.* V *guṇakarmasu sannikṛṣṭeṣu jñānaniṣpatter dravyaṃ kāraṇaṃ kāraṇakāraṇaṃ ca.* This is the reading that I would propose for V. Thakur in his edition omits *kāraṇakāraṇaṃ ca*, which is not in the MS here, but the commentary clearly supports reading these words too. This has already been pointed out by Nozawa[103] who proposes taking *kāraṇakāraṇaṃ ca* as a separate sūtra (numbering it 8.(4+1)). This is of course also possible, but it seems somewhat more natural to regard V's commentary as applying to one sūtra rather than two. Ś *guṇakarmasu sannikṛṣṭeṣu jñānaniṣpatter dravyaṃ kāraṇam.*

Testimonia

— Jinendrabuddhi's *Viśālāmalavatī*:[104] same reading as C.

Obviously there is an important textual problem here: the reading *asannikṛṣṭeṣu* versus *sannikṛṣṭeṣu*. In my opinion however there is little doubt that we should choose for the former reading. It is read by C, in general the most reliable source, and supported by the only testimonium I have been able to find, but there are also internal, historical arguments in its favour. There is no explanation found in the VS of the term *sannikarṣa* of 3.1.13, and in the NS and NBh too a completely worked out treatment of this concept can not be found. I would suggest that in the relatively early period in which this sūtra may be assumed to have been written, *sannikarṣa* was understood in a much simpler fashion, approximately as *saṃyoga*, and as a relationship which existed primarily between substances.[105] Note that in any case three of the four factors involved in the process, the *ātman*, the internal organ and the sense organs, are always substances.

This sūtra then is intended to explain that perception of qualities and actions is possible even though there is no *sannikarṣa* (in this older and more limited sense) between them and the sense organs.[106] Later the concept of *sannikarṣa* was developed considerably; the *locus classicus* is Uddyotakara's NV ad NS 1.1.4.[107] In the new theory *sannikarṣa* was understood in a much wider sense.

[103] Nozawa 1974, 471.

[104] Tibetan not available to me at present: Sanskrit reconstruction by Jambuvijayaji in C 174.11-12, also 183.10-11.

[105] Halbfass has made some remarks in regard to the term *sannikarṣa* as used by Praśastapāda and Śrīdhara, in which he distinguishes two stages of the development of this concept. 'Der von Praśastapāda und Śrīdhara verwendete Begriff des *sannikarṣa* geht in seinen Ursprüngen offenbar auf eine Zeit zurück, die der Zerlegung der Welt und der Dinge in "Kategorien" und einer entsprechenden thematischen Behandlung des Problems der Bestimmtheit vorausliegt: Der *sannikarṣa* ist deshalb zunächst im Sinne eines Kontaktes mit ohne weiteres vorausgesetzten konkret-bestimmten "ganzen" Dingen zu verstehen. Nach Einführung der Kategorienlehre jedoch wird diesem einfachen Denkmodell der Begriff des *dravya* als Substrat und Bestimmungsträger unterlegt, und als unmittelbares Korrelat des Kontaktes gilt nunmehr die "bloße Substanz", der *āśraya*'. Halbfass 1976, 157.

[106] If this is correct, it could imply that this sūtra is older than 8.14, discussed below.

[107] NV[1] 199.9-11.

also covering the relation *saṃyuktasamavāya* which applies for actions and most qualities.[108] In the context of this theory it became meaningless to say *guṇakarmasu asannikṛṣṭeṣu*, so the reading was altered.

It may be useful here to quote Jinendrabuddhi's remarks on this sūtra, which again suggest a certain relation between this sūtra and 3.1.13. Commenting on the passage in the PSV where Dignāga calls 3.1.13 the VS's definition of perception in regard to substance,[109] Jinendrabuddhi says *dravyavacanena guṇakaramaṇor api sautraṃ pratyakṣalakṣaṇam anyad astīti darśayati. tat punaḥ 'guṇakarmasv asannikṛṣṭeṣu jñānaniṣpatter dravyaṃ kāraṇaṃ kāraṇakāraṇaṃ ca' ity etat. svāśrayeṇānabhivyakteṣu guṇakarmasu jñānaṃ nopajāyate, atas tadāśrayo dravyaṃ guṇakarmāṇy abhivyañjayat tajjñānasya kāraṇam bhavati. guṇakarmajñānasya kāraṇam indriyārthasannikarṣaḥ, tatkāraṇam dravyaṃ ghaṭādi kāraṇakāraṇam ity ucyate.*[110] 'With the word "[in regard to] substance", [Dignāga] refers to the fact that there is also another definition of perception in the sūtras, in regard to quality and action. This [definition] is as follows: "in regard to qualities and actions which are not in contact [with a sense organ], substance is the cause and the cause of the cause of the arising of knowledge". Knowledge does not originate in regard to qualities and actions which are not manifested by their respective locus; therefore their locus, [that is to say] substance, is, [in] manifesting qualities and actions [to us], the cause of knowledge in regard to them. [Furthermore] the contact between sense organ and object is [also] the cause of knowledge of qualities and actions, and substance, such as a pot, is the cause of that [contact]; therefore [the sūtra] says "[substance is also] the cause of the cause [of knowledge in regard to qualities and actions"'.

VS 8.5

C and Ś *sāmānyaviśeṣeṣu sāmānyaviśeṣābhāvāt tata eva jñānam.* This sūtra is not found in the MS of V, but this omission is in my opinion either due to a scribal error or a result of the process of abbreviation. We can in any case be certain that Bhaṭṭa Vādīndra knew and accepted this sūtra, for it is quoted by him (in the same reading as C and Ś) in his commentary on 1.1.7.[111]

Testimonia

— NV ad NS 2.2.64 (NV^2 668.7): same reading as the VS commentaries.

— TUS 90.1: same reading as the VS commentaries.

We have seen in the previous chapter that Candrānanda interprets *sāmānyaviśeṣeṣu* as 'in regard to universals and ultimate individuators'. This must be

[108] Uddyotakara distinguishes six different kinds of *sannikarṣa*. It should however be noted that the sixth, *viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāva*, is not generally accepted by the Vaiśeṣika.
[109] Cf. the commentary on 3.1.13 above.
[110] Sanskrit reconstruction by Jambuvijayaji in his edition of C, p. 174.10-15.
[111] BhV 71.1.

regarded as highly implausible; there is no reason at all to assume that *sāmānyaviśeṣa* is used twice with different meanings in the same sūtra. Furthermore, it is not to be expected that the cognition of ultimate individuators should be discussed in this passage, which does not deal with yogic perception. It is obvious that in the following sūtra, 8.6, *sāmānyaviśeṣa* means '(limited) universal', and there can, I think, be little doubt that the word should be understood in the same sense in both its occurrences in this sūtra.[112]

Bhaṭṭa Vādīndra insists that *sāmānyaviśeṣa* means only the limited universals, and excludes 'being'. The argument he employs—that otherwise *°viśeṣa* would have no function, since *sāmānya* would have sufficed—is a clever one, though it must be noted that Bhaṭṭa Vādīndra's principal concern here is to defend a somewhat unorthodox theory of his, that 'being' is inherent in other universals. The relevant passage runs: *jātiṣu sattāṅgīkāre, 'sāmānyaviśeṣeṣu sāmānyaviśeṣābhāvāt tata eva jñānam' iti sūtravirodha iti cet — na, sāmānyaviśeṣābhāvād ity anena sāmānyaviśeṣam avāntaraṃ sāmānyaṃ niṣedhatā sattāyā aniṣedhāt. anyathā sāmānyābhāvād ity etāvataiva sāmānyaniṣedhe siddhe sūtragataviśeṣapadavaiyarthyāpatter iti.*[113] 'If [an opponent objects] that "if one were to agree that 'being' is [inherent] in universals, this would condradict the sūtra 'because of the absence of *sāmānyaviśeṣas* in *sāmānyaviśeṣas*, knowledge [in regard to them] arises from that alone' (8.5)", [we reply]: No, because "being" is not prohibited [from inhering in other universals] by the word "because of the absence of *sāmānyaviśeṣas*", which [only] prohibits a *sāmānyaviśeṣa*, that is to say a limited universal, [from inhering in universals]. For otherwise there would be a fault [in the sūtra] in that the word *viśeṣa* in the sūtra would have no function, since the prohibition of universals [from inhering in universals] would already be established by merely saying "because of the absence of universals" (*sāmānyābhāvāt* rather than *sāmānyaviśeṣābhāvāt*)'.

Śaṅkara Miśra understands *sāmānyaviśeṣa* as '[the highest] universal and limited universals', i.e. in the same way as Candrānanda interprets the term at its occurrence in 8.6.[114]

It may be mentioned in passing that the principle reason that the Vaiśeṣika maintained that universals do not inhere in universals was to avoid any danger of a *regressus ad infinitum* (*anavasthā*).

As for the interpretation of *tata eva*, 'from that alone' Candrānanda, as we have seen, understands 'that' to mean 'contact [of a sense organ] with a substance [in which the universal inheres]'. Śaṅkara Miśra's commentary more or less agrees with this; though he glosses *tata eva* with *yogyāśrayaviśeṣād eva*,

[112] Cf. Frauwallner 1956, 182, and note 232 (on p. 329). Differently e.g. Biardeau, who translates this sūtra 'Etant donné que les genres — *sāmānya* — et les particularités — *viśeṣa* — ne comportent (à leur tour) ni genre ni particularité, leur connaissance ne vient que d'eux-mêmes' (Biardeau 1964, 244).

[113] BhV 70.34–71.4.

[114] *sāmānyaṃ sattā tasya viśeṣā dravyatvaguṇatvakarmatvāni evam eteṣām api sāmānyānāṃ viśeṣāḥ pṛthivītvādirūpatvādyutkṣepaṇatvādīni* Ś 361.6-8. Cf. also ... *sāmānye viśeṣeṣu ca pṛthivītvādiṣu* ... Ś 361.15–362.2.

'just from the particular locus which is suitable [to be perceived]', he then adds *tannibandhanāc ca saṃyuktasamavāyāt saṃyuktasamavetasamavāyāt samavetasamavāyāc ca:*[115] '[and perceptual knowledge of universals also arises] because of the connection with that [locus], [which may be] inherence in the conjoined, inherence in what inheres in the conjoined or inherence in the inherent'. Miyamoto and Murakami both agree with C's interpretation.[116]. Both these scholars reject—rightly, in my opinion—the translation proposed by Hattori: 'from generic quality (i.e. *sāmānya*) alone'.[117]

Simply looking at the context in which we find this sūtra, the most logical explanation would be that *tata eva* refers to *dravyaṃ* (together with its predicates *kāraṇaṃ kāraṇakāraṇaṃ ca*) in the previous sūtra.[118] On the other hand taking *tata eva* as referring to *sannikarṣa* is also defensible, if we grant that 8.3 alludes to 3.1.13 and 8.4 to the *sannikarṣa* mentioned in that sūtra.

VS 8.6

C, V, Ś *sāmānyaviśeṣāpekṣaṃ dravyaguṇakarmasu.*

Testimonia

— *Viśālāmalavatī:*[119] *sāmānyaviśeṣāpekṣaṃ dravyaguṇakarmasu pratyakṣam.*

V introduces this sūtra with the words *dvividhaṃ jñānaṃ savikalpakam nirvikalpakaṃ ca. tatra savikalpake kāraṇam āha —*:[120] '[perceptual] knowledge is of two kinds: propositional and non-propositional. Of these, [the author of the sūtras now] says [what is] the cause of the propositional [knowledge]'. The actual commentary on the sūtra then continues *viśiṣṭaṃ jñānam iti śeṣaḥ. sāmānyāpekṣaṃ dravye yathā idaṃ sad dravyaṃ pṛthivītyādi. viśeṣāpekṣaṃ dravye yathā sāmānyajātiguṇakriyāvantaḥ*[121] *paramāṇavo vyāvartakadharmavanta iti yogināṃ aparokṣajñānam, asmadādīnāṃ ānumānikam. sāmānyāpekṣaṃ guṇe yathā idaṃ sad rūpaṃ śuklam iti. sāmānyāpekṣaṃ karmaṇi yathā idaṃ sat karmotkṣepaṇam iti. viśeṣāpekṣaṃ jñānaṃ guṇakarmaṇor nāsti, tatrāntyaviśeṣābhāvāt.*[122] 'The words "qualified knowledge" are to be supplied [to the sūtra]. [Knowledge] in regard to a substance is dependent on universals, as for example "[this object] exists, is a substance and [is made of] earth".[123] [Knowl-

[115] Ś 361.8-10.

[116] Cf. Miyamoto 1982, 514 and Murakami 1987, 75.

[117] Cf. Hattori 1968a, 166.

[118] This would in the end come down to almost the same thing as Candrānanda's interpretation: substance is the cause of knowledge of universals because contact of a sense organ with a substance is the cause of knowledge of universals.

[119] Tibetan not at present available to me: Sanskrit reconstruction by Jambuvijayaji in C 177.1-2.

[120] V 75.20.

[121] I conjecture that we should read *sāmānajātiguṇakriyāvantaḥ*.

[122] V 76, 1-5.

[123] In choosing these examples Bhaṭṭa Vādīndra was no doubt influenced by Praśastapāda's *sad dravyaṃ pṛthivī viṣāṇī śuklo gaur gacchatīti* (see sentence 6 in chapter four below).

edge] in regard to a substance is dependent on [ultimate] individuators, as for example "[these] atoms, [though] they possess the same universals, qualities and actions, have a property (*dharma*) that distinguishes [them from each other]", which is a direct (perceptual) knowledge for yogis and inferential knowledge for [ordinary] people like us. [Knowledge] in regard to a quality is dependent on universals, as for example "[this] exists, is a colour and is white". [Knowledge] in regard to an action is dependent on universals, as for example "this exists, is an action and is throwing upwards".[124] There is [however] no knowledge in regard to quality and action that is dependent on [ultimate] individuators, because there are no ultimate individuators in them.'

The grave difficulties of such an interpretation, taking *sāmānyaviśeṣa* as 'universals and ultimate individuators', are obvious. Bhaṭṭa Vādīndra is forced to assume that the sūtra refers partly to yogic perception or to inferential knowledge, and himself admits that even so *sāmānyāpekṣam* applies to substance, quality and action while *viśeṣāpekṣam* applies only to substance.

The explanation given by Candrānanda on the other hand is natural and convincing. The only doubt one could have is whether we should assume with Candrānanda that 'being' must be included under *sāmānyaviśeṣa* here, or not. If, however, we assume that Praśastapāda is a reliable guide and that sentence 6 in the PDhS section on perception treated in the next chapter is based partly on this sūtra, 'being' is indeed included.[125] This interpretation is also supported by Jinendrabuddhi.[126]

VS 8.7

C, V, Ś *dravye dravyaguṇakarmāpekṣam.*

Testimonia

— *Viśālāmalavatī*:[127] same reading as the VS commentaries.

The interpretation of this sūtra does not seem to present any significant difficulties. V and Ś add little to what we have learned from Candrānanda's commentary translated in the previous chapter.[128]

VS 8.8

C, V, Ś *guṇakarmasu guṇakarmābhāvād guṇakarmāpekṣaṃ na vidyate.*

[124] 'Throwing upwards' is one of the five kinds of action enumerated already in VS 1.1.6: *utkṣepaṇam avakṣepaṇam ākuñcanaṃ prasāraṇaṃ gamanam iti karmāṇi.*

[125] Of course there is a high degree of likelihood that Candrānanda's commentary has been influenced on this point too by the PDhS.

[126] *atra sāmānyavacanena mahāsāmānyaṃ sattā gṛhyate, viśeṣavacanena dravyatvādīni śeṣasāmānyāni.* Sanskrit reconstruction in Jambuvijayaji's edition of C, 177.2-3.

[127] Tibetan not at present available to me: Sanskrit reconstruction by Jambuvijayaji in C 177.2.

[128] Note however that V says that this sūtra holds good for inferential as well as perceptual knowledge: *aparokṣam ānumānikaṃ vā savikalpakam utpadyata iti śeṣaḥ* (V 76.7).

No testimonia for this sūtra are at present available to me.

This sūtra too poses no problems. Qualities and actions only inhere in substances (cf. VS 1.1.14-16), therefore (perceptual) knowledge of qualities and actions is not qualified by (perceptual knowledge of) other qualities and actions. Bhaṭṭa Vādīndra's commentary consists of a single word: *spaṣṭārtham*,[129] 'the meaning [of the sūtra] is clear'.

VS 8.9

C *samavāyinaḥ śvaityāc chvaityabuddheḥ śvete buddhis te kāryakāraṇabhūte.* V *samavāyinaḥ śvaityāt* (sic) *śvaityabuddheś ca śvete buddhis te kāryakāraṇabhūte.* Ś *śvaityāc chvaityabuddheś ca śvete buddhis te ete kāryakāraṇabhūte.*

Testimonia

— PDhS (NK 112.21-113.1): same reading as C.

— NM Pt. I, 293.21: *samavāyinaḥ śvaityāc chvaityabuddheś* (read so for the printed *chvyaityabuddheś*) *ca śvete buddhis te kāryakāraṇabhūte.*

— Vy (Vy¹ 348.20-21): same reading as C, except *tat* for *te*. This is however probably a scribal error.[130] Again quoted at Vy¹ 469.5-6, with the same reading as C.[131]

After a series of sūtras which developed the concept of 'dependent' or qualified perceptual knowledge, the present sūtra seems to be chiefly intended as an example of such knowledge. There is however a disagreement among the commentators as to whether *śveta* here means 'a white substance' and *śvaitya* 'the quality white', or whether *śveta* means 'the quality white' and *śvaitya* 'the universal "whiteness"'. The latter view is held by Candrānanda, as we have seen above, as well as by Bhaṭṭa Vādīndra.[132] Śaṅkara Miśra chooses for the first possibility,[133] as do also all the commentators on the PDhS.[134]

In fact, however, it is not of particularly great consequence which of these possibilities is accepted. In both cases, the main point is that the cognition of a qualifier is said to be the cause of the cognition of the qualified.

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[129] V 76.10.

[130] Cf. Appendix A, no. 30

[131] This is a PDhS *pratīka*: cf. Appendix A, no. 50.

[132] Cf. *śvaityād iti śuklaguṇāt. śvaityabuddher iti śuklaguṇabuddhe[ḥ]. śvete śuklaguṇaviśiṣṭe paṭe buddhir jāyate* (V 76.13-14).

[133] Cf. his comment *śvetaḥ śaṅkhaḥ ityādipratītau śvaityasamavāyasya śvaityaguṇasya śvaityaviśeṣaṇajñānasya ca kāraṇatvam ity uktaṃ tathā ca viśeṣaṇasambandhaviśeṣaṇataj-jñānānāṃ viśiṣṭapratyakṣapramāṃ prati kāraṇatvam iti tena pūrvoktaṃ sarvaṃ siddhyati.* Ś 365.3-6.

[134] Vyomaśiva for example says *śvetaṃ dravyaṃ tasya bhāvaḥ śvaityaṃ śvetaguṇaḥ, tasmāt kiṃviśiṣṭāt? samavāyinaḥ samavāyena sambandhāc, chvaityabuddher iti śvetaguṇabuddheḥ. etasmāt kāraṇatrayāt śvetabuddhir viśeṣyajñānaṃ* (we should probably emend thus for the printed *śvetabuddhiviśeṣyajñānaṃ*) *'śvetaṃ dravyam' utpadyate.* Vy¹ 469.7-10.

VS 8.10

C *dravyeṣv anitaretarakāraṇā(ḥ)*[135] *kāraṇāyaugapadyāt.* V *dravyeṣv anitaretarakāraṇāḥ pratyayāḥ kāraṇāyaugapadyāt.* This is the reading I would, somewhat hesitantly, suggest for V: Thakur reads the sūtra as *dravyeṣv anitaretarakāraṇāḥ pratyayāḥ* and then reads as the next sūtra *kāraṇāyaugapadyāt [kāraṇakramāc ca ghaṭapaṭādibuddhīnāṃ kramo na hetuphalabhāvāt].* The MS is apparently damaged again here, and Thakur has simply emended to agree with Ś. Ś reads as two sūtras, *dravyeṣv anitaretarakāraṇāḥ* and *kāraṇāyaugapadyāt kāraṇakramāc ca ghaṭapaṭādīnāṃ kramo na hetuphalabhāvāt.*

No testimonia for this sūtra at present available to me.

Ś's reading, which amounts to an expansion of *kāraṇāyaugapadyāt* into a separate sūtra, is no doubt late and may for our purposes be disregarded. C's reading is elliptical, and possibly for this reason *pratyayāḥ* has been added in the reading found in V. The ellipsis may however be explained by assuming that *buddhi*, or rather *buddhayaḥ* must be carried over from the previous sūtra.

The meaning of this sūtra appears to be that successive cognitions of different substances are not related as cause and effect, in contrast with the cognitions of *śvaitya* and *śveta* (however these terms are interpreted) mentioned in the preceding sūtra. That is to say, the rule given in 8.7, according to which cognition of a substance is dependent on (i.e. caused by) cognition of another substance (among other things), does not always apply. In fact 8.7 only applies in cases where there is a relationship of qualifier and qualified (cf. Candrānanda's commentary).[136]

VS 8.11

C *tathā dravyaguṇakarmasu kāraṇāviśeṣāt.* V *tathā dravyaguṇakarmasu kāraṇaviśeṣāt.* This is the reading of the MS, which Nozawa recognized as a sūtra.[137] I suspect however that *kāraṇaviśeṣāt* may be a scribal error for *kāraṇāviśeṣāt.*[138] Ś omits this sūtra.

No testimonia for this sūtra at present available to me.

This sūtra presents no real difficulties of interpretation. Candrānanda's commentary on this sūtra may be accepted. Successive cognitions of a substance, a quality and an action are not related as cause and effect, because a substance

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[135] Cf. chapter two, note 36.

[136] It is worth noting however that the words *viśeṣaṇa* and *viśeṣya* do not occur in the sūtras, though they are frequently used by all the commentators in their explanations. It appears that this terminology was not yet common usage at the time of the composition of these sūtras.

[137] Nozawa 1974, 471. Thakur had printed this as part of the commentary on the previous sūtra.

[138] V's commentary on this sūtra contains a lacuna which has not in my opinion been restored convincingly by Thakur, and it is not certain how Bhaṭṭa Vādīndra read and understood this word. The commentary is printed as *dravyaguṇakarmasv api dravyavat kramabhāvi na [yugapadbhāvijñānam. viśiṣṭabuddhayo] viśeṣāt kramavat kāraṇād utpadyante.* V 77.1-3.

can not be a qualifier of a quality or action, nor can qualities and actions be qualifiers of each other.

VS 8.12

C *ayam eṣa kṛtaṃ tvayā bhojayainam iti buddhyapekṣam.* V *ayaṃ tvayā bhojayainam iti buddhyapekṣam.* Ś reads as C except *tvayā kṛtaṃ* for *kṛtaṃ tvayā.*

No testimonia for this sūtra at present available to me.

In Ś this is the first sūtra of the second *āhnika* of *adhyāya* 8.

V's reading is in my opinion clearly wrong; *ayaṃ tvayā* requires a predicate, which is supplied in V's commentary as follows: *tvayety atra [bhojayi]tavya iti śeṣaḥ*:[139] 'the word "should be fed' must be supplied here to the word "by you"'. This amounts to making *ayam tvayā* and *bhojayainam* semantically equivalent.

The sūtra gives a number of examples of cognitions which are 'dependent on cognition', but not caused by the cognition of a qualifier. Candrānanda's commentary seems to offer an adequate explanation; cf. also Faddegon's comments on this sūtra and the next: 'the Sūtrakāra says that the pronominal indication, which we find in language, is an example of a reflective category. The reflective character becomes apparent by the fact that this pronominal indication only takes place after the perception of individual objects [and is not realised together with the perception]'.[140] Faddegon also suggested that these sūtras might be a later insertion, but as far as I can see there is at best only negative evidence for this (the apparent absence of testimonia or references).

VS 8.13

C, V, Ś *dṛṣṭeṣu bhāvād adṛṣṭeṣu abhāvāt.*

No testimonia for this sūtra at present available to me.

This sūtra gives the reason why the cognitions mentioned in the previous sūtra are considered to be dependent on cognition. Candrānanda again offers what seems to be a good and sufficient commentary.

VS 8.14

C, V, Ś *artha iti dravyaguṇakarmasu.*

Testimonia

- DNC 31.17: same reading as the VS commentaries. Again quoted at DNC 480.6-7.

Jambuvijayaji reports that this sūtra is also quoted by Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka in his *Tattvārtharājavārtika.*[141]

[139] V 77.8.
[140] Faddegon 1918, 147.
[141] Cf. C 234.

In V's commentary this is the first sūtra of the second *āhnika* of *adhyāya* 8.[142] This division into *āhnikas* seems somewhat more logical than that given in Ś, since this sūtra introduces a new subject, the explanations of the concepts of object (*artha*) and sense organ (*indriya*), whereas 8.12 is more closely related with the sūtras that precede it. Ś does preface this sūtra with the remark *idānīṃ prakaraṇāntaram ārabhate*:[143] 'now [the author of the sūtras] begins another topic'.

As suggested above in the commentary on 8.2, this sūtra appears to be closely connected with 8.2. It is intended to define the word *artha*, 'object', which occurs in 3.1.13, and may be compared with Praśastapāda's remark *dravyādīnām trayāṇām ... svasamayārthaśabdābhidheyatvam*.[144] V maintains that all the categories (including even *abhāva*, non-existence) are intended to be included;[145] this interpretation is certainly untenable.

The fact that universals are not according to this sūtra included under the term *artha* seems inconsistent with 4.1.14, where the perception of the universals 'being' and 'qualityness' is referred to. This could however be explained if we were to assume, with e.g. H. Narain,[146] that this sūtra originally had a broader function than defining the word *artha* in 3.1.13, and points to a period when only the first three categories were recognized.

VS 8.15

C *dravyeṣu pañcātmakam pratyuktam*. The MS of V reads only *dravyeṣu pañcakātmakam*, but from the commentary it seems certain that a word like *pratyuktam* should be added. Jambuvijayaji suggests that V's reading was the same as C's,[147] and I am inclined to agree that this is probable. Ś *dravyeṣu pañcātmakatvaṃ pratiṣiddham*.

No testimonia for this sūtra at present available to me.

In the absence of any other deciding factor, we should probably assume that C has preserved the oldest reading.

This is evidently a reference to VS 4.2.1, which reads *pratyakṣāpratyakṣāṇām apratyakṣatvāt saṃyogasya pañcātmakaṃ na vidyate*.[148] This may be translated, following Candrānanda, as 'because a conjuction of perceptible and non-perceptible [elements][149] is not perceptible, [a body] which [consists of] the five

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[142] V introduces the sūtra with the words *arthendriyavyākhyānārtham ayam āhnikārambhaḥ*

[143] Ś 369.13.

[144] NK 17.5-6.

[145] *jātyādīnām upalakṣaṇam. [artha] iti dravyaguṇakarmasāmānyaviśeṣasamavāyābhāveṣu prayujyate.* V 78.4-5.

[146] Cf. Narain 1976, 86.

[147] Cf. p. 120.17 of his edition of C.

[148] This is C's reading, which is certainly better than V's *pratyakṣāpratyakṣavṛtter apratyakṣatvād vāyuvanaspatisaṃyogavat pañcātmakaṃ na vidyate*. Ś reads *pratyakṣāpratyakṣāṇāṃ saṃyogasyāpratyakṣatvāt pañcātmakaṃ na vidyate*, which compared with C's reading may be said to be the *lectio facilior*.

[149] Air and ether are non-perceptible elements.

[elements combined] does not exist, [for the body is perceptible]'. We need not however restrict the application of 4.2.1 to only the body; in our present context it is referred to as an introduction to the theory of the composition of the sense organs given in the following two sūtras.

VS 8.16

C, V *bhūyastvād gandhavattvāc ca pṛthivī gandhajñāne.* Ś as C and V but adding *prakṛtiḥ* at the end.

Testimonia

- NM part II, 57.19: *bhūyastvād gandhavattvāc ca pṛthivī gandhajñāna-prakṛtiḥ.*
- Vy (Vy[1] 233.31–234.1): *bhūyastvād gandhavattvāc ca gandhajñāne prakṛtiḥ pṛthivī.* Again quoted at Vy[1] 234.13-14, omitting *pṛthivī.*[150]

The subject now taken up is that of the sense organs and their composition. As far as the text of the sūtra is concerned, there are two points deserving of attention. First, the expression *gandhajñāna*, literally 'knowledge of smell', is here used to indicate the olfactory organ.[151] Secondly, the reading found in C and V is very elliptic; C supplies *kāraṇam* and V supplies *prakṛti* and glosses this with *samavāyikāraṇa*.[152] Note that the testimonia all also add *prakṛti*.

Given the unwritten assumption of the Vaiśeṣika that a sense organ must itself possess the quality with which it is specially associated, it follows that the olfactory organ must consist of earth, since earth is the only substance which possesses the quality smell.[153]

VS 8.17

C *tathāpas tejo vāyuś ca rasarūpasparśajñāneṣu rasarūpasparśaviśeṣāt.* V reads as two sūtras: *tathāpas tejo vāyuś ca rasarūpasparśajñāneṣu*[154] and *rasarūpasparśāt.* Ś *tathāpas tejo vāyuś ca rasarūpasparśāviśeṣāt.*

No testimonia for this sūtra at present available to me.

This sūtra tells us that the organs of taste, sight and touch are, in analogy with the organ of smell, each made up only out of (atoms of) the particular element which corresponds with it. This close correspondance between the sense organs and the elements is probably among the most archaic features of

[150] Cf. Appendix A, nos. 15 and 16: compare also nos. 7, 19, 22 and 26, a group of 'sūtras' which appear to have been formed on the basis of 8.16 and 8.17.

[151] In addition to Candrānanda's commentary translated in the previous chapter, cf. V's gloss of *gandhajñāne* as *gandhajñāpakaghrāṇe* (V 78.14) and Ś's *gandho jñāyate 'neneti gandhajñānam ghrāṇam* (Ś 371.3).

[152] V 78.14.

[153] Cf. VS 2.1.1-5.

[154] The reading of V is here given as proposed by Nozawa, cf. Nozawa 1974, 471.

the Vaiśeṣika, being found also in the philosophical sections of the *Mahābhārata* and in early Sāṃkhya.[155]

The organ of hearing is not mentioned here, presumably because unlike the other sense organs it is not built up out of atoms but consists of a part of the ether, which is all-pervading and not atomic in nature; see also Candrānanda's commentary on this sūtra.

Some concluding remarks may now be made on the whole of *adhyāya* 8. First of all, this section is much less of a well-structured whole than the section on perception in *adhyāya* 4. I have suggested, in the commentary on 8.2, that 8.14 may have originally followed 8.2; that is to say that 8.1-2 and 8.14-17 seem to form a fairly logical series of sūtras if taken together (I shall refer to this hypothetical section as A). 8.1 refers to 3.1.13, 8.2 reminds us that of the four factors enumerated in 3.1.13 the *ātman* and the internal organ have already been discussed, 8.14 explains what is meant by *artha*, the third of the four factors, and 8.15-17 give an explanation of the last factor, the sense organs. The intervening sūtras, 8.3-13, also hang reasonably well together, forming a sequence in which the main topic is how, in many though not all cases, perceptual cognitions are dependent on or qualified by other perceptual cognitions (I shall refer to this section as B). There is therefore some reason to think that we have here actually two different groups of sūtras, which have been put together in a somewhat awkward fashion.[156] One apparent result of the combination of these sections is that, as the reading preserved by Śaṅkara Miśra shows us, at a certain point the correct explanation of 8.2, which was still known to Candrānanda and Bhaṭṭa Vādīndra, was forgotten, which led to the reading and interpretation we find in Ś.

Of the two, especially B, with its more 'psychological' approach, gives the impression of being more developed than the 'ontological' account of perception in *adhyāya* 4. I have been able to find considerably fewer testimonia for the sūtras of this *adhyāya* than for those in 4.1.6-14. This is however not in itself of much value as an argument that *adhyāya* 8 must be younger. As far as terminology is concerned, note that *upalabdhiḥ* and *anupalabdhiḥ*, which occur so frequently in *adhyāya* 4, are not found here at all. Instead, we have the terms *jñāna*[157] and, in section B only, *buddhi*.[158]

It must be admitted that this hypothesis suffers from at least one disadvantage, which could be thought of as serious. Since the assumption is that section A has been divided in two by the insertion of B, it would naturally follow that A formed part of the VS at an earlier date than B. As far as its philosophical content is concerned too, B gives the impression of being younger than A. But at least one sūtra in B, 8.4, is according to my interpretation old, possibly older

[155] Cf. Frauwallner 1956, 47-48.

[156] I must confess that I am unable to see a satisfactory explanation of why this hypothetical merger of text passages should have been carried out so clumsily.

[157] 8.1, 8.3, and, in a different sense, 8.16 and 8.17.

[158] 8.9, and in 8.12 *buddhyapekṣam*.

than 8.14 which I place in A. The evidence seems therefore to be somewhat contradictive, and it is possible that the composition of *adhyāya* 8 is more complex than suggested here. Further speculation would however in my opinion be unfounded without more material to work on.

Conclusions

On the basis of the investigations detailed in the preceding pages, the following tentative reconstruction may be suggested of the development of the theory of perception in the earliest period of the Vaiśeṣika. The oldest attempt to provide an explanation of the process of perception is to be found in 4.1.6-14 (with the probable exception of 4.1.7).[159] It is quite likely that this was meant as a complete treatment of the subject, systematically dealing with the possible objects of perception. The main problem dealt with in this section is that of the causes or conditions of perception, and the approach may be called 'ontological'.

Both of the sections we have distinguished in *adhyāya* 8 probably belong to somewhat younger layers of the text. Provisionally I would conclude that section A is the older, despite the possible counter-argument mentioned above. This section seems to have primarily the function of a simple addition discussing two terms which had been used but not explained, and does not contain any elements which seem to be newer theoretical developments. Finally section B shows real development and an analytically sharper and, I should say, more interested approach to epistemological questions. Here an analysis of perception is given which makes use of the concepts of qualifier and qualified, later of great importance in the school, although these terms do not themselves occur. The germ of this development could just possibly lie in the word *rūpaviśeṣa* of 4.1.9, if this meant (or was soon undertood to mean) 'the universal "colourness"'. In its turn, the theory outlined in section B was perhaps a source of the later distinction between propositional and non-propositional perception, though it would in my opinion certainly go to far to try and read such a distinction into the sūtras themselves.[160] It should be noted that since 8.9 is quoted in the PDhS and 8.4 is demonstrably old, there is good reason to think that even section B is older than Praśastapāda.

In all the text passages we have seen, the emphasis appears to lie on visual perception. Aside from the fact that sight is generally conceived of as the most important sense, it is of course also the most problematic, especially if a form of contact between the sense organ and the object is considered necessary for the process of perception. It is nonetheless curious to note that neither in the VS nor in the PDhS is the actual physical process of this contact in the case of the visual organ described. We must assume that this silence expresses a tacit

[159] I shall refrain from speculating on the historical relationship between this section and the—also presumably old—'definition of perception' 3.1.13.

[160] Cf. especially Miyamoto 1982, 523.

agreement with the theory, found in the NS, of a ray of fire atoms (*nayanaraśmi*) which proceeds from the eyeball.[161]

Further study is required of all this material, to check the results obtained so far and to form a clearer picture of these still very problematic sections of the VS. In particular I have only been able to scratch the surface of the difficulties surrounding *adhyāya* 8. A new critical edition of V is one major desideratum, as has perhaps been made clear by the references to V in the commentary above. But still more can be hoped from the search for further testimonia and references to the VS in the works of other schools. Only after all of this basic philological work has been done will we be able to properly assess the theory of perception of the earliest Vaiśeṣika.

[161] See especially the lengthy discussion of the sense organs at NS 3.1.32-51.

Chapter Four

The section on perception in the PDhS

Introductory

As we have seen, in the course of time many additions and changes were made to the VS. The usual motivation for this 'tampering' with the oldest and, in principle, most authoritative text of the Vaiśeṣika school, was, we may assume, the desire to bring the text 'up to date', to respond to the latest developments in the philosophical milieu. It was perhaps inevitable that at a certain point this process of *ad hoc* revision would no longer prove practical. The state of the VS as it has come down to us is one of considerable disarray; the apparently haphazard arrangement of large parts of the text has often been remarked on.[1] We may imagine that two courses were open to the Vaiśeṣikas: a thorough, large-scale, re-writing of the VS, or the composition of a text(book) which would incorporate the latest developments of the school and could replace the VS as the basic text of the system, in fact if not in name. The former alternative was apparently never attempted, but it is possible to consider the PDhS (as well as the DPŚ) as an example of the latter.

It is of particular interest that, aside from the PDhS, Praśastapāda also composed a (sub-)commentary covering the VS and the lost *Vākya* and *Bhāṣya*,[2] and it is perhaps significant that this commentary fell into obscurity and was lost.[3] One can imagine that a commentary which attempted to read the latest philosophical developments into an out-of-date text, possibly combined with a certain amount of revision, was far less in demand than a modern, well-organized textbook.

[1]The section of the VS which most clearly preserves a deliberate, and very systematic, organization, is *adhyāya* 1, which is very likely one of the oldest and least tampered with parts of the text. For an excellent analysis cf. Scharfe 1957.

[2]Cf. Thakur's introduction to C, p. 14-16, and Chemparathy 1968, 66-67. Of course the PDhS was also frequently considered a commentary on the VS and called *Praśastapādabhāṣya*. On the various names which have been given to the PDhS cf. Chemparathy 1969b.

[3]As far as I am aware, no writer later than Abhayadeva (fl. ca. 1060) quotes from any work of Praśastapāda other than the PDhS. The latest author who may have had access to Praśastapāda's VS commentary is Bhaṭṭa Vādīndra: cf. Thakur's introduction to C, p. 16.

In the absence of other surviving texts, the PDhS is clearly the main text for us to study the development of the Vaiśeṣika after the earliest period. It therefore seemed desirable to add a brief account of Praśastapāda's theory of perception to the study of the VS presented in the preceding chapters. In the following pages I have attempted to translate and annotate the section on perception in the PDhS.[4] Additional material relevant to this subject can also be found in other sections of the PDhS, such as the sections on number and on indefinite knowledge, but a thorough study of all these passages was beyond the scope of the present work.

A brief reminder is perhaps needed of the context in which the section on perception is found in the PDhS. The main body of the PDhS is devoted to a systematic explanation of the six Vaiśeṣika categories and their subdivisions, in the traditional order. In the section on cognition (*buddhi*: a quality which can only belong to the *ātman*) Praśastapāda tells us that

> [Cognition] is of numerous kinds, because there are an infinite number of objects and [the cognitions] are determined according to the various objects. But although there are thus many kinds of cognition, in general cognition [may be said to be] of two kinds: perfect knowledge (*vidyā*) and imperfect knowledge (*avidyā*).[5]

Praśastapāda then proceeds to treat imperfect knowledge, dividing it again into four kinds: doubt (*saṃśaya*), erroneous knowledge (*viparyaya*), indefinite knowledge (*anadhyavasāya*) and dream cognition (*svapna*). It is after this that our section begins.

Sanskrit text

The following text is based on the texts given in the editions of NK, Vy^1 and Kir.[6] All variants in these texts have been noted except for cases of alternative or incorrect *sandhi* (e.g. Vy^1's *tāvad* for *tāvat* in 5).[7] Remarks on textual problems will be found in the notes to the translation. For purposes of reference I have numbered the sentences consecutively from the beginning of the section; this numbering thus does not correspond to that of Hattori et. al. who only discuss a few sentences.

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[4] There is already a considerable body of literature on this subject. A brief analysis of the section was given in Faddegon 1918, 294-295. An annotated translation of the entire section can be found in Randle 1970, 105-118 (first published in 1930). A summary is also given in Potter 1977, 294-295. Recently attention has focused on Praśastapāda's theory of non-propositional (*nirvikalpaka*) perception: cf. especially N.J. Shah 1966, Hattori 1968a, Schmithausen 1970, Halbfass 1976 (especially p. 154-160), Miyamoto 1982 and Murakami 1987.

[5] PDhS: *sā cānekaprakārārthānantyāt pratyarthaniyatatvāc ca. tasyāḥ saty apy anekavidhatve samāsato dvividhā, vidyā cāvidyā ceti*. Kir 170.24–26. The terms *avidyā* and *vidyā* seem to be used in a more or less similar sense in VS 9.25-27.

[6] Vy^2 is only based on Vy^1 and adds no important variants.

[7] The readings found in the footnotes to these editions have also generally not been given.

विद्यापि चतुर्विधा प्रत्यक्षलैङ्गिकस्मृत्यार्षलक्षना ।१

तत्राक्षमक्षं प्रतीत्योत्पद्यत इति प्रत्यक्षम् ।२

अक्षाणीन्द्रियाणि घ्राणरसनचक्षुस्त्वक्छ्रोत्रमनांसि षट्[8] ।३

तद्धि द्रव्यादिषु पदार्थेषूत्पद्यते[9] ।४

द्रव्ये तावत्त्रिविधे[10] महत्यनेकद्रव्यवत्त्वोद्भूतरूपप्रकाशचतुष्टयसन्निकर्षाद्धर्मादिसामग्र्ये च स्वरूपालोचनमात्रम् ।५

सामान्यविशेषद्रव्यगुणकर्मविशेषणापेक्षादात्ममनःसन्निकर्षात्प्रत्यक्षमुत्पद्यते सद्द्रव्यं पृथिवी[11] विषाणी शुक्लो गौर्गच्छतीति ।६

रूपरसगन्धस्पर्शेष्वनेकद्रव्यसमवायात्स्वगतविशेषात्स्वाश्रयसन्निकर्षान्नियतेन्द्रियनिमित्तम् उत्पद्यते ।७

शब्दस्य त्रयसन्निकर्षाच्छ्रोत्रसमवेतस्य तेनैवोपलब्धिः ।८

संख्यापरिमाणपृथक्त्वसंयोगविभागपरत्वापरत्वस्नेहद्रवत्ववेगकर्मणां प्रत्यक्षद्रव्यसमवायाच् चक्षुःस्पर्शनाभ्यां ग्रहणम् ।९

बुद्धिसुखदुःखेच्छाद्वेषप्रयत्नानां द्वयोरात्ममनसोः सन्निकर्षाद्[12] उपलब्धिः ।१०

भावद्रव्यत्वगुणत्वकर्मत्वादीनामुपलब्ध्याधारसमवेतानामाश्रयग्राहकैरिन्द्रियैर्ग्रहणमित्येतद् अस्मदादीनां प्रत्यक्षम् ।११

अस्मद्विशिष्टानां तु योगिनां युक्तानां योगजधर्मानुगृहीतेन मनसा स्वात्मान्तराकाश-दिक्कालपरमाणुवायुमनस्सु तत्समवेतगुणकर्मसामान्यविशेषेषु समवाये चावितथं स्वरूप-दर्शनमुत्पद्यते ।१२

वियुक्तानां पुनश्चतुष्टयसन्निकर्षाद्योगजधर्मानुग्रहसामार्थ्यात्सूक्ष्मव्यवहितविप्रकृष्टेषु प्रत्यक्षम् उत्पद्यते ।१३

तत्र सामान्यविशेषेषु स्वरूपालोचनमात्रं प्रत्यक्षं प्रमाणं प्रमेया द्रव्यादयः पदार्थाः प्रमातात्मा प्रमितिर्द्रव्यादिविषयं ज्ञानम् ।१४

सामान्यविशेषज्ञानोत्पत्तावविभक्तमालोचनमात्रं प्रत्यक्षं प्रमाणम् *अस्मिन्नान्यत्प्रमाणान्तरम् अस्ति, अफलरूपत्वात्*[13] ।१५

अथवा सर्वेषु पदार्थेषु चतुष्टयसन्निकर्षादवितथमव्यपदेश्यं यज्ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते तत्प्रत्यक्षं प्रमाणं प्रमेया द्रव्यादयः पदार्थाः प्रमातात्मा प्रमितिर्गुणदोषमाध्यस्थ्यदर्शनमिति ।१६

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[8] Omitted in Kir, though the commentary quotes and comments on it.

[9] Kir उपपद्यते.

[10] NK द्विविधे.

[11] Omitted in Kir, though the commentary quotes and comments on it.

[12] NK and Vy[1] read संयोगाद् but Vyomaśiva's commentary only contains the word सन्निकर्षात् while Śrīdhara does not quote or gloss the word. On grounds of consistency of terminology, सन्निकर्षाद् seems the better reading.

[13] * ... * omitted in Kir, though commented on. Note that the commentaries by Vyomaśiva and Śrīdhara seem to support reading न तस्मिन् rather than अस्मिन्न.

Annotated translation

The annotation given here refers frequently, but not exhaustively, to the three available commentaries on this section: in chronological order, Vyomaśiva's *Vyomavatī*, Śrīdhara's *Nyāyakandalī* and Udayana's *Kiraṇāvalī*.[14] These commentaries contain a number of sometimes lengthy digressions and discussions of theories which are definitely later than Praśastapāda; these, while certainly deserving of study in their own right, have generally not been discussed here.

1. Perfect knowledge is also of four kinds, [which are] designated as perceptual, inferential, mnemonic and superhuman.

It should be noted that in Praśastapāda's detailed discussions of these four kinds of perfect knowledge, only the first two, perceptual and inferential knowledge, are called means of correct knowledge (*pramāṇa*).

2. Of these, perceptual knowledge[15] is so called because it arises in dependence on the various senses (*akṣa*).

This sentence gives an etymological explanation of the term *pratyakṣa*. The closest and most important parallel to this is an explanation given by Dignāga in his *Nyāyamukha*, which is quoted by Kamalaśīla in his TSP: *akṣam akṣaṃ prati varttata iti pratyakṣam*.[16]

3. [By] senses [we mean the] sense organs, and these are six [in number]: the olfactory organ, the organ of taste, the organ of sight, the organ of touch, the organ of hearing and the internal organ.

The inclusion of the internal organ in this list requires some comment. There is no passage in the VS where the internal organ is referred to as a sense organ; rather, as in VS 3.2.1, the internal organ merely seems to function as 'attention', or as a go-between which connects the *ātman* with the sense organs. In the passages which allude to the various sense organs there is no suggestion that the internal organ should be included as one (cf. especially VS 8.16-17). In the Nyāya too it is clear that the internal organ was not at first considered as a sense organ,[17] and came to be regarded as one only in response to (Buddhist) criticism.[18] From Pakṣilasvāmin's remark in the NBh ad NS 1.1.4 that '[the internal organ is also to be accepted as a sense organ] because this is the usage

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[14] On the relative ages of these commentaries cf. Varadachari 1963.

[15] In this PDhS section I generally translate *pratyakṣa* with 'perceptual knowledge' rather than 'perception', because one must keep in mind that *pratyakṣa* is a particular kind of perfect knowledge, which again is a kind of cognition (*buddhi*). Miyamoto argues for translating the term as 'immediate/direct knowledge' (Miyamoto 1982, 525-526, note 14).

[16] TSP 456.

[17] Cf. especially NS 1.1.12, which enumerates the sense organs, and NS 1.1.9.

[18] The most succinct expression of this criticism is in a line from Dignāga's PS, which is quoted in the NVṬṬ: *na sukhādi prameyaṃ vā mano vāstv indriyāntaram* (NV^1 235.27). 'Either pleasure and so on are not objects of correct knowledge, or the internal organ must be another sense organ [aside from the five sense organs enumerated in e.g. NS 1.1.12.]'. On this whole subject cf. Hattori 1968b p. 38-39 and 127-129.

in a different school (i.e. the Vaiśeṣika)',[19] we may perhaps conclude that the Vaiśeṣika was earlier than the Nyāya in recognizing the internal organ as a sense organ.

4. That [perceptual knowledge] indeed arises in regard to the categories, substance and so on.

Vyomaśiva gives two interpretations to explain the use of the particle *hi* here. The first amounts to reading this sentence as follows: '[Perception is distinct from memory] for it arises in regard to the categories substance and so on [whereas memory has no direct object].'[20] The second interpretation, which Vyomaśiva attributes to 'others', amounts to understanding this sentence as '[Perception arises from contact between object and sense organ] for it arises in regard to the categories substance and so on [and therefore there must be contact between the sense organ and the categories].'[21] It does not however seem necessary to adopt either of these interpretations; the particle *hi* may here be taken as having merely emphatic rather than causal force.[22]

Vyomaśiva and Śrīdhara both explain the words 'in regard to the categories, substance and so on' (*dravyādiṣu padārtheṣu*) as referring only to the categories substance, quality, action and universal.[23] This is correct, if we take this sentence as applying only to normal perception, but it seems more natural to me to take it as applying to all kinds of perception and assume that the description of normal perception begins with 5 below. In this case, there is no need to limit the scope of this sentence to the first four categories, for, as we shall see under 12 below, perception of the categories individuator and inherence is possible for yogis.

5. First, [perception arises] in regard to substance of three kinds, providing they are large, by virtue of [their] possessing many substances [as inherence causes], [their] (manifest) colour, [the presence of] light and the contact between four [factors], and [providing that] the entire group [of conditions], *dharma* and so on, is present: [this perception consists of] merely seeing [the object's] own nature.

The first point to consider here is the reading *dvividhe* found in the edition of the NK. Hattori has already shown that the reading *trividhe* is to be preferred,[24] but the following may be added to his remarks. Śrīdhara indeed does not quote

[19] *tantrāntarasamācārāc caitat pratyetavyam iti*: NV^1 199.4.

[20] Cf. *nirviṣayajñānasya pratiṣedhena smṛtivyavacchedārtham āha – tad dhi pratyakṣaṃ yasmād dravyādiṣu padārtheṣūtpadyate tasmān na nirviṣayam iti* (Vy^1 557.9-11).

[21] Cf. *anye tu indriyasyārthena sannikarṣapratipādanārthaṃ tad dhi dravyādiṣūtpadyate pratyakṣam. tasmād astīndriyeṇa saṃyuktasamavāyādisambandhaḥ* (Vy^1 557.12-14).

[22] Cf. Śrīdhara's *hiśabdo 'vadhāraṇe* (NK 188.20) and Udayana's *hiśabdaḥ khalvarthaḥ* (Kir 184.10).

[23] *atra cādiśabdena guṇakarmasāmānyāni gṛhyante. samavāyo 'pīty anye* (i.e. the Naiyāyikas) Vy^1 557.11-12, *dravyaguṇakarmasāmānyeṣv evotpadyate na viśeṣasamavāyayor ity arthaḥ* NK 188.20-21.

[24] Cf. Hattori 1968a, 161 (note 2).

this word, but there can be little doubt of his reading: *pṛthivyaptejolakṣaṇe*[25] must be intended as a gloss of *trividhe*. The possible interpretation of *dvividhe* suggested by Hattori, taking it as a neuter nominitive dual and understanding as *dvividhe pratyakṣe*, must be regarded as implausible, considering the position of the word between *dravye* and *mahati*, which clearly belong together. That Praśastapāda did not himself name the three kinds of substance intended may be because he had already indicated that the first three substances (of the traditional list, i.e. earth, water and fire) are perceptible.[26]

Here the words *mahaty anekadravyavattvodbhūtarūpaprakāśacatuṣṭayasannikarṣād* are clearly based on VS 4.1.6 (and 3.1.13). However, whereas the sūtra only mentions the word *rūpa*, here we find °*udbhūtarūpaprakāśa*°. These words in my opinion present us with two problems. Firstly, does Praśastapāda intend to give two more conditions for perception here or only one, or in other words, what is the relation between *prakāśa* and *rūpa*? Secondly, does the word *udbhūta* really belong in the text here or not?

The answers to these two questions are probably closely related. To begin with the second one, although the editions used by me unanimously agree in including *udbhūta* before *rūpa*, there can be little doubt that the two oldest commentaries we have on the PDhS both did not have this word in their text. Vyomaśiva analyses the compound as *anekadravyavattvaṃ*[27] *ca rūpatvaṃ*[28] *ca prakāśaś ca catuṣṭayasannikarṣaś ceti tathoktas tasmād*,[29] and later he adds that *rūpa* should be understood as meaning *rūpaviśeṣa*: *rūpaṃ cātra rūpaviśeṣo vivakṣitaḥ*.[30] Śrīdhara's explanation of the compound reads: *anekadravyavattvaṃ bhūyovayavāśritatvaṃ rūpasya prakāśa udbhavasamākhyāto rūpasya dharmaḥ yadabhāvād vāriṣṭhe tejasi pratyakṣābhāvaḥ catuṣṭayasannikarṣād ātmano manasā saṃyogo manasa indriyeṇa indriyasyārthenaitasmāt kāraṇakalāpād*.[31] Again, it is clear that Śrīdhara only read *rūpa* in his text, and not *udbhūtarūpa*, but understood *rūpaprakāśa* as meaning approximately the same as *udbhūtarūpa*. Turning now to Udayana, the text of his commentary on this compound may be corrupt (at least I cannot construe it completely satisfactorily), but it seems likely that he did read *udbhūtarūpa*: *anekaṃ dravyam ārambhakaṃ yeṣām avayavānāṃ te 'nekadravyā avayavās tadvattvam anekadravyavattvam ca svabhāvaḥ, udbhūtarūpaṃ ca prakāśasyālokaḥ taiḥ sahitāḥ, catuṣṭayasannikarṣāt, ātmā mano bahirindriyaṃ grāhyaṃ ca dravyam iti catuṣṭayasaṃyogāt*.[32]

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[25] NK 188.23.

[26] Cf. the following remark, from the *sādharmyavaidharmyaprakaraṇam* of the PDhS section on substance: *trayāṇāṃ pratyakṣatvarūpavattvadravatvāni* (NK 24.12).

[27] Vy[1] reads *anekadravyatvam*, but Vyomaśiva's later explanation of this term clearly supports *anekadravyavattvam*: *anekaṃ ca dravyaṃ ceti anekadravyaṃ tad yasyāsti tat tadvat tasya bhāvo 'nekadravyavattvam* (Vy[1] again reads *'nekadravyatvam*!) Vy[1] 557.19-20, Vy[2] vol. 2 141.12-13.

[28] Emend to *rūpaṃ*?

[29] Vy[1] 557.18-19, Vy[2] vol. 2 141.10-12.

[30] Vy[1] 557.20-21.

[31] NK 188.24-26.

[32] Kir 184.17-19.

Obviously a thorough examination of the manuscript evidence would be desirable, but I suspect that the original text of the PDhS probably did not contain the word *udbhūta* here, and that this word was later inserted precisely because of such explanations as that given by Śrīdhara.[33] This leads us to the question of the word *prakāśa*. As we have seen, Śrīdhara interprets *rūpaprakāśa* as a *tatpuruṣa* compound, meaning approximately 'manifestation of colour'.[34] Vyomaśiva on the other hand takes *prakāśa* as an independent condition of perception, on the same level as *anekadravyavattva*, *rūpa* and *catuṣṭayasannikarṣa*. In this context *prakāśa* can only mean 'light'. This is in my opinion a much more natural interpretation of the word than that given by Śrīdhara, and it may be pointed out that in the NS too the word *prakāśa* is used in the sense of light, and the importance of *bāhyaprakāśa* for visual perception is referred to.[35] Udayana's commentary may also support this interpretation, judging from the word *āloka*.[36]

Summing up, I would like to read simply *rūpaprakāśa* rather than *udbhūtarūpaprakāśa*, and take *rūpa* and *prakāśa* as two separate conditions, i.e. respectively as 'colour [of the substance which is the object of perception]' and 'light' or 'illumination'. It may be noted that both Randle and Jha follow Śrīdhara's interpretation, Randle translating 'providing that they ... show manifest colour'[37] and Jha 'the appearance of manifested colour'.[38] Hattori similarly translates 'manifestation of distinct color'.[39]

The group of supplementary conditions referred to by Praśastapāda with the word *dharmādisāmagrye* is explained by Vyomaśiva as including, aside from *dharma* 'space, time and so on'.[40] To these Śrīdhara adds *adharma*,[41] and Udayana includes God as well.[42]

The final word in sentence 5, *svarūpālocanamātram*, has in recent years been

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[33] The concept of *udbhūtarūpa* is also not referred to elsewhere in the PDhS.

[34] In addition to the passage already quoted above, Śrīdhara's explanation of the function of the word *rūpaprakāśa* again confirms both that he did not read the word *udbhūta* before *rūpa* and that he took *rūpaprakāśa* as a single condition: *saty api mahattve anekadravyavattve ca vāyor anupalambhād rūpaprakāśo hetuḥ* NK 189.4.

[35] Cf. NS 3.1.42 *bāhyaprakāśānugrahād viṣayopalabdher anabhivyaktito 'nupalabdhiḥ*.

[36] Simply on the grounds of the structure of Udayana's commentary, one might want to take *prakāśasyālokaḥ* as a gloss of *udbhūtarūpam*, but, apart from the fact that the resulting interpretation is in my opinion implausible, the use of the plural *taiḥ* rather than *tebhyām* suggests that Udayana took *prakāśa* as a separate condition (which would mean that Udayana does not gloss or explain *udbhūtarūpam*). I cannot however explain the genitive *prakāśasya* where I would have expected a nominitive. Cf. also a remark made somewhat later by Udayana: *tathā ca ghaṭālocane 'pi cakṣuṣaḥ prakāśāpekṣitayā śaktir avasīdeta* (Kir 185.8-9).

[37] Randle 1976, 107.12-13.

[38] Jha 1982 391.19-20.

[39] Hattori 1968a 162.20.

[40] *dharmādisāmagrye ceti ādipadād dikkālāder grahaṇam iti* Vy[1] 557.25-26.

[41] *dharmādisāmāgrye ca sati dharmādharmadikkālādīnāṃ samagrāṇāṃ bhāve sati* NK 188.26–189.1.

[42] *dharmādisāmāgrye sati dharmādharmau dikkālāv īśvaraś ceti sādhāraṇāni nimittāni, teṣāṃ samagrāṇāṃ bhāve sati* Kir 184.19-20.

at the centre of the scholarly discussion of Praśastapāda's theory of perception. While it is not possible to go into all the arguments that have been brought forth in regard to the interpretation of this word, the following may be said. There is general agreement between both ancient and modern interpreters that the kind of perception designated by this word is to be regarded as non-propositional (*nirvikalpaka*, translated by Hattori as 'non-qualificative' and by Schmithausen as 'vorstellungsfrei').[43]

Hattori and Schmithausen are in agreement in considering *svarūpālocanamātra* here to mean a kind of perception in regard to substance alone and unqualified or *an sich*.[44] Miyamoto however advanced the theory that *svarūpālocanamātram* is nothing else than *viśeṣaṇajñāna*, the knowledge of the qualifiers of the substance, and Murakami appears to accept this explanation.[45] The evidence adduced by these scholars in favour of this explanation is mostly gathered from the section on number (*saṃkhyā*) in the PDhS and statements found in the various PDhS commentaries.[46] I am not able in the limited space available to go into all these arguments in detail,[47] so I will confine myself to a few remarks and counter-arguments.

It is, in my opinion, quite implausible to take *svarūpālocanamātram* as meaning knowledge of the very qualifiers which Praśastapāda enumerates in sentence 6 below. It is true that knowledge of qualifiers proceeds knowledge of the qualified according to the Vaiśeṣika,[48] but this phase seems to be sufficiently alluded to in sentence 6. The most natural reading seems to me that Praśastapāda is trying to clearly contrast *svarūpālocanamātram* with the *sāmānyaviśeṣadravyaguṇakarmaviśeṣaṇa* which immediately follows as the first word of the next sentence. If Miyamoto and Murakami are right, why does Praśastapāda only mention these qualifiers in the next sentence, and here use a term which would certainly be misleading? Furthermore, if *svarūpālocanamātram* is equivalent to

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[43] The commentaries are unanimous in this respect: *svarūpālocanaṃ nirvikalpakaṃ jñānam* Vy[1] 557.17, *svarūpālocanamātraṃ grahaṇamātraṃ vikalparahitaṃ pratyakṣamātram iti yāvat* NK 189.16-17, *svarūpasyālocanaṃ nirvikalpakaṃ pratyakṣaṃ sākṣātkāri* Kir 184.20-21. Among modern scholars only N.J. Shah considers the stage of perception referred to here as 'determinate and thought-involving' (N.J. Shah 1966, 19). Shah thus distinguishes two stages of determinate (or propositional) perception, the one mentioned here and the one described in our sentence six. This view is based primarily on Shah's interpretation of the *avibhaktam ālocanamātram* of sentence fifteen below.

[44] Hattori calls this 'simple presentation of a substance itself' (Hattori 1968a, 163) while Schmithausen speaks of 'die Anschauung der Substanz (*dravyam*) — also des Bestimmungsträgers (*viśeṣyam*) — für sich allein' (Schmithausen 1970, 129).

[45] Cf. Miyamoto 1982, especially p. 523, and Murakami 1987, 77ff.

[46] Particularly explicit for example is Śrīdhara's *viśeṣaṇaṃ viśeṣyasya svarūpam* (NK 121.1). I should like however to point out that there are other passages in the NK where Śrīdhara appears to use the word *svarūpa* in a broader, more general sense; see for example *astitvaṃ svarūpavattvaṃ ṣaṇṇām* (sc. *padārthānām*) api sādharmyam. *yasya vastuno yat svarūpaṃ tad eva tasyāstitvam* (NK 16.5-6).

[47] The most thorough presentation of the evidence is to be found in Murakami 1987, 77ff. Cf. also Miyamoto 1976 and 1982.

[48] At least since the composition of the sūtras 8.6–8.11.

the *viśeṣaṇajñāna* which is the cause of the *viśiṣṭajñāna* or knowledge of a substance described in sentence 6, then sentence 5 would not be really be describing knowledge of a substance at all, but only its qualifiers. But this does not seem to fit with the whole structure of sentences 5-11, which systematically deal with perception on the basis of the different statuses of the objects of perception, and the different kinds of contact which are therefore involved.

For a further, and in my opinion fairly decisive, argument against the interpretation of *svarūpālocanamātram* as *viśeṣaṇajñāna*, see the annotation on this word as it occurs in sentence 14 below, and compare also the use of the similar word *svarūpadarśana* in sentence 12.

The theory that substances can be perceived by themselves alone, independently of their qualifiers, which is almost certainly advocated by Praśastapāda here, is, as Schmithausen says, probably not native to the Vaiśeṣika, and may come from the Nyāya.[49] We must agree with the remarks made by Halbfass that 'die "bloße Anschauung" der Substanz selbst ist nur unzureichend in den Kontext integriert; sie bleibt inhaltlich unbestimmt und ist *de facto* kaum zu trennen von dem, was als einer ihrer auslösenden Faktoren gilt — dem Kontakt (*sannikarṣa*) mit dem Gegenstand, der selbst noch nicht als inhaltliches Gewahrwerden zu verstehen ist', and 'das *svarūpālocanamātra* der Substanz als solcher ist und bleibt ein hypothetisch angenommenes Moment im Wahrnehmen'.[50] After Praśastapāda this form of perception seems to have again been disregarded in the Vaiśeṣika.

6. [Next], because of a contact between the *ātman* and the internal organ, dependent on the [various] qualifiers [of the substance, namely the highest] universal (i.e. 'being'), limited universals, substance, quality and action, perceptual knowledge arises [to the effect]: '[this object] exists, is a substance and [made of] earth, is [a] horned [animal], is white, is a cow [that] goes'.

This sentence should be compared with VS 8.6-7. Noteworthy is that by adding the words 'because of a contact between the *ātman* and the internal organ' Praśastapāda makes clear that this is a different kind of perception than that described in sentence 5 above: no equivalent for these words is found in the VS. This clearly corresponds to what is called 'propositional' (*savikalpaka*) knowledge in later texts.

Praśastapāda gives a number of examples of this propositional knowledge. I have translated these as all concerning the perception of a (moving) cow, in relation to its various, successively more specific, qualifying properties. Schmithausen, however, seems to understand the examples as being divided into two groups: '"die Erde ist [etwas] Seiendes und eine Substanz" ... "die Kuh hat Hörner, ist weiß und geht"'.[51] This implies taking *pṛthivī* as a perceptual knowl-

[49] Cf. Schmithausen 1970, 129. Somewhat differently Halbfass 1976, 160-162.
[50] Halbfass 1976, 156-157 and 159.
[51] Schmithausen 1970, 126 note 7.

edge which arises dependent on (the knowledge of) two qualifiers, the universals 'being' and 'substanceness', and not connected with the following words describing the perceptual knowledge in regard to a cow.[52] It is probably better to take *pṛthivī* as another perceptual knowledge in regard to the cow, namely as being (made of) earth (dependent on the limited universal 'earthness'). This interpretation is supported by all the commentators,[53] but also seems to be confirmed by a similar passage in the PDhS section on indefinite knowledge: *tatra sattādravyatvapṛthivītvavṛkṣatvarūpavattvādiśākhādyapekṣo 'dhyavasāya eva ...*: 'in regard to this (a bread-fruit tree, seen by someone who does not know the species) there is definite knowledge [of the tree] dependent on [the qualifiers] "being", "substanceness", "earthness", "treeness", and its possessing colour, and so on, and [dependent on the qualifiers] branches and so on'.

The first three examples are of perceptual knowledge dependent on *sāmānyaviśeṣa*. The knowledge 'this object exists' is knowledge which arises dependent on (the perception of) the universal 'being', the knowledge 'this is a substance' is dependent on (the perception of) the limited universal 'substanceness' and, as argued above, the knowledge 'this substance is [made of] earth' is dependent on (the perception of) the limited universal 'earthness'. Here it seems that Praśastapāda intends *sāmānyaviśeṣa* to include both the universal 'being' and limited universals.[54] The knowledge 'this is a horned animal' is dependent on (the perception of) a substance, namely the horns of the cow. The knowledge that 'this substance is white' depends on the perception of the quality white (which in turn depends on the perception of the universal 'whiteness'). The knowledge that '[this cow] goes' is dependent on the perception of an action, the movement of the cow.

As for the knowledge that 'this is a cow', I have in my translation followed the interpretation given by both Vyomaśiva and Udayana, taking this as a separate cognition, dependent on the perception of the universal 'cowness'.[55] Śrīdhara, less convincingly, takes *śuklo gauḥ* together: *śuklo gaur iti guṇaviśiṣṭam ... pratyakṣam*:[56] 'the perceptual knowledge "the cow is white" is qualified by a quality'. The order of the examples seems to suggest that the realization that the object of perception is a cow (and therefore the perception of the universal

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[52]Hattori also understands the examples in more or less the same way, cf. Hattori 1968a, 162.

[53]Vyomaśiva's commentary on this passage is corrupt, but has been emended plausibly by Schmithausen as '... *dravyam iti sāmānyaviśeṣ<aviśeṣaṇ?>āpekṣam, pṛthivīti tathā* (sc. *sāmānyaviśeṣaviśeṣaṇāpekṣam*), *viṣāṇīti dravyaviśeṣaṇ<āpekṣ?>am, śukla iti guṇaviśeṣ<aṇ>āpekṣam*, ...' (Schmithausen 1970, 126 note 7; cf. Vy[1] 558.9-10). Śrīdhara explains *pṛthivī* as *pṛthivītvaviśiṣṭam ... pratyakṣam* (NK 190.12-13) and Udayana as *pṛthivītvaviśiṣṭam ...jñānam* (Kir 186.14-16).

[54]Cf. Schmithausen 1970, 127, and Vyomaśiva's analysis of the compound as *sāmānyaṃ ca sāmānyaviśeṣaś ca dravyaṃ ca guṇaś ca karma ceti tathoktāni, tāny eva viśeṣaṇāni tāny apekṣata iti tadapekṣaḥ samuccaye* Vy[1] 558.2-4.

[55]*gaur iti sāmānyaviśeṣaviśeṣaṇāpekṣam* Vy[1] 558.10-11, *gaur iti gotvaviśiṣṭam ...jñānam* Kir 186.14-16.

[56]NK 190.13.

'cowness') only occurs after the perception of the other qualifying universals and qualities.

7. In regard to [the qualities] colour, taste, smell and touch [perceptual knowledge] arises, by means of their [respectively] fixed sense organs, because of [the qualities'] inherence in [a substance] which possesses many substances [as inherence causes], because of their own (specific) limited universals (*svagataviśeṣāt*) and because of contact [of the sense organ] with the locus (*āśraya*) [of the qualities].

This is clearly based on VS 4.1.9-10. The most critical problem posed by this sentence is the interpretation of the word *svagataviśeṣāt*. This is obviously also closely related to the interpretation of the word *rūpaviśeṣāt* in VS 4.1.9. Vyomaśiva explains *svagataviśeṣa* as *udbhavasamākhyāto rūpādidharmaḥ sahakāriviśeṣaḥ*:[57] 'a property of colour and so on which is called "manifestness" and is a particular assisting factor'. Śrīdhara's explanation is completely different: *svagato viśeṣo rūpe rūpatvaṃ rase rasatvaṃ gandhe gandhatvaṃ sparśe sparśatvam*:[58] '[their] own (specific) limited universal, [that is to say] "colourness" in colour, "tasteness" in taste, "smellness" in smell and "touchness" in touch'. Udayana's commentary is closer to that of Vyomaśiva: *svagataviśeṣād udbhūtasamākhyātāt sāmānyaviśeṣāt*:[59] '"because of their own limited universal" means "because of the limited universal called "manifest[-ness]"'.

The word *niyatendriyanimittam* probably refers, as explained by Śrīdhara and Udayana,[60] to the fact that each of the four qualities here enumerated can only be perceived by the specific sense organ it is connected with.

8. Because of contact between three [factors, there is] perception (*upalabdhiḥ*) of sound, which is inherent in the organ of hearing [itself, and is therefore perceived] by that [organ] alone.

The VS does not give an explanation of the process of perception of sound.[61] The idea that perception of sound arises from a contact of three factors is not expressed in the VS,[62] but may be said to be a logical consequence of the Vaiśeṣika theories on the nature of sound and of ether (*ākāśa*). Sound is a quality by which one can infer the existence of the element ether which is its substratum.[63]

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[57] Vy[1] 558.15-16.

[58] NK 194.5-6.

[59] Kir 186.20.

[60] *cakṣurnimittaṃ rūpe rasananimittaṃ rase ghrāṇanimittaṃ gandhe tvagindriyanimittaṃ sparśe* NK 194.7-8, *niyatendriyanimittam iti niyatam indriyaṃ nimittaṃ yasya, cakṣur eva rūpajñānasya, rasanaṃ eva rasajñānasya, ghrāṇam eva gandhajñānasya, tvagindriyam eva sparśajñānasya tathoktam* Kir 186.21-23.

[61] Cf. VS 2.2.24 *śrotragrahaṇo yo 'rthaḥ sa śabdaḥ*: 'The object which is apprehended by the organ of hearing is sound'.

[62] Cf. however the DPŚ, 1265a, line 6-8, translated by Ui 'What is the perception produced by contact of three factors? All the perceptions of sound and of objects like potentiality, non-potentiality, sound-ness, and existence which are inherent in sound have their causes in contact of three (factors), self, sense-organ, and mind' (Ui 1962, 109).

[63] VS 2.1.26 *liṅgam ākāśasya*.

Ether is an eternal substance and is one.[64] The organ of hearing must consist of ether, just as the other sense organs consist of the elements which correspond to the respective qualities which are perceived by them.[65] Since ether is one and not many, the organ of hearing consists of the part of the all-pervading ether which is located within the ear.[66] Therefore in the process of perception of sound, no contact is necessary between the organ of hearing and the substratum of the sound, because the organ of hearing is the substratum.

9. [The qualities] number, size, separateness, conjunction, disjunction, remoteness, nearness, viscidity, fluidity and impulse, as well as actions are apprehended by the organs of sight and of touch because of their inherence in substances which are perceptible.

This is clearly based on VS 4.1.12; see my commentary on that sūtra in the previous chapter. Praśastapāda however adds viscidity, fluidity and impulse[67] to the list given in the sūtra.

10. Perception of [the qualities] cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion and effort [arises] because of contact between two [factors, namely] the *ātman* and the internal organ.

This sentence deals with the perception of qualities which inhere in the *ātman*. The only sūtra in the VS which mentions perception of the qualities of the *ātman* is 9.17 which reads *ātmasamavāyād ātmaguṇeṣu*: '[Perception] in regard to the qualities of the *ātman* [arises] because of [their] inherence in the *ātman*.' This however belongs to the sequence of sūtras which deals with yogic perception, whereas Praśastapāda here still is discussing ordinary perception. One may compare the passage in the DPŚ translated by Ui as follows: 'What is the perception produced by contact of two (factors)? All the cognitions of the objects like pleasure, pain, desire, aversion and effort, and of the objects like potentiality, non-potentiality, commonness and existence which are inherent in these (five) attributes, have their causes in contact of two (factors), self and mind'.[68]

11. [There is] apprehension (*grahaṇam*) of [the universals] 'being' (*bhāva*), 'substanceness', 'qualityness', 'actionness' and so on, when they are inherent in a substratum (*ādhāra*) which is perceptible, by the sense organs which [are capable of] apprehending the [respective] locus. Such (i.e. as described in 5-11) is the perceptual knowledge of [ordinary] people such as us.

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[64] VS 2.1.27-28: *dravyatvanityatve vāyunā vyākhyāte* and *tattvaṃ bhāvena*.

[65] Cf. VS 8.16-17; note that the case of the organ of hearing is not mentioned in these sūtra's, but is referred to by Candrānanda in his commentary on 8.17.

[66] Cf. Candrānanda's commentary on VS 8.17 and the PDhS *śrotraṃ punaḥ śravaṇavivarasaṃjñako nabhodeśaḥ* NK 58.20-59.1 (*nabhas = ākāśaḥ*).

[67] Impulse (*vega*) is one of three kinds of the quality trace (*saṃskāra*) distinguished by Praśastapāda: *saṃskāras trividho vego bhāvanā sthitisthāpakaś ca* NK 266.23-24.

[68] DPŚ 1265a, line 8-10. Translation from Ui 1962, 108.

Here Praśastapāda gives a more complete description of the process of perception of universals than that found in VS 4.1.14.

With this the description of ordinary perception is completed.

12. But for yogis, who are superior to us, when [in the condition called] *yukta*, an unerring seeing of the object's own nature arises, by virtue of [their] internal organ [which is] assisted (*anugṛhīta*) by *dharma* arising from yoga, in regard to [the following substances:] their own *ātman* and the *ātman* of others, ether, space, time, atoms, the air and the internal organ, [as well as] in regard to the qualities, actions, universals and individuators which are inherent in these [substances], and in regard to [the category] inherence.

The annotation on this sentence will be found combined with that on sentence 13 below.

13. Furthermore, for [yogis in the condition known as] *viyukta*, perceptual knowledge arises in regard to objects which are fine (*sūkṣma*), concealed [from sight], or at a [great] distance, because of contact between four [factors], in consequence of the assistance (*anugraha*) of *dharma* arising from yoga.

Praśastapāda now turns to the phenomenon of yogic or supernormal perception. Sentence 12 may be compared with VS 9.13-14, and sentence 13 with VS 9.15-16.[69] In referring to 'objects which are fine, concealed [from sight] or at a great distance', Praśastapāda may also have been influenced by the use of the same words in the *Yogasūtra*.[70]

The PDhS is to the best of my knowledge the earliest text which explicitly refers to two kinds of yogic perception, *yukta* and *viyukta*. This distinction was later adopted by a number of other authors, e.g. Bhāsarvajña in his *Nyāyasāra* and *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa*. Such a distinction may however also be presupposed by the sūtras on yogic perception in the VS.[71] I also think it likely that Pakṣilasvāmin knew and referred to a similar distinction in the passage (already quoted in note 2 to chapter two above) *pratyakṣam yuñjānasya yogasamādhijam ātmany ātmamanasoḥ saṃyogaviśeṣād ātmā pratyakṣaḥ iti*:[72] 'For the [yogi] who is *yuñjāna* (i.e. presumably 'at that moment in *samādhi*'), the perception which arises from the *samādhi* of his yoga [also is a means of correct knowledge in regard to the existence of the *ātman*], for [VS 9.13 says]: "the ātman is perceptible through a particular kind of conjunction between the *ātman* and the internal organ"'. Here the word *yuñjānasya* would seem to imply that there also are yogis who are not *yuñjāna*.

Two explanations of the difference between *yukta* and *viyukta* yogis are found in the commentaries on the PDhS. Śrīdhara glosses *yuktānām* with *samādhy-*

[69]On these sūtras see especially Wezler 1982, 666-668.

[70]*pravṛttyālokanyāsāt sūkṣmavyavahitaviprakṛṣṭajñānam* YS 3.25.

[71]Cf. Wezler 1982, 667.

[72]NV[1] 182.17-19

avasthānām:[73] 'for [yogis] in the state of *samādhi*', and later explains *viyukta* with the words *atyantayogābhyāsopacitadharmātiśayā asamādhyavasthitā api ye atīndriyaṃ paśyanti te viyuktāḥ*:[74] 'yogis who, having accumulated an abundance of *dharma* by their extreme practice of yoga, though not [at that moment] in the state of *samādhi*, see [things which are normally] beyond the reach of the senses, are [called] *viyukta*'. That is to say that *yukta* and *viyukta* are not two different types of yogis, but different states. A yogi can when *yukta*, that is to say in *samādhi*, perceive certain things such as the ātman, atoms and ether. This perception does not involve a four-fold contact, since that is specifically mentioned only in 13. When he emerges from *samādhi* this kind of perception is no longer actual for him, but because of the *dharma* accumulated by his yoga he still is capable of perceiving a number of objects which are not normally perceptible.[75]

Udayana on the other hand understands *yukta* and *viyukta* as two different kinds or levels of yogis. The most relevant passage runs *te* (sc. *yoginaḥ*) *ca dvividhāḥ, yuktaviyuktabhedāt. tatra yuktā indriyebhyaḥ pratyāhṛtya*[76] *sākṣātkartavyavastuny ādareṇa mano vidhārya pravartamānacintāsantānāḥ. viyuktās tu atyantābhyāsena paramavaśīkāram āpannā vigatāvaraṇāḥ*[77] *sarvataḥ pradyotamanaso*[78] *niravaśeṣitābhyāsāḥ*.[79] 'And these [yogis] are of two kinds, for they are divided into *yukta* and *viyukta* [yogis]. Of these, the *yukta* [yogis are those who], withdrawing from the sense organs, and attentively fix their internal organ on the object which is to be perceived, have a continuing stream of concentration [or vision].[80] The *viyukta* [yogis] however have obtained supreme mastery by their extreme practise [of yoga] and got rid of [all] obstructions, [so that] their internal organs [emit] light on all sides, and no [further] practise remains [to be done].' It is clear that for Udayana the *viyukta* yogi is superior,[81] and later he describes them as *aṇimādyāḥ kāryasiddhir dūraśravaṇādyāś cendriyasiddhir āsāditavantaḥ*:[82] 'having obtained supernatural powers of the body (or 'of action'), such as the power of becoming as small as an atom, as well as supernatural powers of the senses, such as the power of hearing at a [great] distance.'

Of these two explanations, the former seems clearly better and probably

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[73]NK 196.2.

[74]NK 198.5-6.

[75]Cf. Biardeau's translation of *yuktānām* as 'quand ils sont en état de *yoga*' and *viyuktānām* as 'quand ils ne sont plus en état de *yoga*' (Biardeau 1964, 120, note 2).

[76]Emend thus for the printed *pratyākṛtya*.

[77]I propose reading thus for the printed *āpannavigatāvaraṇāḥ*.

[78]Note that a variant *pradyotamānaso* is given. I suspect that the original reading was *pradyotamānamanaso*.

[79]Kir 189.16-18.

[80]Alternatively one could perhaps take *pravartamānacintāsantānāḥ* as opposing *niravaśeṣitābhyāsāḥ* and translate it with something like 'have a continuing stream of concerns'.

[81]Udayana does not however explicitly state whether or not yogis of the *viyukta* type still occasionally resort to the former type of yogic perception or not.

[82]Kir 190.12.

represents Praśastapāda's intention. Yogis who are actually in *samādhi* can perceive a number of things, such as the category inherence, which are presumably not perceptible when they emerge from *samādhi* and become *viyukta*. Udayana's different explanation is perhaps partly motivated by the desire to bring the account of yogic perception here more or less into correspondence with the teachings on yogic powers (*siddhi*) in the *Yogasūtra*.

It may be added that yogic perception actually plays a quite important part in the Vaiśeṣika as presented by Praśastapāda, being required to prove the existence of the category individuator (*viśeṣa*). For this reason too we must translate °*sāmānyaviśeṣeṣu* in sentence 12 as 'in regard to ... universals and individuators' rather than 'in regard to ... (limited) universals'.

Finally, we should note the word *svarūpadarśanam* in 12. Neither Miyamoto nor Murakami refer to this sentence, but it does not seem possible that this word, which is presumably equivalent to *svarūpālocanamātra*,[63] could be interpreted as 'knowledge of qualifiers' here. It is surely to be construed with all the preceding locatives, including the category inherence, which would not be called either qualifier or qualified, being itself nothing more or less than the relationship which applies between the two.

14. In this connection, the perceptual knowledge in regard to (limited) universals[64] [which consists of] merely seeing [the object's] own nature, is the means of correct knowledge (*pramāṇa*), the categories, substance and so on, are the objects of knowledge (*prameyā*), the *ātman* is the knower, and the correct knowledge (*pramiti*) is knowledge which has [the categories] substance and so on as its object.

Praśastapāda now turns to the classification of means of correct knowledge, object of correct knowledge, knower and correct knowledge. The fact that this classification is only given after a systematic exposition of both ordinary and yogic perception suggests that it is not native to the Vaiśeṣika. It may be noted that the word *pramāṇa*, 'means of correct knowledge, occurs just once in the VS, in a sūtra which is not perhaps completely above suspicion.[65] The earliest text that emphasizes this classification is probably the introductory section of Pakṣilasvāmin's NBh. It seems plausible that Praśastapāda was influenced by this text.

Here *sāmānyaviśeṣeṣu svarūpālocanamatraṃ pratyakṣam* is given as the means of correct knowledge. As in sentence 5, this appears to be a non-propositional type of knowledge.[66] It appears to me that it is impossible to maintain with Miyamoto and Murakami that *svarūpālocanamatram* means *viśeṣaṇajñānam*.

[63] That here the word *darśana* is employed rather than *ālocanamātra* may be because the latter is more closely associated with a purely physical process of seeing.

[64] Here as well as in sentence 15, it is very possible that Praśastapāda intended 'being' to be included in *sāmānyaviśeṣa*.

[65] *hetur apadeśo liṅgaṃ nimittaṃ pramāṇam kāraṇam ity anarthāntaram* VS 9.20.

[66] Cf. Śrīdhara's gloss of *svarūpālocanamātram* in this sentence as *svarūpagrahaṇamātraṃ vikalparahitam* NK 198.12-13.

The locative *sāmānyaviśeṣeṣu* clearly depends on *svarūpālocanamātram pratyakṣam*. (Limited) universals do not, however, have qualifiers (none of the other categories can inhere in universals), so that one would be forced to take *svarūpa* as somehow or other applying to 'the categories, substance and so on' (*dravyādayaḥ padārthāḥ*) which are given as the objects of correct knowledge. This seems to me to be syntactically impossible.

Though it is perhaps not immediately evident from the text whether *sāmānyaviśeṣa* here is intended to include 'being' or not,[67] this seems plausible in view of the close correspondence with sentence 6 above, where we know from the examples that 'being' was included.[68]

15. In regard to the arising of knowledge of (limited) universals, the perceptual knowledge [which consists of] merely seeing the own nature [of the limited universals], and is undifferentiated (*avibhaktam*), is the means of correct knowledge, and in regard to this [perceptual knowledge], there is no other means of correct knowledge, because it is not a result [of another perceptual knowledge].

In the previous sentence, the non-perceptual knowledge of (limited) universals was said to be a means of correct knowledge. Since this is itself (correct) knowledge, Praśastapāda now explains what is the means of correct knowledge that produces it. *avibhaktam ālocanamātram* is therefore, it would appear, distinguished from *svarūpālocanamātra*. Note that *svarūpālocanamātram* is used both in sentence 5 and sentence 14 with the direct object of the 'seeing' in the locative (so also with the *svrūpadarśanam* of sentence 12), whereas the 'undifferentiated mere seeing' here does not have such a direct object. Śrīdhara's commentary may prove helpful here: *ālocyate 'nenety ālocanam indriyārthasannikarṣas tanmātram avibhaktaṃ, kevalaṃ jñānānapekṣam iti yāvat, sāmānyaviśeṣajñānotpattau pramāṇam. viśeṣyajñānotpattāv apīndriyārthasannikarṣaḥ pramāṇaṃ bhavaty eva pramāhetutvāt, kiṃ tu viśeṣaṇajñānasahakāritayā na kevalaḥ. sāmānyaviśeṣajñānotpattau tu jñānānapekṣaḥ kevala evety abhiprāyaḥ. sannikarṣamātram iha pramāṇaṃ, na jñānam ity atropapattim āha — na tasminn iti. sāmānyaviśeṣajñāne nānyat pramāṇaṃ jñānarūpam asti sāmānyaviśeṣajñānasyāphalarūpatvāt, jñānaphalābhāvāt. viśeṣyajñānaṃ hi viśeṣaṇasya phalaṃ, viśeṣaṇajñānaṃ na jñānāntaraphalam, anavasthāprasaṅgāt, ato viśeṣaṇajñāne indriyārthasannikarṣamātram eva pramāṇam ity arthaḥ. yadā nirvikalpakaṃ sāmānyaviśeṣajñānaṃ phalaṃ tadendriyārthasannikarṣaḥ pramāṇam, yadā viśeṣyajñānaṃ phalaṃ tadā sāmānyaviśeṣālocanaṃ pramāṇam ity uktaṃ tāvat.*[69] '*ālocanam* ('seeing') is that by which one sees, [that is] contact between sense organ and object. [*ālocanamātra* means] "merely this" (i.e. merely a contact between sense organ and object), [and this, which is] undifferentiated, that is to

[67] Cf. Schmithausen 1970, 127.

[68] So also Śrīdhara, *sāmānyaṃ sattā dravyatvaguṇatvakarmatvādikaṃ viśeṣā vyaktayaḥ* NK 198.11-12. Differently Vyomaśiva, *sāmānyaviśeṣeṣu dravyatvaguṇatvakarmatvādiṣu* Vy[1] 560.24-25.

[69] NK 198.21–199.7.

say alone (or simple) and not dependent on [another] knowledge, is the means of correct knowledge in regard to the arising of the (perceptual) knowledge of (limited) universals. Contact between sense organ and object is a means of correct knowledge in regard to the arising of (perceptual) knowledge of a qualified [object] also, since it is a cause of correct knowledge, but because it is [in that case] assisted by knowledge of the qualifiers, it is not "alone" [a cause]. In regard to the arising of (perceptual) knowledge of (limited) universals, however, [contact between sense organ and object] is "alone" [the means of correct knowledge], not being dependent on [another] knowledge: this is the implicit meaning [of the word *avibhaktam*]. [Next, Praśastapāda] states the proof that in this connection merely the contact [of sense organ and object], and not [another] knowledge, is the means of correct knowledge, with the words "in regard to this" [and so on]. There is no other means of correct knowledge in the form of [another] knowledge in regard to the knowledge of (limited) universals, because the knowledge of (limited) universals does not have the form of a result, [that is to say] because it is not the result of [another] knowledge. For the knowledge of the qualified is a result of the knowledge of the qualifiers, [but] the knowledge of the qualifiers is not the result of another knowledge, because [this would lead to] a *regressus ad infinitum*. Therefore, in regard to the knowledge of the qualifiers, the mere contact between sense organ and object is the means of correct knowledge: this is the meaning [of the sentence]. It amounts to saying that when the result is the non-propositional knowledge of (limited) universals, the means of correct knowledge is the contact between sense organ and object [alone], and when the result is the knowledge of the qualified, the means of correct knowledge is the "seeing" of the (limited) universals.'

This interpretation of *avibhaktam ālocanamātram* as meaning 'contact between sense organ and object' is also supported by Udayana[90] and, fairly closely, by Vyomaśiva,[91] and is followed by most modern scholars.[92] The most important argument in its favour is that Praśastapāda says that this *avibhaktam ālocanamātram* is 'not a result'; this does indeed seem to confirm that it is not a form of knowledge or cognition.

16. Or alternatively, the knowledge which arises in regard to all

[90] Udayana even uses precisely the same phrase as Śrīdhara: *ālocyate 'nenety ālocanam indriyārthasannikarṣaḥ* Kir 192.13.

[91] Vyomaśiva explains *avibhaktam* with 'devoid of knowledge of qualifiers, and maintains that other causal factors aside from the contact between sense organ and object are meant to be included in *ālocanamātram*: *sāmānyaviśeṣajñānotpattāv avibhaktaṃ viśeṣaṇajñānaśūnyam ālocyate 'nenety ālocanamātram indriyārthasannikarṣādyupalakṣitaṃ kāraṇasāmagryaṃ pratyakṣaṃ pramāṇam, prameyaṃ sāmānyaviśeṣā iti* (Vy^1 561.2-5).

[92] Cf. especially Schmithausen 1970, 128 ('bloße Vorgang des Hinschauens'), and Murakami 1987, 95-98 (with detailed discussion of all the PDhS commentaries on this passage). Differently Hattori 1968a, 164-165 (interpreting *avibhaktam* as 'without differentiation between the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) and the qualified (*viśeṣya*)'), and N.J. Shah 1966, 19 (understanding *avibhaktam* as implying 'that at this stage all the categories are presented to consciousness but the cogniser is absolutely unable to differentiate one from the other, and recognize them as they are').

the categories because of the contact of four [factors], and which is unerring and can not be designated [by words] (*avyapadeśyam*), is the means of correct knowledge [known as] perceptual knowledge, the categories, substance and so on are the objects of knowledge, the *ātman* is the knower and the correct knowledge is the seeing of the good, bad and indifferent [nature of the object].

Praśastapāda now appears to give an alternative application of the fourfold *pramāṇa* classification to perception. The 'correct knowledge' that is now said to result from perception is something closer to a 'value judgement' and seems a far cry from the strict ontology of the earliest Vaiśeṣika.[93] It seems likely that Praśastapāda is influenced here by the following passage from Paksilasvāmin's NBh ad NS 1.1.3: *akṣasyākṣasya prativiṣayaṃ vṛttiḥ pratyakṣam. vṛttis tu sannikarṣo jñānaṃ vā. yadā sannikarṣas tadā jñānaṃ pramitiḥ, yadā jñānaṃ tadā hānopadānopekṣābuddhayaḥ phalam.*[94] 'Perception is the activity of the various sense organs upon their corresponding objects. This "activity" may be either contact [with the object] or knowledge. When it is contact, then the [resulting] correct knowledge is knowledge [of the object itself], and when it is knowledge, the result is the cognition that [the object should be] abandoned, acquired or treated with indifference.'[95]

Further evidence of the influence of the Nyāya in this passage may perhaps be seen in the words *avitatham avyapadeśyam* which remind one of course of the *avyapadeśyam avyabhicāri* of the Nyāya definition of perception.[96]

Let us conclude by briefly summing up some of the results of this preliminary study of Praśastapāda's theory of perception. In the first part of the section we have looked at, Praśastapāda appears to keep fairly close to the sūtras. Sentences 5 and 7-11 are modelled on VS 4.1.6-14, treating a number of qualities, such as sound, not mentioned in the sūtras,[97] while sentence 6 is related to VS 8.6-9. Among the minor differences that may be pointed out is the fact that, if my interpretation of sentence 5 is correct, the presence of light or illumination is given as an additional necessary condition for perception of substances. A more important innovation is that Praśastapāda distinguishes far more clearly than the sūtras between a non-propositional and a propositional form of perception,

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[93] Compare the similar passage in the PDhS section on inference: *tatra liṅgadarśanaṃ pramāṇaṃ pramitir agnijñānam. athavāgnijñānam eva pramāṇam pramitir agnau guṇadoṣamādhyasthyadarśanam* (NK 206.5-7). Such passages may perhaps be seen as resulting from Praśastapāda's desire to bridge the apparent gap between the almost atheistic natural philosophy of the early Vaiśeṣika and his own theistic and more soteriologically oriented system.

[94] NV[1] 182.5-7.

[95] Vyomaśiva is perhaps attempting to point out or emphasize the correspondence between our sentence and this passage from the NBh when he says *guṇadarśanam upādeyajñānaṃ doṣadarśanaṃ heyajñānam upekṣaṇīyajñānaṃ ca mādhyasthyadarśanam iti* (Vy[1] 561.21-22).

[96] NS 1.1.4.

[97] It has been argued in the previous chapter that the omission of these qualities in the corresponding sūtras is an argument in favour of their relatively high antiquity.

without however actually using such terms as *nirvikalpaka* and *savikalpaka*.[98] Sentences 12 and 13 may be compared with VS 9.13-16, though the precise relation between the sūtras and Praśastapāda on this point should be investigated in more detail.[99] Finally, in sentences 14-16 Praśastapāda seems to be heavily influenced by the Nyāya,[100] and introduces the *pramāṇa* terminology which by his time had come to play a central part in the epistemological discussions of and between many Indian philosophical schools. The fourfold classification of this terminology does not however seem to have been fully integrated with Praśastapāda's earlier explanations; notably the non-propositional knowledge of substances independent from their qualifiers which appears to be taught in sentence 5, has not been given a place within the *pramāṇa* classification.

[98] I have above argued for the position expressed by Schmithausen that two different kinds of non-propositional perception are taught in sentences 5 and 14, the former applying to substance unqualified by other categories and the latter to the qualifying (limited) universals.

[99] Cf. Wezler 1982, 667-668.

[100] I would agree with Miyamoto, who finds nothing in Praśastapāda's teachings on perception that necessitates the assumption of influence from or direct knowledge of Dignāga's works.

Appendix A

VS quotations in the Vyomavatī

Introductory

It is well known that the text of the VS has come down to us in a most unsatisfactory condition. An excellent survey of the philological difficulties surrounding the VS has been given in a recent article by A. Wezler.[1] By way of introduction to the work here presented I can do no better than to refer to Wezler's statements that 'the transmission of the VS has unfortunately been of such a kind that even the faintest opportunity should not be missed to enlarge the documentary basis on which a critical edition of this important text ought to be built',[2] and that, in regard to the VS, 'testimonia and comparable sources gain very much in value, even more than is usual in Indian philology; it is almost only with the help of this secondary transmission that the many and intricate problems of lower and higher textual criticism posed by the VS at every step can be solved at least partially.'[3]

Vyomaśiva's Vyomavatī

Both on account of its relatively early date and the large number of VS quotations found in it, Vyomaśiva's Vyomavatī (Vy), the oldest surviving commentary on the PDhS, is among the most important of these secondary sources. The date of Vyomaśiva is generally put at ca. 950 A.D.,[4], so that the Vy is considerably older than the extant commentaries on the VS, with the possible exception of Candrānanda's Vṛtti (C), the date of which as yet remains uncertain. The range and number of VS quotations in the Vy are, as we shall see, impressive, and there are also a number of fragments apparently considered

[1] Wezler 1982, 643-648.
[2] Op. cit. 645.
[3] Op. cit. 646.
[4] For the arguments for this date cf. especially Bhattacharya 1958, 12-13. P. S. Ramanujam (Ramanujam 1979, 8-19) and G. Sastri (introduction to Vy[2] vol. 1, v-vi) suggest placing Vyomaśiva in the seventh century, a date which appears considerably less plausible to me.

sūtra's by Vyomaśiva but not found in any recension of the VS now available.

In his excellent edition of the VS with C, Jambuvijayaji has cited the Vy's readings of a number of sūtra's, both in his notes to the edition itself and in an appendix.[5] However, only a small fraction of Vyomaśiva's VS quotations have been thus utilised by him.

A new edition of the Vyomavatī.

The *editio princeps* of the Vy (Vy^{1}), basically simply a transcription of the only MS available, was published in 1930 in the Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series (reprinted 1983), and for over half a century remained the only edition available. In 1983-1984 a new edition in two volumes (Vy^{2}), edited by Gaurinath Sastri, was published by Sampurnanand Sanskrit University. The text of this edition is based only on that of the *editio princeps*, as the editor was unable to make use of any fresh MS material.[6] Sastri has however introduced a large number of emendations to the text, many of which are undoubtably correct. Unfortunately, these editorial emendations are often not indicated as such, so that the student of the Vy must still constantly consult Vy^{1}.

An important contribution of this new edition of the Vy is that Sastri has attempted to identify the quotations found in the text, and provides indexes of quotations. Regrettably, as far as the VS quotations are concerned the usefulness of these features is severely limited by a large number of mistakes: especially sūtra's wrongly identified (e.g. nrs. 48 and 78 below), not identified (e.g. nrs. 49 and 63) or not recognized as sūtra's (e.g. nrs. 58 and 66).[7] Some of these may be attributed to the fact that Sastri apparently only made use of the 'Maithila version' of the VS, that is, the text as commented on by Śaṅkara Miśra.[8] Others perhaps resulted from the haste with which vol. 2 appears to have been prepared for the press, as there are far more mistakes of this kind in vol. 2 than in vol. 1.

VS quotations in the Vyomavatī

The following list contains all the VS quotations I could find in Vy, as well as other passages of importance for the textual problems of the VS. References are

[5]See the *katipayānāṃ sūtrāṇāṃ granthāntareṣūddhṛtena sūtrapāṭhena saha tulanā* in C, 231-234.

[6]One MS of the Vy, preserved in the library of the University of Mysore, has been referred to by E. Franco (Franco 1987, 561). See also the notice in WZKS 27 (1983) of a doctoral dissertation by W. Slaje which made use of a MS of the Vy. Unfortunately, this dissertation has not been published and is not at present available to me. Obviously a new edition of the Vy on the basis of all the extant MS material is a major desideratum for Vaiśeṣika studies. Let us hope we will not have to wait another fifty years for it.

[7]Such mistakes are not as a rule pointed out below, since it was not my intention to give a list of corrigenda to Vy^{2}.

[8]This in spite of the fact that Sastri refers to C in the introduction (Vy^{2} vol. 1, ii.).

to page and line of Vy[1], with page and line numbers of Vy[2] given in parentheses (nrs. 1-43 in Vy[2] vol. 1, the rest in vol. 2). The readings of the available commentaries on the VS have also been cited; where identical with the readings of the Vy only the number of the sūtra is given.[9] Due to limitations of space I have kept comments to a minimum and have not as a rule referred to the explanations that Vyomaśiva often gives of the sūtra's he quotes.

1. **vyavasthāto nānātmānaḥ**. 20(ca).13-14 (11.8).

C *nānā vyavasthātaḥ* 3.2.16. V *sukhaduḥkhajñānaniṣpattyaviśeṣād aikātmye na vyavasthā* 3.2.14. Ś *vyavasthāto nānā* 3.2.20.

V's reading, which combines this sūtra with the one preceding it, is in my opinion almost certainly corrupt. Unfortunately V does not comment on this sūtra save with a laconic *spaṣṭo 'rthaḥ*, but note the words with which the sūtra is introduced: *ākṣepapūrvakam ātmanānātvasamarthanārtham sūtram*, which suggests that V's text was actually closer to that of C. In any case there can be no doubt that V's interpretation of this sūtra is in agreement with that of the other commentators (including Vyomaśiva). The Kir. and NK also quote this sūtra, both reading *nānātmāno vyavasthātaḥ*.[10] Cf. also nr. 40 below.

2. **athāto dharmaṃ vyākhyāsyāmaḥ**. 20(ca).28 (12.2-3).

1.1.1 in all VS commentaries available. Cf. nr. 4.

3. **yato 'bhyudayaniḥśreyasasiddhiḥ sa dharmaḥ**. 20(ca).29 (12.3).

1.1.2 in all VS commentaries available.

4. **yad iha bhāvarūpaṃ tat sarvaṃ mayopasaṃkhyātavyam iti pratijñā muneḥ**. 47.13-14 (21.23).

Not in any available VS commentary. On the strength of this passage and nr. 59 below, Frauwallner suggested (in a paper published posthumously in 1984) that the first sūtra of the VS may originally have read *yad iha bhāvarūpam tat sarvam abhidhāsyāmaḥ*.[11] While *muneḥ* does of course, here as well as elsewhere in the Vy, refer to Kaṇāda, there are a number of reasons why this suggestion should, I think, be viewed with caution. First, as Frauwallner himself has pointed out,[12] Vyomaśiva knew and accepted VS 1.1.1 as it has come down to us (nr. 2 above). Secondly, this 'sūtra' seems only to be quoted

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[9] Of the VS commentaries available only C and Ś cover the complete text. BhV is available almost up to the end of the second *adhyāya*, and V breaks off in the beginning of *adhyāya* 9. S apparently covers *adhyāya*'s 9 and 10, but only *adhyāya* 9 has so far been published. For S's *sūtrapāṭha* in *adhyāya* 10 I have relied on Thakur's report (Thakur 1965, 335), and for the *sūtrapāṭha* of the anonymous Vyākhyā (V) I have used the corrections and numbering given by Nozawa (Nozawa 1974).

[10] Kir. 99.5, NK 86.23.

[11] Frauwallner 1984, 37-38. The same suggestion was already made in Frauwallner 1956, 339 (note 387). Cf. also Halbfass 1970, 138.

[12] Frauwallner 1984, 38, note 11.

by Vyomaśiva and Udayana,[13] and it is possible that Udayana knew it only from the Vy.[14] Frauwallner does not give any reason why this sūtra, which according to him occupied so important a position, should have been removed from the text and not known or not referred to by other writers. Finally, the difference in wording between this passage and nr. 61 is such that I think it unlikely that Vyomaśiva was really quoting a sūtra known and accepted by him.

5. **kriyāvad guṇavat samavāyikāraṇam iti dravyalakṣaṇam.** 110.16 (27.27).

C, BhV 1.1.14. V 1.1.15. Ś (reading *kriyāguṇavat* for *kriyāvad guṇavat*) 1.1.15.

6. **śrotragrāhyo 'rthaḥ śabdaḥ.** 128.7 (37.26).

C *śrotragrahaṇo yo 'rthaḥ sa śabdaḥ* 2.2.24. BhV, V (both as C) 2.2.26. Ś (as C) 2.2.21.

With Vyomaśiva's reading *śrotragrāhyo* cf. the PDhS *śabdo 'mbaraguṇaḥ śrotragrāhyaḥ* ... (Vy[1] 645.10).

7. **tac ca vakṣyāmaḥ pṛthivyādyadhikāre bhūyastvād gandhavattvād ityādisūtraiḥ.** 158.9-10 (48.23).

Refers to a group of sūtra's quoted in extenso below; see nrs. 15, 16, 19, 22 and 26.

8. **śabdakarmabuddhyādīnāṃ viramya vyāpārāsambhavād iti sūtravirodhāt.** 191.21-22 (58.10-11).

Not in any available VS commentary, though 'sūtra' in the Vy seems always to refer to the VS.

9. **rūparasagandhasparśavatī pṛthivī.** 194.25-26 (61.14).

2.1.1 in all available VS commentaries.

10. **saṃkhyāḥ parimāṇāni pṛthaktvaṃ saṃyogavibhāgau paratvāparatve karma ca rūpidravyasamavāyāc cākṣuṣāṇi.** 194.27-28 (61.15-16)

C 4.1.12. V 4.1.10. Ś 4.1.11.

11. **gurutvāt patanam.** 195.9 (62.1).

C *saṃyogābhāve gurutvāt patanam* 5.1.7. V (as C) 5.1.6. Ś (as V) 5.1.7.

12. **sarpirjatumadhūcchiṣṭānām pārthivānām agnisaṃyogād dravatvam adbhiḥ sāmānyam.** 195.11-12 (62.3-4).

[13]Kir. 148.12-14.

[14]Udayana knew and frequently referred to the Vy; see Bhattacharya 1958, 11-13; Varadachari 1963, 170-171.

C (reading *dravatādbhiḥ* for *dravatvam adbhiḥ*) 2.1.6. BhV 2.1.6. V (omitting *pārthivānām*) 2.1.6. Ś (as V) 2.1.6.

BhV's commentary actually supports the reading *tejaḥsaṃyogād* rather than *agnisaṃyogād*.

13. **nodanād ādyam iṣoḥ karma tatkarmakāritāc ca saṃskārāt tathottaram uttaraṃ ca.** 195.14-15 (62.6).

C *nodanād ādyam iṣoḥ karma karmakāritāc ca saṃskārād uttaraṃ tathottaram uttaraṃ ca* 5.1.17. V (as C but reading *tatkarmakāritāc* for *karmakāritāc*) 5.1.15. Ś (as V) 5.1.17.

14. **(a)vibhuni dravye samānendriyagrāhyāṇāṃ viśeṣaguṇānām asambhavād iti vyāhanyeti.** 220.26-27 (63.20-21).

Vy^1 reads *vibhuni*, Vy^2 emends to *avibhuni*, which is required by the sense, and is confirmed by Vyomaśiva's commentary on this sentence.[15] Not in any available VS commentary, though from the way it is introduced and commented on it clear that this passage is intended as a VS quotation.[16]

15. **bhūyastvād gandhavattvāc ca gandhajñāne prakṛtiḥ pṛthivī.** 233.31-234.1 (77.7).

C *bhūyastvād gandhavattvāc ca pṛthivī gandhajñāne* 8.16. V (as C) 8.2.3. Ś *bhūyastvād gandhavattvāc ca pṛthivī gandhajñāne prakṛtiḥ* 8.2.5.

16. **bhūyastvād gandhavattvāc ca gandhajñāne prakṛtiḥ.** 234.13-14 (77.19).

See nr. 15 above. The omisssion of *pṛthivī* is most probably due to a scribal error.

17. **rūparasasparśavatya āpo dravā(ḥ) snigdhāś ca.** 244.3-4 (80.3-4).

Read *dravāḥ* with Vy^2. 2.1.2 in all available VS commentaries; V and Ś omit *ca*.

18. **guṇāś ca guṇāntaram ārabhante.** 245.15 (81.16).

C, BhV and V (all omitting *ārabhante*) 1.1.9. Ś *dravyāṇi dravyāntaram ārabhante guṇāś ca guṇāntaram* 1.1.10.

Ś's *dravyāṇi dravyāntaram ārabhante* is regarded as a separate sūtra, 1.1.8, by all the other commentaries.

[15] *vyāpake hi dravye samānendriyagrāhyāṇāṃ bahūnām api sambhavo dṛṣṭo yathā śabdānām ākāśa iti tannirdeśyāvibhugrahaṇam. tathā avibhuni dravye vibhinnendriyagrāhyāṇāṃ rūparasādīnām asambhavād* (Vy^2 *sambhavād*) *iti samānendriyagrāhyapadam.* Vy^1 220.27-221.2, Vy^2 63.22-24.

[16] The passage is adduced to refute a *pūrvapakṣa*, and is called a sūtra: *abhyupagame vā sūtravyāghātaḥ* Vy1 220.26, Vy^2 63.19). I have not been able to find any places in the Vy where the word sūtra clearly refers to a text other than the VS.

19. **bhūyastvād rasavattvāc codakaṃ rasajñāne prakṛtiḥ.** 246.18 (82.20).

Not in any available VS commentary. Based on the sūtra quoted above as nr. 15 together with the sūtra which immediately follows that one in the VS: *tathāpas tejo vāyuś ca rasarūpasparśajñāneṣu rasarūpasparśaviśeṣāt* 8.17 (C's reading and numbering). Cf. nrs. 22 and 26 below, which, so to speak, complete the set. All of these are referred to as sūtra's by Vyomaśiva, and note also the use of the plural *sūtraiḥ* in nr. 7 above.

20. **tejo rūparasasparśavat.** 255.28-29 (84.10).

2.1.3 in all available VS commentaries.

21. **trapusīsaloharajatasuvarṇānāṃ taijasānāṃ agnisaṃyogād dravatā sampadyate. adbhiḥ sāmānyaṃ yathā bhavatīti sūtreṇa dravatvam uktam.** 256.1-3 (84.13-14).

C 2.1.7. BhV *trapusīsaloharajatasuvarṇādīnāṃ ca dravatvam adbhiḥ sāmānyam* 2.1.7. V *trapusīsaloharajatasuvarṇādīnāṃ ca taijasānāṃ agnisaṃyogād dravatvam adbhiḥ sāmānyam* 2.1.7. Ś *trapusīsaloharajatasuvarṇādīnāṃ agnisaṃyogād dravatvam adbhiḥ sāmānyam* 2.1.7.

The words *sampadyate* and *yathā bhavati* are interpolated explanations by Vyomaśiva; compare nr. 78 below, where this sūtra is again quoted, and the parallel sūtra already quoted (nr. 12 above). This was seen also by Sastri, but in omitting these words completely from his edition and emending *dravatā* to *dravatvam* he seems to go too far.

22. **bhūyastvād rūpavattvāc ca rūpajñāne prakṛtiḥ kāraṇaṃ tejaḥ.** 257.7-8 (85.17).

Not in any available VS commentary; see nr. 9 above. The word *kāraṇam* is a gloss of *prakṛtiḥ* and should not be regarded as part of the sūtra, a fact which is made certain by comparison with the parallel sūtra's (nrs. 15, 16, 19 and 26) and Vyomaśiva's comments thereon, where he consistently uses *kāraṇam* to gloss *prakṛtiḥ*.

23. **vāyuḥ sparśavān.** 270.27 (88.16).

C, BhV, V 2.1.4. Ś *sparśavān vāyuḥ* 2.1.4.

24. **arūpiṣv acākṣuṣatvāt.** 270.29 (88.18).

C 4.1.13. V 4.1.11. Ś *arūpiṣv acākṣuṣāṇi* 4.1.12.

25. **vāyusaṃyogāt tṛṇe karma.** 271.2 (88.23).

C *tṛṇakarma vāyusaṃyogāt* 5.1.14. V and Ś *tṛṇe karma vāyusaṃyogāt* 5.1.14.

26. **bhūyastvāt sparśavattvāc ca sparśajñāne prakṛtir vāyuḥ.** 272.6 (90.4).

Not in any available VS commentary; see nr. 9 above.

27. **mahattvād anekadravyavattvād rūpaviśeṣāc ca dravyaṃ pratyakṣam iti sūtravirodhaḥ.** 272.21-22 (90.19).

C *mahaty anekadravyavattvād rūpāc copalabdhiḥ* 4.1.6. V (as C) 4.1.5. Ś (as C) 4.1.6.

28. **vibhavān mahān ākāśas tathā cātmā tadabhāvād aṇu manaḥ.** 330.17-18 (118.15-16).

C reads as three sūtra's, with the divisions after *ākāśas* and *cātmā* 7.1.28-30. V and Ś read as two sūtra's, dividing after *cātmā*; V 7.1.24-25, Ś 7.1.22-23. See also nr. 43 below.

29. **saṃyogād vibhāgāc chabdāc ca śabdaniṣpattiḥ.** 330.29 (118.15-16).

C (reading *śabdaniṣpatteḥ*?) 2.2.36. BhV 2.2.36. V 2.2.30. Ś (adding *ca* after *vibhāgāc*) 2.2.31.

30. **samavāyinaḥ śvaityāc chvaityabuddheḥ śvete buddhis tat kāryakāraṇabhūte kāryakāraṇasvabhāve iti.** 348.20-21 (126.21).

C (reading *te* for *tat*) 8.9. V (as C but adding *ca* before *śvete*) 8.1.8. Ś (as V but adding *ete* after *te*) 8.1.9.
Considering nr. 51 below, which gives this sūtra in exactly the reading found in C, we should probably emend *tat*, which in any case gives a less satisfactory sense, to *te*.

31. **tathā kāraṇe kāla iti vacanāt paramamahat parimāṇam iti. yugapadādipratyayānāṃ kāraṇe kālākhyeti sūtraṃ darśayati.** 350.20-22 (129.4-5).

C *kāraṇena kālaḥ* 7.1.32 (=C 5.2.28). V (as C) 7.1.27. Ś *kāraṇe kālaḥ* 7.1.25. *kāraṇe kāla iti vacanāt paramamahat parimāṇam* is a PDhS *pratīka*. Vyomaśiva seems to consider *yugapadādipratyayānām* part of the sūtra, repeating it in his brief commentary; cf. also nr. 33 below. Note also the NK's comment on the same PDhS passage: *kāraṇe kāla iti vacanāt paramamahat parimāṇam ity anena kāraṇe kālākhyeti sūtraṃ lakṣayati. yugapadādipratyayānāṃ kāraṇe kālākhyā kālasañjñeti sūtrārthaḥ*.[17] Ś's commentary actually also clearly supports the reading *kāraṇe kālākhyā*[18]

[17] NK 65.23-25.

[18] Ś's ... *kāla iti samākhyā* ... (309.2) glosses *kālākhyā* and at 309.10 the word is quoted in its complete form.

32. **tathā kāraṇaparatvādivacanāt saṃyoga iti kāraṇaparatvāt kāraṇāparatvāc ca kārye paratvāparatve iti sūtraṃ darśayati.** 350.25-27 (129.9-10).

C (omitting *kārye paratvāparatve*) 7.2.26. V, Ś (both as C) 7.2.22.

One must probably emend *kāraṇaparatvādivacanāt* to *kāraṇaparatvād iti vacanāt* (a PDhS *pratīka*). The words *kārye paratvāparatve* may well have been added by Vyomaśiva to render the sūtra more intelligible; in the VS commentaries *param aparam (ca)* is understood to be carried over from the preceding sūtra.

33. **pūrvāparādipratyayānāṃ kāraṇe digākhyeti vākyena paramamahattvam.** 358.27-28 (132.10-11).

This should undoubtably not be considered a VS quotation (note that Vyoma-śiva calls it a *vākya* rather than sūtra), but is a useful confirmation of Vyomaśiva's reading of the sūtra quoted above (nr. 31) on which it is modelled.

34. **kāraṇaparatvāt kāraṇāparatvāc ca paratvāparatve.** 358.30-31 (132.12-13).

See nr. 32 above.

35. **prāṇāpānanimeṣonmeṣajīvanamanogatīndriyāntaravikārāḥ sukhaduḥkhecchādveṣaprayatnāś cātmaliṅgāni.** 403.1-2 (147.18-19).

C (reading *sukhaduḥkhe icchādveṣau prayatnaś cety ātmaliṅgāni*) 3.2.4. V (reading *parātmani liṅgam* for *sukhaduḥkhecchādveṣaprayatnāś cātmaliṅgāni*) 3.2.4. Ś (reading *cātmano liṅgāni*) 3.2.4.

Note that the reading of V as edited and reproduced above is almost certainly wrong. It is impossible to reconstruct V's reading from the commentary, but it was probably close to the reading preserved in the Vy.[19]

36. **pravṛttinivṛttyoḥ pratyagātmani dṛṣṭatvāt paratrānumānam.** 404.8 (152.19-20).

C *pravṛttinivṛttī ca pratyagātmani dṛṣṭe paratra liṅgam* 3.1.14. V (as C) 3.1.21. Ś (as C) 3.1.19.

37. **tathā dharmādharmāv ātmāntaraguṇānām akāraṇa(tva)vacanād ity ātmaguṇānām ātmāntaraguṇeṣv akāraṇatvād iti sūtraṃ darśayati.** 408.3-4 (152.19-20).

C, V *ātmaguṇeṣv ātmāntaraguṇānām akāraṇatvāt* 6.1.7. Ś *ātmāntaraguṇānām ātmāntare 'kāraṇatvāt* 6.1.5.

One should probably read *akāraṇatvavacanāt* with Vy^2, since *dharmādharmāv ātmāntaraguṇānām akāraṇatvavacanāt* is a PDhS *pratīka*.

[19] 'The sūtrapāṭha of V. is still under necessity of inspection.' (Nozawa 1974, 473). For Nozawa's remarks on this sūtra see page 472 of the same article.

38. **ātmāntaraguṇānām ātmāntaraguṇeṣv akāraṇatvāt.** 408.6-7 (152.22).
See nr. 37 above.

39. **saṃskāra(ḥ) smṛtyutpattāv iti smṛtir vāsanākhyād iti sūtraṃ darśayati.** 408.16 (153.5).

Read *saṃskāraḥ smṛtyutpattāv* (a PDhS *pratīka*) with Vy². This sūtra is not found in the available VS commentaries, but compare the sūtra *ātmamanasoḥ saṃyogaviśeṣāt saṃskārāc ca smṛtiḥ* (C 9.22, S 9.15, Ś 9.2.9).

40. **tatra vyavasthāvacanāt saṃkhyeti sukhaduḥkhādivyavasthāto nānātmāna iti sūtraṃ darśayati.** 408.28-30 (153.16-17).

vyavasthāvacanāt saṃkhyā is another PDhS *pratīka*. See nr. 1 above; *sukhaduḥkhādi°* is not intended as part of the sūtra but is an explanatory addition by Vyomaśiva. Vy² emends to *sukhaduḥkhavyavasthāto*, for reasons which are unclear to me.

41. **tathā cātmavacanāt paramamahat parimāṇam iti vibhavān mahān ākāśas tathā cātmeti sūtraṃ darśayati.** 410.27-28 (155.13-14).

See nr. 28 above. One should perhaps again read with Vy² *tathā cātmeti vacanāt paramamahat parimāṇam* (a PDhS *pratīka*).

42. **prayatnajñānāyaugapadyavacanāt pratiśarīram ekatvaṃ siddham iti prayatnāyaugapadyāj jñānāyaugapadyavacanāc ca pratiśarīram ekaṃ mana iti sūtraṃ darśayati.** 425.24-26 (158.11-13).

C, V *prayatnāyaugapadyāj jñānāyaugapadyāc caikaṃ manaḥ* 3.2.3. Ś (as C and V but omitting *manaḥ*) 3.2.3.

prayatnajñānāyaugapadyavacanāt pratiśarīram ekatvaṃ siddham is another PDhS *pratīka*. We may assume that Vy's reading *jñānāyaugapadyavacanāc* is a scribal error caused by the preceding *prayatnajñānāyaugapadyavacanāt*. Cf. also nr. 52 below.

43. **tathā tadabhāvavacanād aṇuparimāṇam iti vibhavān mahān ākāśas tathā cātmā tadabhāvād aṇu mana iti sūtre darśayati.** 426.25-26 (159.8-9).

See nr. 28 above. Note the dual form *sūtre*, proving that Vyomaśiva read this as two sūtra's, not three. *tathā tadabhāvavacanād aṇuparimāṇam* is a PDhS *pratīka*.

44. **tathāpasarpaṇopasarpaṇavacanāt saṃyogavibhāgāv ity apasarpaṇam (upasarpaṇam) aśitapītasaṃyogāḥ kāryāntarasaṃyogāś cety adṛṣṭakāritānīti sūtraṃ darśayati.** 427.3-5 (159.16-18).

C (reading *tāpitasaṃyogaḥ*) 5.2.19. V, Ś 5.2.17.

Vy[1] omits *upasarpaṇam*, but it must be supplied on the strength of Vyomaśiva's comments on this sūtra.[20] *apasarpaṇopasarpaṇavacanāt saṃyogavibhāgau* is a PDhS *pratīka*.

45. **anekadravyeṇa (dravyeṇa) samavāyāt svagataviśeṣāc ca rūpaṃ pratyakṣam. etena rasādiṣu jñānaṃ vyākhyātam.** 441.20-21 (15.20-21).

C *anekadravyeṇa dravyeṇa samavāyād rūpaviśeṣāc copalabdhiḥ* 4.1.9, *etena rasagandhasparśeṣu jñānaṃ vyākhyātam* 4.1.10. V omits the first of these two and reads the second as C, 4.1.8. Ś ***anekadravyasamavāyāt rūpaviśeṣāc ca rūpopalabdhiḥ*** 4.1.8, ***etena rasagandhasparśeṣu jñānaṃ vyākhyātam*** 4.1.9.

Vy[1] puts *dravyeṇa* in parentheses, as above; Vy[2] omits. Presumably it is an editorial suggestion. With the Vy's *svagataviśeṣāt* cf. the PDhS: *rūpa-rasagandhasparśeṣv anekadravyasamavāyāt* svagataviśeṣāt *svāśrayasannikarṣān niyatendriyanimittam utpadyate* (Vy[1] 553.5-7).

46. **mahattvād anekadravyavattvād rūpaviśeṣāc ca dravya(ṃ) pratyakṣam. tatsamavāyāc ca guṇādayo 'pi pratyakṣā ity upalabdhau rūpaviśeṣasya kāraṇatvam uktam.** 442.6-8 (16.13-16).

Vy1 reads *dravyapratyakṣam*. Vy[2] emends to *dravyaṃ pratyakṣam*. For the first part of this passage see nr. 27 above. The latter part has no equivalent in any of the available VS commentaries and is perhaps not intended as a sūtra quotation.

47. **tathā ca sūtrakāreṇāpy uktaṃ rūpādiṣu spārśanaṃ jñānam iti kasmān na bhavatīti tadabhāvāt sparśatvasāmānyasyābhāvāt, yatraiva sparśatvasāmānyaṃ tatraiva spārśanaṃ jñānam iti.** 444.20-22 (19.4-7).

Vy[1] reads *sparśanam* (at the first occurance of the word in this passage). Vy[2] emends to *spārśanam*. No equivalent for this can be found in the available VS commentaries, though it is here clearly attributed to Kaṇāda. I am not sure which words should be regarded as Vyomaśiva's commentary and which as a quotation; it is possible that only *tadabhāvāt* was meant as a VS quotation.

48. **tathā ca sūtraṃ rūparasagandhasparśā dravyānityatvād anityā ity āśrayavināśena vināśo 'bhihitaḥ.** 449.20-22 (19.4-7).

C *pṛthivyāṃ rūparasagandhasparśā dravyānityatvād anityāḥ* 7.1.4. V *pṛthivyāṃ rūparasagandhasparśā anityā eva* 7.1.(1+3). Ś ***pṛthivyādirūparasagandhasparśā dravyānityatvād anityāś ca*** 7.1.2.

V's reading and numbering is given above as suggested by Nozawa.[21] The word *eva* should however in my opinion probably not be regarded as part of the

[20] *apasarpaṇaṃ tu mṛtaśarīrād vibhāgārthaṃ karma. pratyagreṇa śarīreṇa saṃyogārthaṃ copasarpaṇam iti.* Vy[1] 427.5-6, Vy[2] vol. 1 159.18-19.

[21] Nozawa 1974, 472.

sūtra.

49. **kāryadravye 'gnisaṃyogāc ca. etena nityeṣv anityatvaṃ vyākhyātam ity agnisaṃyogasya nityeṣv eva rūpādinivartakatvam uktam.** 449.14-16 (24.21-23). C *agnisaṃyogāc ca* 7.1.5, *etena nityeṣv anityatvam uktam* 7.1.7. V *agnisaṃyogāc ca* 7.1. 1+4), *etena nityeṣv apy anityatvam uktam* 7.1.2. Ś omits the first of these two and reads the second as *etena nityeṣu nityatvam uktam* 7.1.3.

50. **atha dravyāṇi dravyāntaram ārabhante, saṃyogānāṃ dravyam iti sūtravyāghātaḥ.** 451.10-11 (26.25-26).

C 1.1.8, 1.1.25. BhV 1.1.8 1.1.26. V 1.1.8, 1.1.27. Ś *dravyāṇi dravyāntaram ārabhante guṇāś ca guṇāntaram* 1.1.10, 1.1.27.

51. **tathā cāha sūtrakāraḥ samavāyinaḥ śvaityāc chvaityabuddheḥ śvete buddhis te kāryakāraṇabhūte.** 469.5-6 (47.1-2).

This is a PDhS *pratīka*, with the exception of the word *ca*. See nr. 30 above.

52. **jñānāyaugapadyavacanena prayatnāyaugapadyāc ca pratiśarīram ekaṃ manaḥ.** 471.1-2 (49.21-22).

See nr. 42 above. *jñānāyaugapadyavacanena* is a PDhS *pratīka*. The word *jñānāyaugapadyāt* has presumably been omitted due to a scribal error.

53. **kāraṇabahutvāt kāraṇamahattvāt pracayaviśeṣāc ca mahat.** 474.26-27 (53.6-7).

C 7.1.16. V 7.1.17. Ś *kāraṇabahutvāc ca* 7.1.9.

54. **guṇakarmasu guṇakarmābhāvād guṇakarmāpekṣaṃ na vidyate.** 483.27-28 (63.24-25).

C 8.8. V 8.1.7. Ś 8.1.8.

55. **yathā ca vyākhyātam etat tathā bhavati nānyatheti. kuto jñānam iti cet sāpekṣebhyo nirapekṣebhyaś ceti vacanāt.** 486.18-20 (64.23-25).

C, S *tathā bhavatīti sāpekṣebhyo 'napekṣebhyaś ca* 10.7. Ś omits this sūtra.

This is a comment on the PDhS passage *tathā bhavatīti sāpekṣebhyo nirapekṣebhyaś ceti vacanāt* (Vy[1] 484.1-2). It is noteworthy that Vyomaśiva apparently does not regard the words *tathā bhavatīti* as part of the sūtra. The possibility should perhaps be considered that these words were added to the sūtra in C and S on the strength of this very PDhS passage. If so, this would perhaps also call the reading of the two sūtra's preceding this one in C and S into question. It should be noted that Ś, though admittedly the least authoritative VS commentary, omits sūtra's 10.5-7 of C and S.

56. samyuktasamavāyād agner vaiśeṣikam. 486.30 (65.9).

C, S 10.18. Ś 10.2.7.

This is a PDhS *pratīka*.

57. guṇāś ca guṇāntaram. 489.31 (69.6).

See nr. 18 above.

58. nityaṃ pārimāṇḍalyam. 492.22 (72.24-25).

C *nityaṃ parimaṇḍalam* 7.1.26. V (as C) 7.1.22. Ś (as C) 7.1.20.

This is a PDhS *pratīka*, but it is noteworthy that the other commentators of the PDhS read *parimaṇḍalam*.[22]

59. pratijñātaṃ ca maharṣiṇā yad bhāvarūpaṃ tat sarvam abhidhāsyāmīti. 492.24-25 (73.1-2).

See nr. 4 above.

60. nityaṃ pārimāṇḍalyam. 493.2 (73.8).

Vy[1] reads *pārimaṇḍalyam*, Vy[2] emends to *pārimāṇḍalyam*. See nr. 58 above

61. ekadikkābhyām ekakālābhyāṃ sannikṛṣṭaviprakṛṣṭābhyāṃ param aparaṃ ca. 517.11-12 (96.22).

C *ekadikkālābhyāṃ sannikṛṣṭaviprakṛṣṭābhyāṃ param aparam* 7.2.25. V (omitting *ekakālābhyām*) 7.2.21. Ś 7.2.21.

62. tathā hi param aparaṃ ceti buddhyapekṣam ity apekṣāśabdaś cātra kāraṇe varttata iti. 517.17-18 (96.27-97.2).

Not in any available VS commentary. Sastri suggests that this is a VS quotation, but it does not seem necessary to assume this from the context.

63. kāraṇaparatvāt kāraṇāparatvāc ca paratvāparatve. 517.18-19 (97.2).

See nr. 32 above.

64. sāmānyapratyakṣād viśeṣāpratyakṣād viśeṣasmṛteś ca saṃśayaḥ. 535.13-14 (117.26-118.1).

C, BhV 2.2.19. V, Ś 2.2.17.

65. mahattvād anekadravyavattvād rūpaviśeṣāc ca dravyaṃ pratyakṣam. 557.21-22 (151.14-15).

[22] NK 141.1 (with a variant reading *pārimāṇḍalyam*), Kir. 148.8 (with a variant *pārimāṇḍalyam*).

See nr. 27 above.

66. **atah sattāyām guṇatve ca sarvendriyajñānam iti.** 559.6-7 (143.15). C *etena guṇatve bhāve ca sarvendriyajñānam vyākhyātam* 4.1.14. V (as C but reading *sarvendriyam jñānam*) 4.1.12. Ś (as V) 4.1.12.

67. **aprasiddho 'napadeśo 'san sandigdhaś ca.** 569.24-25 (154.21).
C *aprasiddho 'napadeśaḥ* 3.1.10. *asan sandigdhaś cānapadeśaḥ* 3.1.11. V (as C's 3.1.10) 3.1.18. *asan sandigdhaś ca* 3.1.19. Ś *aprasiddho 'napadeśo 'san sandigdhaś cānapadeśaḥ* 3.1.15.

68. **asyedaṃ kāryaṃ kāraṇaṃ saṃyogi samavāyi virodhi ceti laiṅgikam.** 572.5-6 (157.18-19).
C (reading *sambandhi ekārthasamavāyi* for *saṃyogi samavāyi*) 9.18. S *asyedaṃ kāryaṃ kāraṇaṃ saṃyogi virodhi samavāyy ekārthasamavāyi ceti laiṅgikam* 9.14. Ś (as S but omitting *ekārthasamavāyi*) 9.2.1.

69. **tadvacanād āmnāyasya vedarāśeḥ prāmāṇyam.** 581.2 (168.2-3).
C *tadvacanād āmnāyaprāmaṇyam* 1.1.3 and, adding *iti*, 10.21. BhV (as C) 1.1.3. V 1.1.3. S 10.21. Ś 1.1.3 and, adding *iti*, 10.2.9.

70. **liṅgāc cānityaḥ.** 581.14 (168.5).
C, BhV 2.2.37. V 2.2.31. Ś (adding *śabdaḥ*) 2.2.32.
This is a PDhS *pratīka*, as are the following three items.

71. **buddhipūrvā vākyakṛtir vākyaracanā vede.** 581.18 (168.8-9).
C 6.1.1. V (reading *vedaḥ* for *vede*) 6.1.1. Ś 6.1.1.

72. **buddhipūrvo dadātiḥ.**
C, V 6.1.4. Ś 6.1.3.

73. **yathā kriyāvattvād guṇavattvāc ceti.** 603.21 (193.26-194.1).
C, BhV, Ś 2.1.12. V omits this sūtra.

74. **dṛṣṭaṃ ca dṛṣṭavat.** 609.2-3 (199.1).
C 2.2.21. BhV (omitting 'ca') 2.2.21. Ś 2.2.18. V omits this sūtra.

75. **yathādṛṣṭam ayathādṛṣṭam ubhayadṛṣṭatvāt saṃśaya ity asādhāraṇasya ca saṃśayahetutvam uktam.** 609.5-6 (199.4-5).
C *dṛṣṭaṃ yathādṛṣṭam ayathādṛṣṭam ubhayathā dṛṣṭatvāt* 2.2.22. BhV *yathādṛṣṭam ayathādṛṣṭam* 2.2.23, *ubhayathā dṛṣṭatvāc ca* 2.2.24. V (as BhV 2.2.23) 2.2.19, (as BhV 2.2.24) 2.2.20. Ś *yathādṛṣṭam ayathādṛṣṭatvāc ca* 2.2.19. No

equivalent in Ś for the second part of this quotation.

76. **tadabhāvād aṇu manaḥ.** 609.21 (199.19).
See nr. 28 above.

77. **ayam aprasiddho 'napadeśaḥ.** 610.16 (201.1).
See nr. 66 above. This is a PDhS *pratīka*.

78. **sarpirjatumadhūcchiṣṭānāṃ pārthivānām agnisaṃyogād dravatvam adbhiḥ sāmānyam.** 632.8-9 (224.11).
See nr. 12 above.

79. **trapusīsaloharajatasuvarṇānāṃ taijasānām agnisaṃyogād dravatvam adbhiḥ sāmānyam.** 632.9-10 (224.12).
See nr. 21 above.

80. **saṃyogād vibhāgāc chabdāc ca śabdaniṣpattiḥ.** 650.5-6 (242.1-2).
See nr. 29 above.

81. **ihedam iti yataḥ kāryakāraṇayoḥ sa samavāyaḥ.** 698.11-12 (289.17).
C (reading *iheti* for *ihedam iti*) 7.2.29. V, Ś 7.2.26.

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Abbreviations

AKBhS	Yaśomitra's subcommentary *Sphuṭārtha* on Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*.
BhV	Bhaṭṭa Vādīndra's commentary on the VS (extended version).
C	Candrānanda's commentary on the VS.
DNC	Mallavādisūri's *Dvādaśāranayacakram*.
DPŚ	Candramatiś *Daśapadārthaśāstra*.
HBṬ	Bhaṭṭa Arcaṭa's commentary *Hetubinduṭīkā* on Dharmakīrti's *Hetubindu*.
JIBSt	Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies (*Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū*).
JOI	Journal of the Oriental Institute, M.S. University of Baroda.
Kir	Udayana's commentary *Kiraṇāvalī* on the PDhS.
NBh	Pakṣilasvāmin's *Nyāyabhāṣya* on the NS.
NK	Śrīdhara's commentary *Nyāyakandalī* on the PDhS.
NM	Jayanta Bhaṭṭa's *Nyāyamañjarī*.
NS	*Nyāyasūtra*.
NV	Uddyotakara's subcommentary *Nyāyavārtika* on the NBh.
NVTṬ	Vācaspati Miśra's subcommentary *Nyāyavārtikatātparyaṭīkā* on the NBh and NV.
PDhS	Praśastapāda's *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha*.

Ś	Śaṅkara Miśra's commentary *Upaskāra* on the VS.
S	Anonymous commentary on the VS, written at the Sena court.
TBhP	Cinnaṃbhaṭṭa's commentary *Tarkabhāṣāprakāśikā* on Keśava Miśra's *Tarkabhāṣā*.
TJ	Bhavya's autocommentary *Tarkajvālā* on his *Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā*.
TSP	Kamalaśīla's commentary *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā* on Śāntarakṣita's *Tattvasaṃgraha*.
TUS	Jayarāśi's *Tattvopaplavasiṃha*.
V	Commentary *Vyākhyā* on the VS; abridged version of BhV.
VIJ	Vishveshvaranand Indological Journal.
Vip	Śāntarakṣita's commentary *Vipañcitārthā* on Dharmakīrti's *Vādanyāyaprakaraṇa*.
VS	*Vaiśeṣikasūtra*.
Vy	Vyomaśiva's commentary *Vyomavatī* on the PDhS.
WZKS(O)	Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- (und Ost-) Asiens.
YD	Anonymous commentary *Yuktidīpikā* on the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*.
YS	*Yogasūtra*.

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TUS Section on *pratyakṣa* edited in Franco 1987.

TJ References are to the Peking edition of the Tibetan canon [vol. 96], no. 5255. The chapter on Vaiśeṣika covers fol. Dza 272b–282b.

TBhP Tarka-bhāṣā of Keśava Miśra with the commentary Tarkabhāṣāprakāśikā of Cinnambhaṭṭa. Ed. Devadatta Ramkrishna Bhandarkar and Pandit Kedarnath, Sāhityabhūṣaṇa. Poona 1937. Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series LXXXIV.

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NVTṬ For editions used see under NV[1,2].

NS For editions used see under NV[1,2].

PDhS For editions used see under Kir, NK and Vy[1,2].

BhV Bhaṭṭavādīndraracita-vaiśeṣikavārtika-kṛṣṇabhūpālaracita-trisūtrīprakāśajñātakarttṛkavṛttibhir vilasitam maharṣikaṇāda-praṇītam Vaiśeṣika-darśanam. Ed. Anantalal Thakur. Darbhanga 1985. Mahārājādhirāja-kāmeśvarasiṃhagranthamālā puṣpam 21. [Also contains an unrevised reprint of Thakur's edition of V, and S (on *adhyāya* 9 only).]

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Dutch Summary

Deze scriptie heeft als onderwerp een realistische school van Indische filosofie: de Vaiśeṣika. Doel van de scriptie was de theorieën over de waarnemingsleer zoals die gekend en gereconstrueerd kunnen worden uit de vroegste overgeleverde geschriften van deze school te onderzoeken.

Het eerste hoofdstuk bevat voornamelijk inleidende materie, waaronder een kort overzicht van enige belangrijke presupposities en begrippen van de Vaiśeṣika die regelmatig in de rest van de scriptie zullen voorkomen. Tevens worden beknopt de voornaamste problemen geschetst die de studie van de vroege Vaiśeṣika bemoeilijken en wordt een kort overzicht gegeven van een aantal recente publicaties op dit gebied.

Hoofdstuk twee bestaat hoofdzakelijk uit een vertaling van de belangrijkste delen van de *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* (VS; ca. eerste eeuw voor–eerste eeuw na Chr.) die betrekking hebben op de waarnemingsleer. De sūtras zijn vertaald samen met—en overeenkomstig de interpretaties van—het oudst bestaande kommentaar, n.l. dat van Candrānanda (voor A.D. 1000).

In hoofdstuk drie wordt nader ingegaan op zowel de—niet onaanzienlijke—textuele problemen, als de interpretatie van de sūtras vertaald in hoofdstuk twee. Naast het genoemde kommentaar van Candrānanda wordt vooral gebruik gemaakt van de kommentaren op de VS van Bhaṭṭa Vādīndra (ca. A.D. 1200) en Śaṅkara Miśra (15e eeuw). Verder zijn er zo veel mogelijk testimonia voor de tekst van de sūtras verzameld uit andere filosofische werken. Deze blijken vaak ook belangrijk voor de juiste interpretatie van de sūtras.

Op grond van verschillende filologische en historische argumenten wordt gekonkludeerd dat naar alle waarschijnlijkheid VS 4.1.6–14 (met de mogelijke uitzondering van 4.1.7) de oudste systematische behandeling van de waarneming bevat. VS 3.1.13 is ook mogelijk zeer oud, en was waarschijnlijk bedoeld als definitie van de waarneming (hoewel ook andere duidingen van deze sūtra niet uitgesloten zijn). Boek 8 van de VS bevat waarschijnlijk jonger tekstmateriaal. De hypothese wordt opgesteld dat dit boek uit twee aanvankelijk onafhankelijke gedeelten bestond, waarvan het ene later in het andere werd gevoegd, waardoor de oorspronkelijke gedachtengang enigszins onduidelijk werd. De tussengeschoven passage is mogelijk de jongste van de behandelde delen van de VS en toont een verder ontwikkeld stadium waarin meer aandacht wordt geschonken aan 'psychologische' elementen van de waarneming.

In hoofdstuk vier wordt de tekst van het hoofdstuk over de waarneming in Praśastapāda's *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* (6e eeuw) gepresenteerd samen met een geannoteerde vertaling. Praśastapāda blijkt deels vrij dicht bij de leer van de sūtras te blijven, maar deels ook een aantal nieuwe gedachten te introduceren. Zo maakt hij, duidelijker dan de sūtras, onderscheid tussen propositionele en niet-propositionele fasen van de waarneming. Ook introduceert hij—waarschijnlijk onder invloed van de Nyāya—de zogenamde *pramāṇa* terminologie, al lijkt

deze nog slechts moeizaam te integreren met de rest van zijn waarnemingsleer.